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Abstract 
The aim of this thesis is to defend fictionalism as a response to the mathematical 
placement problem. As we will see, against the backdrop of philosophical 
naturalism, it is difficult to see how to fit mathematical objects into our best total 
scientific theory. On the other hand, the indispensability argument seems to suggest 
that science itself mandates ontological commitment to mathematical entities. My 
goal is to undermine the indispensability argument by presenting an account of 
applied mathematics as a kind of revolutionary prop-oriented make-believe, the 
content of which is given by a mapping account of mathematical applications. 
This kind of fictionalism faces a number of challenges from various quarters. To 
begin with, we will have to face the challenge of a different kind of indispensability 
argument, one that draws ontological conclusions from the role of mathematical 
objects in scientific explanations. We will then examine one recent theory of 
mathematical scientific representation, and discover that the resulting position is 
Platonistic. At this point we will introduce our fictionalist account, and see that it 
defuses the Platonist consequences of mathematical representation.  
The closing chapters of the thesis then take a metaphilosophical turn. The legitmacy 
of a fictionalist response to the mathematical placement problem is open to challenge 
from a metaphilosophical perspective in two different ways: on the one hand, some 
modern pragmatists have argued that this kind of metaphysics relies on questionable 
assumptions about how langauge works. On the other, some modern philosophers 
have developed forms of metaontological anti-realism that they believe undermine 
the legitimacy of philosophical work in metaphysics. In the final two chapters I 
defend the fictionalist account developed here against these sceptical claims.  
I conclude that the fictionalist account of applied mathematics offered here is our 
best hope for coping with the mathematical placement problem.     
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Introduction 
The aim of this thesis is to defend fictionalism as a response to the mathematical 
placement problem. A placement problem arises when we have committed ourselves 
to a synoptic philosophical project (such as naturalism) that places restrictions on the 
kinds of things we can admit into our ontology (Price, 2011, pp.184-189). We are 
then faced with a number of discourses (for instance, modal, mathematical, moral) 
for which it is difficult to find a home under this new, austere regime (Price, 2011, 
p.187). That is, it is difficult to find a place for the kinds of things apparently spoken 
of in these discourses, given our picture of human beings as thoroughly natural 
creatures, knowers and speakers embedded in the natural world.  
The main line of argument in this thesis takes place against a broadly Quinean 
backdrop, in which naturalism is assumed, and in which ontological commitment is 
determined by establishing what objects there must be in order to account for the 
success of our best scientific theories (Quine, 1980). That is, we are assuming that 
our best scientific theories are our most reliable guide to what the world is like and 
what kinds of things it contains. Further, it is my belief that Quine is correct to see 
philosophy as essentially continuous with the natural sciences, and that the 
philosopher’s job is to determine what precisely our best scientific theories are 
telling us about the world, by establishing what must be true, and what kinds of 
things must exist, in order to make those theories successful (Quine, 1980, pp.45-46).  
As we will see, against this Quinean backdrop the mathematical placement problem 
becomes especially stark. On the one hand, we have a picture of human beings as 
thoroughly natural beings that makes the development of a satisfying epistemology 
for mathematics extremely challenging. On the other, we are faced with an argument, 
the indispensability argument, that seems to establish mathematical Platonism on the 
basis of scientific practice itself. This makes the challenge to the naturalist to find a 
place for mathematical discourse in our total picture of the world especially pressing.    
Huw Price (Price, 2011, pp.6-8) sees a number of possible responses to this kind of 
situation. As he sees it, we can reduce the terms of the suspect discourse to the terms 
of a discourse more acceptable to our naturalistic scruples (reducing the terms of folk 
psychology to those of a mature science of the brain, for instance). We can eliminate 
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the suspect discourse all together – this strategy can be carried out in one of three 
ways: we might recommend replacing the naturalistically suspect discourse with 
some new, scientific way of speaking (for instance, replacing mental terms with the 
terms of a mature science of the brain); we might adopt some kind of fictionalist 
response; or else we might drop the discourse all together, agreeing that, after all, we 
were not talking about anything (perhaps this is what we did with witch discourse). 
Or finally, we might adopt non-cognitivism, that is, we might claim that the purpose 
of the discourse was not to make truth-apt statements about the world, and so the 
claims of this discourse should not be seen as conflicting with the claims of best 
science (which does try to make truth-apt claims about the world). Price himself goes 
on to defend a fourth approach, a global non-cognitivism tied to linguistic functional 
pluralism, that has the advantage of dissolving all the placement problems (Price, 
2011).  
As Price sees it, then, fictionalism is related to eliminativism (Price, 2011, p.7). That 
is, the fictionalist about some discourse agrees with the eliminativists that the 
relevant region of discourse is representational (it has the usual semantics of fact 
stating portions of our language), and that it is false. But the fictionalist parts 
company with the other eliminativists at this point, by denying that we need to 
abandon or replace the questionable discourse. Instead, we can keep the suspect 
discourse on the books, by recognising that the sentences of a discourse need not be 
true to be ‘good’. Obviously, the fictionalist will need to tell us what is ‘good’ about 
the relevant sentences, but so long as she can substantiate the claim that they play a 
vital role in our cognitive or practical lives, then we have reason not to abandon the 
relevant region of discourse.  
The Platonist, of course, faces a particular challenge from the placement problem, for 
she holds that mathematical entities exist, and that further, these mathematical 
entities are abstract objects. But at first blush it is difficult to see how to fit our 
knowledge and talk of abstracta into our picture of ourselves as natural creatures in a 
natural world. For instance, Hartry Field (Field, 1989, 25-30) has challenged the 
mathematical Platonist to say how it is that we arrive at our knowledge of 
mathematical objects, given that they are abstract objects, outside of spacetime, and 
causally isolated from us. Given that our best scientific theories locate human beings 
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within the spacetime world, with only evolved cognitive abilities appropriate to that 
environment, it is difficult to see what kind of epistemological account the Platonist 
can offer that will show how mathematicians are able to acquire reliably true beliefs 
about the abstract mathematical realm. This seems to place a particular pressure on 
the naturalist Platonist, who is willing to follow scientific theory as her guide to what 
the world is like, but also wishes to find a space for abstract objects in her ontology. 
(It is important to note that this challenge does not depend on any particular 
epistemological theory. For instance, the claim is not that knowledge is causal, and 
that therefore we cannot have knowledge of causally isolated abstracta (Benacerraf, 
1983b). Nor, it seems to me, does Field’s challenge depend upon a reliabilist 
epistemology, despite being framed in terms of reliably true belief. Instead, the 
challenge to the Platonist is to give a naturalistically satisfying account of how 
mathematicians are able to arrive at reliably true beliefs about mathematical objects, 
on the plausible assumption that failure to do even this much will vitiate any attempt 
to provide a plausible Platonist epistemology).     
I suggest that, in the light of Field’s challenge, the best bet for the Platonist is to 
establish her Platonism on the foundation of the indispensability argument. By doing 
so, she is able to respond to the epistemological and semantic worries for Platonism 
(the main source of placement difficulties) by insisting that we come to know about 
abstracta in much the same way that we come to know about theoretical objects, that 
is, via their role in our best scientific theories. Of course, this tells us very little about 
how the connection to either abstract objects or theoretical ones is established, but it 
makes it look more likely that worries like those giving rise to naturalist placement 
problems are based on an a priori commitment to semantic and epistemological 
theories that may also struggle with the entities of mature science.  
Insisting on the indispensability argument also puts pressure on the fictionalist. After 
all, the fictionalist differs from the other eliminativists by insisting that false 
discourses, like mathematics, play an indispensable role in our cognitive and 
practical lives, even though they are false. But the indispensability argument suggests 
that, instead, we should conclude that these discourses are not false, they are true 
(confirmed in just the way in which all the other posits of our scientific discourse are 
confirmed: by playing an indispensable role in best scientific theory). 
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In the first main chapter, I will review some of the responses to this kind of 
indispensability argument, showing how concerns over some of its central 
assumptions (especially confirmational holism) create space for the fictionalist to 
deny that we should believe in the posits of a theory (and the truth of its sentences) 
just because they appear in our best confirmed scientific theories. I will then consider 
attempts to press the indispensability argument that do not depend on the assumption 
of confirmational holism. In particular, we will consider the explanatory 
indispensability argument. This is the claim that because mathematical entities 
appear in our best explanations of scientific facts, we should conclude that they exist 
(Baker, 2005; Baker and Colyvan, 2011). I will argue that attempts to substantiate 
mathematical truth or mathematical existence on the basis of the putative existence 
of mathematical explanations of physical facts must fail, because the facts to be 
explained were not and could not be identified independently of mathematical 
theory. I suggest that we should recognise a general constraint on theories of 
explanation, to the effect that explanations do not license ontological commitments 
when the theory doing the explaining is required to identify the phenomena to be 
explained.  
This suggests that the Platonist’s best bet was, all along, to insist on the 
indispensability of mathematics to scientific representation not scientific explanation. 
So in the second chapter I turn to the topic of mathematics’ role in scientific 
representation. I begin in chapter 2 by outlining one particular response to the 
question of how mathematical-scientific representation works, the so-called mapping 
account (Pincock, 2004). According to this theory, the contents of mathematical-
scientific representations are given by the existence of structure preserving mappings 
between the empirical domain under investigation and a mathematical structure 
employed in the representation. I will consider a number of objections to this account 
and argue that an enhanced version of the theory, drawing on some of the machinery 
of the inferential conception of applications presented by Bueno and Colyvan (2011), 
can withstand these objections.  
But the resulting theory seems thoroughly Platonistic: it seems to commit us to the 
existence of mathematical structures and mappings at the least. This suggests a 
variant of the indispensability argument: suppose we are naturalists, then we are 
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likely to think that philosophy is continuous with science. But that suggests that we 
should see the project of investigating scientific representation as itself a scientific 
enquiry into the workings of natural science. But then, as naturalists, it behoves us to 
believe in the posits of our best scientific theory of scientific representation. So we 
should believe in morphisms and mathematical structures and the like, as they are 
part of our best scientific theory of representation.  
In the third chapter I give the fictionalist response to this argument. In short, the 
fictionalist should claim that when we set up a mathematical-scientific 
representation, we speak as if there are mappings of the relevant sort and as if there is 
a mathematical structure of the required kind for the representation to work (drawing 
on the work of Leng (2010), who in turn draws on the ideas of Walton (1990; 1993), 
we will see how set-theory with ur-elements forms the basis of this pretence). In 
other words, we should see the mapping account as providing the content of a fiction, 
the fiction of applied mathematics. It is this fiction that does the job of representing 
how things are with the natural world, but the nature of the fiction is settled by the 
mapping account: the mapping account is part of the story we tell when we engage in 
the fiction of applied mathematics. This modification will also enable us to respond 
to some lingering worries with how empirical structure is identified prior to 
mathematical application. In effect, the attribution of empirical structure is itself a 
part of the fictional pretence, albeit a part of the pretence that we hope to be getting 
approximately right. 
In the preceding sections of chapter 3 I discuss the kind of fictionalism employed in 
this fictionalist account of applied mathematics. I begin by suggesting that Kendall 
Walton’s theory of fictions as prop-oriented make-believe (Walton, 1993) provides 
us with the kind of account the mathematical fictionalist needs (though other kinds of 
fictionalism may do the job just as well). Walton’s theory enables us to evade 
ontological commitment to abstracta while preserving the idea that in engaging in the 
applied mathematical fiction, we learn important information about the real world. 
The rest of chapter 3 is taken up with the discussion of revolutionary and 
hermeneutic fictionalism. I conclude that, for conservative reasons, having to do with 
hermeneutic fictionalism’s susceptibility to empirical falsification, we should be 
revolutionary fictionalists. I conclude the chapter by claiming that the resulting form 
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of revolutionary, prop-oriented, fictionalist mapping account undermines the 
indispensability argument from our best theory of mathematical applications. I 
conclude that if the original holist indispensability argument didn’t work, the 
explanatory indispensability argument doesn’t work, and the argument from our best 
theory of mathematical-scientific representation doesn’t work, then the prospects for 
the indispensability argument look dim. In the light of this, fictionalism appears an 
attractive response to the placement problem.      
Chapter 4 takes a more metaphilosophical stance. Recall that Price defends a global 
non-cognitivism as the appropriate response to the placement problems, suggesting 
that the naturalist should reject the assumption of ‘representationalism’ (Price, 2011, 
pp.10-11), the assumption that the function of language is to tell us how things are 
with the world. I argue that this poses a serious threat to the project in this thesis – 
that we have, in effect, been assuming representationalism throughout. Should this 
assumption prove faulty, then the whole idea of finding a place for mathematical 
entities within the scientific order would be misguided. It would not be the job of 
mathematical language to tell us anything about mathematical objects out in the 
external world (nor would this be the job of scientific language) and so the 
ontological problem lapses. In its place Price recommends an anthropological inquiry 
into the role and functions of this kind of discourse in our cognitive and practical 
lives (Price, 2011, p.199).  
Now one consequence of combining anti-representationalism, as Price does, with 
functional pluralism about language is a kind of metaphysical pluralism or 
metaphysical quietism (Price, 2011, pp.34-53). There is no more to the existence of 
some entities than their being spoken of in some region of discourse, but no region of 
discourse is getting things more or less right about the world than any other. The 
result is that any discourse, so long at it serves some function in our cognitive and 
practical lives will be as good as any other, at least so far as its existential 
commitments go and at least as far as its descriptions of the world go. But this seems 
to sit uncomfortably with Price’s insistence that he is a naturalist. Price’s naturalism 
amounts to the claim that we should see human beings as entirely natural creatures 
existing in an entirely natural world and enjoying only natural relations with things in 
that world. But surely our only (naturalist) reason for thinking that is that it is the 
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picture of ourselves and our world delivered by our best scientific theories. The 
worry is that Price’s pluralism has relegated science to the status of just one more 
perspective, its commitments and descriptions no more authoritative for philosophy 
than those of any other discourse (Price, 2011, pp.30-32). But, then, why must we 
philosophers be constrained to view humans as entirely natural creatures existing in 
an entirely natural world and enjoying only natural relations with things in that 
world? Price seems to have undermined his own claim that science is authoritative 
for philosophy.  
In the remainder of chapter 4 I suggest further replies to Price’s anti-representational 
anti-metaphysics. Firstly, I consider one way in which an anti-representationalist 
concerned by Price’s pluralist tolerance might resist metaphysical pluralism or 
quietism by rejecting functional pluralism. By insisting that all language serves one 
function (just not a representational one), the anti-representationalist can preserve the 
appearance of discord among different regions of discourse. The main purpose of this 
discussion is to bring out the important role the questionable premise of functional 
pluralism plays for Price in defending his anti-metaphysical stance. I conclude by 
suggesting that Price’s position faces a number of challenges for further explanation 
that have plausible representationalist answers, but about which Price himself has 
little to say. I conclude that the advantage is with the representationalist, pending 
further elaboration of the theory by Price.       
Chapter 5 continues the metaphilosophical themes turning to a discussion of anti-
metaphysical stances arising out of the metaontology literature. I believe that a 
number of these kinds of attempts to substantiate anti-metaphysical intuitions, for 
instance, those tying metaphysical pluralism to differences in the meaning of certain 
words across languages face grave difficulties of formulation. Nonetheless, at least 
two of these kinds of metametaphysical deflationism, the epistemicism of Karen 
Bennett (2009), and Yablo’s figuralism (1998) do seem to pose an especial challenge 
to the debate over mathematical Platonism and fictionalism.   
We begin with an attempt to draft fictionalism itself into the services of 
metaontological anti-realism, namely Stephen Yablo’s contention that fictionalism 
undermines the Quinean ontological project (1998). As Yablo sees it, the project of 
Quinean ontology, that is, looking to best science to determine our ontological 
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commitments, depends upon a distinction between the literal and non-literal that, like 
Carnap’s distinction between analytic and synthetic, cannot be maintained in the 
light of actual scientific practice (Yablo, 1998, pp.240-258). That is, when we look to 
the kinds of languages, like that of natural science, that the Quinean ontologist 
investigates to determine their ontological commitments, we notice the presence of 
large amounts of non-literal language. Yablo suggests that in some cases, it will be 
impossible to eliminate this non-literal language, and that, even worse, in some cases 
it may be difficult to establish whether a piece of language is intended literally or 
non-literally (Yablo, 1998, pp.257-258). Against Yablo I argue that the presence of 
non-literal language in science is no threat to Quinean ontology, and that the divide 
between literal and non-literal is sufficiently robust in scientific language to enable 
us to continue with the Quinean ontological project.  
In the second half of chapter 5 we turn to Karen Bennett’s epistemicism. This is the 
claim that metaphysical questions, like that at issue in the debate over mathematical 
ontology, are trivial, not for linguistic reasons, but because no evidence is ever 
available that will settle them one way or the other (Bennett, 2009, p.42). Bennett 
argues that certain structural features of these debates (what she calls ‘difference-
minimization’) mean that the proponents of the two sides of the debate will do 
everything possible to move their theory as close as possible in ontology and 
expressive power to the theory of their opponents (Bennett, 2009, p.46). But, Bennett 
suggests, this will leave every objection to and strength of the opposing views 
applying equally to both (Bennett, 2009, pp.65-71). Against Bennett I argue that in 
the mathematical case at least, the distance between the rival views will remain 
sufficiently great to enable the existence of objections that apply to one and not the 
other. In particular I suggest that in the absence of a workable indispensability 
argument, Field’s challenge remains a serious problem for the Platonist, and not for 
the fictionalist.    
I conclude by drawing these strands of argument together. I suggest that what we 
have established is an attractive theory of mathematical application, that draws on 
Walton’s prop-oriented make-believe and the mapping account to give us a 
satisfyingly detailed theory of applications, without Platonist commitments. As this 
theory does not seem to face any sort of epistemological challenge equivalent to that 
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of Field’s challenge to the Platonist, and as the Platonist’s best hope, the 
indispensability argument, seems to have failed them, I argue that the theory 
developed in this thesis provides our best account of mathematical applications, and 
a satisfying response to the mathematical placement problem. I end by sketching 
some avenues of further research.     
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Chapter 1. Indispensability and Mathematics’ Role in Scientific Explanation  
 
1.1 Preliminaries 
In the introduction we saw how the question of mathematical ontology can be seen as 
a species of what Huw Price (2011) calls a ‘placement problem’. That is, the 
challenge is to find a way of reconciling our ordinary mathematical (and 
mathematized scientific) discourse, with an appropriately naturalistic view of human 
knowers and speakers. In particular, a realist must find some way of ‘placing’ the 
objects apparently spoken of within mathematical (and mathematized scientific 
discourse) within our best naturalistic account of humans and their relation to the 
world.  
In the introduction I suggested, on epistemological grounds, that the best bet for the 
mathematical realist is to do this via the indispensability argument, which links our 
knowledge of mathematicalia to our ordinary scientific knowledge of reality. If this 
can be accomplished then the mathematical realist can respond to any 
epistemological worries by pointing out that our knowledge of mathematical objects 
is established in much the same way as our knowledge of the theoretical posits of 
natural science, that is, via their presence in our best scientific theories.      
 In this chapter I begin to look at ways in which a mathematical anti-realist might 
challenge this indispensabilist position. In particular, my aim is to establish the 
viability of a fictionalist response to the indispensability argument. I begin by briefly 
sketching some ways in which we might challenge the premises of the 
indispensability argument, and suggest that if we reject confirmational holism this 
leaves open the possibility of a fictionalist answer to the mathematical placement 
problem. Much of this work has been accomplished by others, and the significance of 
the failure of the original Quine-Putnam indispensability argument for the fictionalist 
line in mathematical ontology has been adequately treated of by Leng (2010), so my 
main focus in this chapter is a more recent variant of the indispensability argument, 
one that seeks to do without the controversial holist premise. This is the so called 
explanatory indispensability argument, which seeks to establish mathematical 
Platonism on the basis of the role of mathematics in scientific explanations. My 
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preliminary aim, then, is to show how and why this new indispensabilist strategy 
fails to establish mathematical Platonism.  
But the preliminary aim of defeating the explanatory indispensability argument is 
itself only a contribution to the wider dialectical strategy of the thesis. If I am correct, 
then no attempt to draw ontological conclusions from the role of mathematics in 
scientific explanations will be successful. (To be more precise: the fact that 
mathematical claims or mathematical objects themselves seem to do explanatory 
work will not establish mathematical realism. Mathematics may still play a non-
explanatory role in mathematical explanations, such as indexing or some other 
representational role that might license ontological commitment to mathematicalia, 
even if the argument of this chapter is successful) I will take this to show that the 
recent focus of Platonists on the role of mathematics in explanation is misguided, and 
that the indispensabilist was better off focusing on mathematics’ representational 
role. The next two chapters will follow up on this, presenting a novel naturalist 
argument for mathematical realism from the role that mathematics plays in theories 
of mathematical  representation in science. The third chapter then attempts to deploy 
a fictionalist theory of representation in order to evade this realist challenge.           
 
1.2 Resisting the Quine-Putnam Indispensability Argument  
The aim of this section is to briefly present and discuss the influential Quine-Putnam 
version of the indispensability argument. (Much of the following material is 
influenced by Mark Colyvan’s discussion of this topic (Colyvan, 2001a), and so it 
might be appropriate to label this the Quine-Putnam-Colyvan indispensability 
argument). We begin by examining the various ‘moving parts’ of the argument, its 
explicit and supplementary premises. The main focus of this dicussion will be on 
bringing out the role of confirmational holism in establishing the Platonist 
conclusion. I then move on to present some arguments drawn from the work of 
Penelope Maddy (1992) that suggest that the holist premise might be the weak link in 
the Quine-Putnam indispensabilist’s argumentative chain. One aim of this is to 
display the way in which the failure of the confirmational holist premise of the 
Quine-Putnam indispensability argument is suggestive of a potential fictionalist 
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response to the mathematical placement problem. But my main focus in this chapter 
will not be on following up this suggestion (we will return to the issue of fictionalism 
in chapter 3); instead my aim is to illustrate the motivation that some Platonist 
philosophers have had for developing a new kind of explanatory indispensability 
argument, one that eschews reliance on confirmational holism.   
 
1.2.1 The Quine-Putnam Argument: Premises and Supplementary Premises  
The original Quine-Putnam indispensability argument was an attempt to draw 
positive ontological conclusions from the application of mathematics within natural 
science. In brief, (1) our best scientific theories are laced with existential 
commitments to mathematical objects, and there is no hope of paraphrasing away 
those commitments so as to render our scientific theories nominalistically acceptable. 
Call this the indispensability premise. (2) But we ought to be ontologically 
committed to all and only those existential commitments of our best scientific 
theories. Call this our criterion for ontological commitment. (3) Therefore, we ought 
to be ontologically committed to the existence of mathematical objects. This, of 
course, is the Platonist conclusion.  
In order to strengthen the argument we will add two further supplementary premises, 
labelled (2b) and (2c), in order to indicate the role they play in supporting our 
criterion for ontological commitment. 
(2b) There is no higher court of appeal in settling philosophical disputes 
than that provided by our best scientific theories. Call this naturalism.  
About the naturalism premise I will have little to say, except to note that its role in 
the indispensability argument is to secure the “only” in “all and only those existential 
commitments” of premise (2).  
Nonetheless, we might still suspect that we are entitled to disregard some of the 
existential commitments of our best science when it comes to settling ontological 
matters. Of course, we would not be so entitled if our only reasons for so doing 
originated in some prior first philosophy (a corollary of naturalism), but perhaps we 
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might find good scientific reasons for taking a differential attitude to the 
commitments of our theories. The purpose of premise (2c) is to scotch any hope of 
picking and choosing our commitments in this way; in other words, (2c) establishes 
the “all” in (2)’s “all and only”.  
(2c) Confirming or infirming evidence does not attach to individual 
hypotheses of our scientific theories; instead, our theories face the 
tribunal of evidence as a corporate body. 
Let us call premise (2c) confirmational holism. Confirmational holism prevents us 
taking a differential attitude to the commitments of our scientific theories by 
ensuring that evidence for one part of a successful theory (one posit of the theory) is 
equally evidence for another part of that theory (another posit of the theory). In the 
particular case of mathematics, confirmational holism prevents us from isolating the 
physical objects and mathematical objects that appear within the existential 
commitments of our best science and saying, “The evidence which confirms our 
theory goes this far (physical objects) and no farther (mathematical objects).”  
As we have presented it then, the indispensability argument has just these working 
parts:  
(1) The Indispensability Premise  
(2) Our Criterion for Ontological Commitment (with supporting premises 
(2b) Naturalism and (2c) Confirmational Holism) 
(3) Conclusion: Platonism (or realism in ontology) 
Now any one of premises (1), (2), (2b) and (2c) might be (and has been) challenged. 
A challenge to the indispensability thesis is presented in Field’s (1980). Field’s 
ambitious project involves the presentation of a nominalized version of Newtonian 
gravitational theory along with metamathematical results establishing the 
conservativeness of classical mathematics over Field’s nominalized physics. An 
assessment of Field’s project is beyond the scope of this chapter, but it is often 
thought that the choice of Newtonian physics as a starting point was somewhat 
fortuitous, and that Field’s nominalization project may well stall when we move 
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beyond spacetime theories to phase space theories such as quantum mechanics (cf. 
(Malament, 1982). But see also (Balaguer, 1996a) for a more hopeful appraisal of the 
chances for a nominalized quantum theory).  
 However that may be, my reason for introducing Field’s efforts here is that they are 
the paradigm of what Mark Colyvan (2010) has called a hard road to nominalism 
(hard for the sort of reasons just alluded to). That is, Field’s is an example of a 
nominalization strategy that seeks to challenge the indispensability premise and 
restructure science in such a way as to make it nominalistically acceptable. Theories 
that endorse indispensability and provide no nominalistic reconstrual of 
mathematized science, which nonetheless refuse to countenance mathematical 
objects, are lumped together as easy road strategies. As we shall see, Colyvan thinks 
that explanation in science makes it difficult to keep these roads from converging 
(Colyvan, 2010).  
 
1.2.2 Indispensability and Confirmational Holism 
Of the routes left open to us, if we wish to slum it on the easy road and avoid the 
narrow way of nominalizing science, one especially has seemed attractive to 
philosophers in recent years. This is the challenge to (2c), confirmational holism. The 
hope is that if we can resist the charge to spread our evidence evenly over all the 
posits of our best science, then we can take a differential attitude to some of those 
posits, without having to abandon the thought that it is within science that we address 
ontological issues. That is, if we can show that something is wrong with 
confirmational holism, then we can still be naturalists, and endorse a modified 
version of premise (2), perhaps something like “we ought to be ontologically 
committed to only those existential commitments of our best scientific theories (but 
not necessarily all)”. And the hope is that once we have adopted this modified, non-
holist naturalism, the unwelcome Platonist conclusion will no longer follow.   
We will not here review the various way in which confirmational holism might be 
challenged, but one promising strategy, introduced by Penelope Maddy (1992), is to 
note the prevalence in our (current) best scientific theories of explicitly false 
hypotheses. For instance, we might work in physics with pendulums on frictionless 
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pivots or waves in an infinitely deep sea. The idea that these idealizations might be 
dispensed with in our best science is itself often nothing more than an idealization. 
Quine seems to have believed that any idealization involving explicitly false 
hypotheses would be paraphrased away in our ‘best science’, where ‘best science’ 
seems to have meant something like ‘science at the limit of enquiry’. But there are at 
least two reasons for thinking that this is unlikely and that some scientific fictions 
may prove resistant to paraphrase. The first is that ‘best science’, even the explicit 
idealization ‘best science at the limit of enquiry’ is still best science for creatures like 
us, human beings with our cognitive capacities and our cognitive limitations. If the 
resultant paraphrase is unmanageably complex – if we cannot calculate, cannot 
predict nor explain with it – then the theory will surely not be part of our best 
science. But it was our best science that was to determine our ontological 
commitments, not some idealized science available only at the limit of enquiry and 
useful only for superhuman intellects (Maddy, 1992, pp.281- 282).  
Secondly, it may well be that there are theories for which we know of no procedure 
for paraphrasing away our fictional commitments. The idea of paraphrase gets 
traction only when we know of some background theory, more accurate than our 
explicitly false one. But what if the falsehood is part of our most fundamental theory 
(Maddy, 1992, p.282)? Newtonian mechanics, in its day, was surely such a 
fundamental theory. But Newtonian mechanics treats of forces acting on point 
masses. What are point masses? Certainly not physical things we might bump into, 
out there in the world. It is at least not obvious that point masses should ever have 
been considered part of scientific ontology, even if there was no more accurate 
theory than Newton’s within which they could be dispensed with. Of course, one 
could object that Newtonian mechanics is no longer our best theory. But can we be 
certain that no explicit falsehoods have crept into those theories we now do regard as 
our best? And should we discover any, then we would have no more basic theory to 
appeal to in order to translate away our explicit falsehoods (Maddy, 1992, pp.181-
282). We would simply have to mark them as false and withhold commitment, and 
the only consistent way of doing that would be to reject confirmational holism.  
I will say little more on this issue here. For further elaboration I direct the interested 
reader to (Maddy, 1992) and for a defence of the idea that mathematical objects may 
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well function like fictions to (Leng, 2010). For now we simply note the result for the 
original indispensability argument. We have seen reason (the presence of explicitly 
false hypotheses in our best science) to reject premise (2c) of the indispensability 
argument. With confirmational holism out of the way, we have opened up the 
possibility that not all the hypotheses of our best science feature in our theories 
because they are true, and that therefore we need not conclude that some entity exists 
merely because it is quantified over in such a hypothesis. In particular, we have 
opened up the easy road of fictionalism, the claim that the mathematics featuring in 
our best science need not be true to be useful, but that it may serve some other 
function (such as enlarging our descriptive resources), for which its truth and the 
existence of its posits is a matter of indifference.  
 
1.3 The Explanatory Indispensability Argument 
In this section we begin our investigation of the explanatory version of the 
indispensability argument. The strategy behind this dialectical shift, from the more 
generic indispensability claim to the particular role that mathematics plays in 
explanation, has been, on the one hand, to find a version of the indispensability 
argument that is independent of the controversial holist premise that we saw 
challenged in the previous section, and on the other, to press against the nominalist a 
kind of abductive argument form that she is supposed to see as part of good scientific 
method (and, therefore, of good philosophical method too).    
We begin by reviewing the motivations for this shift to the explanatory version of the 
indispensability argument. I then present the argument in a form similar to the 
original Quine-Putnam argument examined above. In the next section we begin the 
evaluation of this new Platonist strategy.  
 
1.3.1 Motivating the Explanatory Strategy 
It is against the background of challenges to confirmational holism that the 
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explanatory indispensability argument is introduced.1 If confirmational holism is the 
weak premise, then defenders of mathematical Platonism will have to find an 
alternative that does without it. The explanatory indispensability argument is 
precisely such an alternative, non-holist argument for Platonism. It avoids the 
reliance on holism by focusing specifically on the role that mathematics plays in 
scientific explanation. In short, the claim is that even if it is not true that favourable 
empirical evidence confirms all the parts of our theories equally, it does confirm a 
theory’s explanatory portions. And so, if a mathematical entity is playing an 
explanatory role (an indispensable explanatory role) in a scientific theory, then that 
entity must exist.   
The explanatory indispensability argument has seemed an especially attractive move 
for the Platonist, because it gets most traction when directed at those nominalists 
who wish to remain scientific realists (or else realists about the non-mathematical 
parts of science). The strategy here is to point out to the scientific-realist-naturalist 
nominalist that they are ordinarily happy to endorse inference to the best explanation. 
Constructive empiricists and other scientific anti-realists might be more suspicious of 
IBE as an argument form (cf. Van Fraassen, 1980), but the indispensability argument 
is, anyway, directed at naturalists, who tend to be realists about science and its 
methods. Supposing IBE to be part of the normal methods of best science, the 
nominalist scientific-realist surely ought to endorse IBE in general.  
But now, the Platonist hopes, if it can be shown that mathematical claims play an 
indispensable explanatory role in scientific explanations of some 
phenomenon/phenomena, then the nominalist will be forced onto one of the horns of 
the following dilemma: either reject the idea that an explanation must be true to be 
good (and run the risk of abandoning scientific realism as a consequence) or else 
argue that the examples offered in the literature of mathematical explanations in 
                                                          
1 We have considered only Maddy’s critique of this doctrine, as being the most congenial to 
the fictionalist position defended in this thesis. Other anti-holisms are available. For instance, 
Elliott Sober (1993) has used his contrastive empiricism to motivate a challenge to the 
doctrine of confirmational holism, arguing that unless there is some alternative kind of 
mathematics that might be deployed in scientific practice, then mathematized science cannot 
be tested against an opposing hypothesis. This is because the mathematics made use of in an 
empirically tested scientific theory, being common to all scientific theories, will also be a 
part of the theory it is tested against. This, according to Sober rules out seeing the empirical 
test of a scientific theory as confirming or disconfirming its mathematical content. 
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science are not good explanations after all (and so run the risk of abandoning 
naturalism, by questioning the deliverances of our best scientific theories). If the 
nominalist wishes to choose neither horn, then her only option seems to be to 
abandon her nominalism.  
Our focus in this thesis, though, is not nominalism in general, but fictionalism in 
particular. And, of course, fictionalism, strictly speaking, is itself a brand of anti-
realism about science. The official line is that the fictionalist does not believe her 
best scientific theories, but she does believe them to them be nominalistically 
adequate, where nominalistic adequacy is, in a rough and ready fashion, getting it 
right about the concrete stuff (Balaguer, 1998, p.131; Leng, 2010, p.180). So the 
fictionalist cannot accept unrestricted application of the principle that we should 
believe our best explanations to be true, because she is already committed to the 
existence of very many explanatory theories that are not true (they are merely 
nominalistically adequate), but which are nonetheless good explanatory theories. But 
the argument just sketched will prove to present a challenge to the fictionalist just as 
surely as it does to the nominalist-realist. In short, the challenge is to say what 
licenses the fictionalist’s differential treatment of explanations. We will return to this 
in a later section.  
 
1.3.2 The Explanatory Indispensability Argument: Premises and Conclusion 
 Now that we have seen the motivation for it, we should turn to the argument itself 
(see Baker, 2009, p.613). One premise of the argument we have encountered already, 
in the form: an explanation must be true to be good. That is, if a claim explains some 
phenomenon, and if that explanation is the best available, then we should believe that 
that claim is true. And of course, if such an explanatory claim requires for its truth 
the existence of some object, then that object must exist. Putting this in language 
which brings out the relation of this first premise to the project of establishing our 
ontological commitments, premise one will read: (1) We ought to be ontologically 
committed to those objects appearing in our best scientific explanations. 
 Premise two then seeks to build on this, by establishing the existence of 
mathematical explanations of scientific phenomena: (2) There exist mathematical 
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explanations (requiring existent mathematical objects for their truth) of phenomena 
of interest to our current best science. This claim will be the topic of the next section.   
Therefore, (3) we ought to be committed to the existence of mathematical objects 
(Baker, 2009, p.613).  
And so we see that the explanatory indispensability argument has just these working 
parts.  
(1) We ought to be ontologically committed to those objects appearing in 
our best scientific explanations. 
(2) There exist mathematical explanations (requiring existent 
mathematical objects for their truth) of phenomena of interest to our current 
best science. 
(3) We ought to be committed to the existence of mathematical objects.  
Once more we have a choice of premises to challenge, and perhaps neither one is 
obviously true. Nonetheless, proponents of the explanatory indispensability argument 
have tended to take it as given that (1) holds and that therefore it is premise (2) that 
requires defence and supplementation. In order to establish premise (2) what is 
required are real world examples of mathematical explanations of physical 
phenomena. And so it is to case studies of apparent mathematical explanations of 
physical phenomena that defenders of the argument have tended to turn.  
 
1.4 A Case Study: Baker Among the Cicadas 
We saw in the last section that defenders of the explanatory indispensability 
argument have tended to assume that it is premise (2) of their argument that will be 
found controversial. This has motivated them to find and display examples from 
contemporary science of mathematical explanations of biological, chemical, 
physical, and social phenomena. In this section we introduce one such example, the 
life-cycle periods of two sub-species of periodic cicada, the explanation of which is 
supposed to make indispensable use of certain theorems from number theory. It is 
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important to note in advance that it is the number theoretic results themselves 
(relating to some characteristics of prime numbers) that are taken to do the 
explaining; the number theoretic theorems are not, according to Baker, just playing a 
descriptive/representational/indexing role (Baker, 2005). As we saw in the previous 
section, if it is the case that these number theoretic results are pulling the explanatory 
weight, then we ought to believe that they are true. And because their truth would 
require the existence of prime numbers, we seem to have here a compelling argument 
for mathematical Platonism. The remaining sections of this chapter will provide 
reasons for thinking that examples like these will not, contrary to appearances, 
support mathematical realist conclusions, and we will examine the consequences of 
this for the continuing debate over the issue over mathematical ontology.      
 
1.4.1 A Mathematical Explanation for the Life-Cycle Periods of Periodic Cicadas?  
In this section I present an example of a supposed mathematical explanation of a 
physical phenomenon. The example is taken from evolutionary biology, and was 
introduced to philosophers by Alan Baker in his paper Are there Genuine 
Mathematical Explanations of Physical Phenomena? (2005, pp.229 -233).  
 Baker’s case study involves what appears to be a number theoretic explanation of a 
biological fact, the prime-numbered life-cycle of the North American Magicicada 
cicada. These are insects, most of whose lives are spent in a nymphal stage within the 
soil, emerging periodically after 13 and 17 years (depending on the species) as 
adults. The emergence of the adults is synchronized, with all the adult insects 
emerging within a few days. The adult stage then lasts only a few weeks (during 
which time the insects mate, and lay their eggs), after which the adults die off, the 
emerging nymphs burrow back into the soil, and the cycle starts over. There are, of 
course, many questions biologists might ask about these curious creatures, but one 
seems especially relevant for our purposes: why life-cycles of 13 and 17 years? In 
other words: why the prime numbered life cycles? Baker points out that this is a 
genuine question biologists are interested in, and that the best answer (the best 
explanation of the phenomenon) makes essential use of number theoretic results.  
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Our presentation of Baker’s case study must needs be somewhat hasty and for a 
fuller presentation I direct the reader to (Baker, 2005). Here I will give the structure 
of the argument, as presented by Baker and then try to fill in some of the details. 
Here is the argument:   
(1) Having a life-cycle period which minimizes intersection with other 
(nearby/lower) periods is evolutionarily advantageous. [biological law] 
(2) Prime periods minimize intersection (compared to non-prime periods) 
[number theoretic theorem]  
(3) Hence organisms with periodic life-cycles are likely to evolve periods 
that are prime. [‘mixed’ biological/mathematical law]  
                                                                    (Baker, 2005, p.233)                                                        
Premise (1) as it stands requires some explanation; what are the nearby/lower periods 
the cicadas are supposed to be avoiding? Baker notes two different hypotheses 
making use of this biological law, one based on the hypothetical presence of 
predators in the Magicicada’s evolutionary past, the other on the existence of similar 
species of insects with which the emerging adults might have hybridized. If, in either 
case, the hypothesized species itself had a periodic life-cycle, its emergence from the 
soil may well have coincided with that of the adult cicadas. Now, the adult stage of 
the cicada life-cycle is very short (compared with the nymphal stage) and 
opportunities to mate are correspondingly restricted. Given these biological 
restrictions, avoiding mating with a similar species could well have conferred an 
evolutionary advantage. If the hybrid offspring of coinciding species had life-cycle 
periods differing from those of their parents, then the emergence of the future adult 
stage might no longer synchronize with the other cicadas, thus reducing the 
likelihood of future mating. The evolutionary advantage of not getting eaten, for a 
creature with such limited opportunities to mate, hardly needs elaborating on. 
Premise (2) depends upon two results from elementary number theory given by 
Baker as two lemmas.  
Lemma 1: The lowest common multiple of m and n is maximal iff m and n are 
coprime. 
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Lemma 2: A number, m, is coprime with each number n < 2m, for n ≠ m iff m is 
prime. (Baker, 2005, p.232)  
Now suppose m and n are lengths in years of the life-cycle of some periodic species, 
M and N respectively. Then, further supposing the emergence of M and N at some 
point of their life-cycle to have coincided in some year, the next year in which they 
will coincide is given by the lowest common multiple of m and n (that is, the lowest 
number such that both m and n will divide into that number). Now, this taken 
together with lemma 1 implies that the period of intersection will be greatest when m 
and n are coprime. Lemma 2, together with the assumption that the cycle periods of 
the hypothesized species, n, are low, generates the primeness result we wanted: 
prime life cycles will tend to reduce intersection with other periodic species.2       
The argument presented so far establishes the general conclusion that animals with a 
periodic life-cycle are likely to develop life-cycle periods that are prime. A further 
premise (4), together with the preceding argument establishes the particular 
conclusion that the cicadas are likely to develop 17 year life-cycle periods:  
(4)  Cicadas in ecosystem-type, E, are limited by biological and 
environmental constraints to periods from 14 to 18 years. [ecological 
constraint] 
(5)  Hence cicadas in ecosystem-type, E, are likely to evolve 17-year 
periods.  
                                                                               (Baker, 2005, p.233) 
With (5), the conclusion, following from (3), the ‘mixed’ biological/mathematical 
law, and (4), the ecological constraint. (It should be clear how the preceding 
argument can be varied so as to establish the corresponding result for the 13 year 
species).  
What we have then is a prediction that cicadas in a certain geographical location, 
with certain biological and ecological constraints, will tend to evolve life-cycle 
periods of certain lengths, in part because those lengths are prime (Baker, 2005, 
                                                          
2 This argument will not work for the hybridization case, because the cycle periods for 
similar species are likely to have been similar, But the underlying number theory is the same. 
For further details of how the argument must be modified see (Baker, 2005). 
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p.233). Had we not known the fact in advance, we could have used the above 
argument to predict the existence of such species. In other words, the argument 
shows how the phenomenon was to be expected. This to be expectedness of the 
phenomenon, once we have seen the putatively explanatory argument, is often taken 
to be a mark of scientific explanations. So this would appear to be a successful 
scientific explanation. And, moreover, it seems to be a scientific explanation making 
indispensable use of mathematical facts (the two number theoretic lemmas); 
indispensable not in the sense that they are essential representational aids, but in the 
sense that they themselves do the explanatory work. 
My aim in this chapter is not to challenge the cogency of Baker’s example. For now I 
am willing to grant that this is a good explanation of a genuinely puzzling biological 
phenomenon.3 Nonetheless, it remains to be seen whether this explanation or 
anything similar commits us to the existence of prime numbers. This is the question I 
address in the remaining sections of this paper.  
 
1.5 Resisting the Explanatory Indispensability Argument 
In this section we turn to the evaluation of the explanatory indispensability argument, 
using Baker’s cicadas example as a foil. While my focus will be on the way in which 
Baker’s argument fails to establish Platonism, the arguments of this section are 
supposed to be more general. The point is not that Baker’s particular example fails 
(which, after all, would only serve as an invitation to Platonistic philosophers to 
provide new examples), but that no attempt to establish Platonism via the role of 
mathematics in scientific explanation is likely to be successful. Here I draw on an 
argument of Bangu (2008, pp.16-17), who points out that the explanatory 
indispensability argument assumes the truth of ‘mixed’ explananda (explananda with 
                                                          
3 It has been pointed out to me in discussion that the argument has one suspicious feature. 
Remember that the general conclusion of the argument, independent of its application to the 
magicicada species was: “organisms with periodic life-cycles are likely to evolve periods 
that are prime.” In other words, prime life-cycles are evolutionarily advantageous for all 
periodic species. If that is correct, then prime numbered life-cycles ought to be common 
across all periodic species, not just these two species of magicicada. But the phenomenon of 
the periodic cicadas with prime life-cycles was taken to demand explanation just because it 
was so striking, so unexpected. And it surely would not be striking or unexpected if it was 
found in all periodic species. 
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both mathematical and scientific components, like “the life-cycles of these and those 
species of cicada are prime numbered”) and so presupposes the truth of the 
mathematics whose truth was supposed to be established by its appearance in the 
explanans. The argument I hope to sustain will, for reasons given in their proper 
place, be slightly different to Bangu’s, but the essential drift of my response is 
similar: mathematical explanation of mathematised scientific descriptions of the 
world will always evince a kind of circularity that rules out drawing ontological 
conclusions, however good the explanation seems to be. In the concluding section of 
this chapter I argue that as a result of this, those seeking to defend Platonism via the 
indispensability argument should return their focus to the role that mathematics plays 
in scientific representation.  
 
1.5.1 But Why Worry?   
So far we have seen that under pressure from nominalist challenges, those wishing to 
defend a Platonistic construal of the indispensability of mathematics have sought to 
reach their conclusions via the use of mathematics in scientific explanations. In 
particular Platonists like Colyvan and Baker have argued that some uses of 
mathematics in science are explanatory in and of themselves. As good scientific 
realists, with a healthy respect for inference to the best explanation, it then behoves 
us to treat such explanatorily essential mathematics as true and, in particular, to 
regard the existence claims made by such explanatorily essential mathematics to be 
true.  
How might we resist this argument? Well, we have seen that premise 2 is unlikely to 
be at fault (at least we are conceding this much for the present). We good scientific 
realists are very often also right minded naturalists, and as such we are unlikely to 
want to challenge the considered judgements of scientific practitioners about which 
explanations are and which are not good.4 If the arguments of the preceding section 
                                                          
4 It is a ticklish matter just how far naturalists are permitted to challenge the consensus 
judgements of the broader scientific community. Of course, one does not wish to claim that 
scientists are infallible; presumably methodological mistakes can be (and are) made. 
Nonetheless I take it as an article of good philosophical practice that explanations and 
theories taken to be good by the rest of the scientific community are not to be challenged by 
philosophers just because they seem to have unwelcome ontological consequences. 
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are sound, then we seem to have at least one good example of an explanatory 
application of mathematics in science. So Premise 2 of the explanatory 
indispensability argument looks to be comparatively robust.    
But what of premise (1)? Remember that (1) claimed that “We ought to be 
ontologically committed to those objects appearing in our best scientific 
explanations.” Have we been given any reason to think that this is true? Superficially 
it might seem no more difficult to resist this claim than the corresponding premise of 
the Quine-Putnam indispensability argument. Remember that (1) was found to rest 
on the assumption that any explanation must be true in order to be good. Well then, 
we might simply ask the Platonist, Why must good explanations always be true 
explanations? Couldn’t the explanatory role of the mathematics deployed in 
scientific explanations be underwritten by some feature of the mathematics other 
than its supposed truth?  
Now it might be thought that the naturalist, as a scientific realist, requires a blanket 
commitment to inference to the best explanation in order to independently motivate 
some kind of abductive ‘no miracles’ argument for scientific realism. I do not believe 
(though I cannot argue for this claim here) that naturalists need any kind of argument 
for scientific realism, so the naturalist nominalist will not acquire a blanket 
commitment to the claim that all good explanations are true explanations from this 
direction. Nonetheless, what is needed is some kind of argument that the naturalist 
cannot distinguish between kinds of explanation in a way that would enable her to 
say that some explanations can be good without being true, while the goodness of 
some other explanations does establish their truth. The aim of this section is to 
examine what reasons there might be for thinking this.  
Perhaps the most explicit statement of the idea that explanations must be true in order 
to be good has come from Mark Colyvan. In his (2010) Colyvan argues that any 
explanation in science must be literally true or else eliminable in favour of a literally 
true explanation. Of course, we often use metaphor when we provide explanations, 
but, Colyvan contends, such metaphorical explanations go proxy for a literally true 
alternative (Colyvan, 2010, pp.300-301). Colyvan is willing to concede that we may 
not always know how to provide such a literally true replacement in practise. For 
instance, if we say that such and such an individual lost his job because the stock 
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market crashed, we do not necessarily know how to provide a literally true 
alternative explanation that makes no use of the metaphorical term ‘crashed’. Stock 
market crashes are very complex events and it may just be that we have no idea how 
to translate ‘the stock market crashed’ into literally true economic theory. But, 
Colyvan insists, we must at least have a partial translation, in terms of economic 
theory, which we can substitute for our metaphorical explanation in terms of crashes 
(Colyvan, 2010, p.301).  
At this point one might wonder whether such partial translations are actually 
available (and indeed how the possession of a partial translation of a non-literal 
explanation relates to what seems to be Colyvan’s belief that, in principle, fully 
literal explanations are always available, even if in practice we cannot find them. 
Surely having slightly less metaphorical explanations doesn’t in itself provide 
evidence that fully de-metaphored explanations exist?) The only suggestion Colyvan 
offers for a partial literal translation of the stock market example talks of “many 
industry sectors being placed under financial stress and that this was the motivation 
for the change of career of the person in question.”(Colyvan 2010, p.301) It is at least 
not obvious that this talk of “financial stresses” is less metaphorical than the original 
talk of crashes. So we seem to have no reason at this point to believe that such 
translations are even possible in most cases.    
For now, I will leave this last point hanging. Colyvan has given us no reason to 
believe that literal replacements for every metaphorical explanation can be found. 
But for the sake of argument, I will grant Colyvan this claim. Nonetheless, we can 
continue to press Colyvan. Even supposing that Colyvan is correct that literal 
replacements for our metaphor-involving explanations are available, why must we 
provide them? Not, presumably, just because it can be done? Colyvan seems to be 
working with the assumption that the truer explanation will always be the better 
explanation. And if that is the case, then when we are confronted with some 
apparently metaphorical explanation, we have two options available: either we can 
paraphrase away the putatively metaphorical portions of our explanation, replacing 
them with a fully or partially de-metaphored alternative; or else, we simply conclude 
that the metaphorical portions of the explanation were not metaphorical at all, but 
were in fact true and literal claims all along. But what reason is there for thinking 
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this? I believe that an answer to this question will emerge from an examination of the 
debate between Colyvan and Leng over structural explanations in science.   
 
1.5.2 Structural Explanations and Colyvan’s Slippery Slope     
In this subsection I want to bring out what I think is the best reason for thinking that 
an explanation must be true in order to be good. By examining Colyvan’s response to 
Leng’s nominalist line on mathematical explanations, I think we can develop a 
challenge for the fictionalist: the challenge to say what it is about the distinctively 
mathematical explanations that rules them out as candidates for IBE style arguments 
like the explanatory indispensability argument. When we return to the Baker case 
study, we will see a way of responding to this challenge that should enable us to 
disarm the explanatory indispensability argument. 
In her (2012) Leng concedes that there may well be explanatorily essential uses of 
mathematics and that, moreover, the mathematics itself may be bearing a significant 
portion of the explanatory burden. This is because, in certain cases, the mathematics 
enables us to provide a “structural explanation” (Leng, 2012, p.988). Structural 
explanations work by showing how the phenomenon under investigation results from 
general structural features of the physical/natural situation, and these structural 
features are, in the interesting cases, mathematical. So, for instance, in the cicadas 
case we see how general structural features of the natural numbers (the lemmas 
concerning coprimeness) account for the observed life-cycle periods. In brief, Leng’s 
suggestion is that we link the explanatory mathematical structure with the physical 
domain under investigation by providing an interpretation of the axioms of the 
mathematical structure in terms of the physical stuff. We then see how the relevant 
explanatory result follows from the axioms characterizing the mathematical structure 
and the interpretation we have given to those axioms (Leng, 2012, pp.988-989). 
Leng goes on to suggest that the explanatory role played by mathematics in these 
kinds of structural explanations may well be an indispensable one. We can perhaps 
see this best if we consider the result of trying to provide a nominalistic reconstrual 
of a particular structural explanation. We can, for instance, provide explanations of 
the life-cycle periods of each of the magicicada species in turn that are 
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nominalistically unobjectionable (cf. Saatsi, 2011, p.150), but what we lose in the 
switch to the nominalistic alternative is the ability to provide one single explanation 
of why both species have the life-cycles they have. In other words, by taking the 
mathematics out, we lose the ability to see how the phenomenon in question results 
from perfectly general structural features of the empirical situation. And, further, by 
demathematizing the explanation we lose the ability to see how other similar 
phenomena result from exactly the same general structural features. What the 
nominalistic explanation lacks is generality and generalizability; in other words, it 
explains less.  
But Leng goes on to argue that none of this requires us to assume the existence of the 
mathematical entities featuring in the structural explanations (Leng, 2012, p.991). In 
a structural explanation we have, on the one hand, a set of axioms presumed to 
correctly characterize some mathematical structure and an interpretation of that 
structure in terms of some non-mathematical stuff. That is, we claim that the axioms 
of our mathematical structure are (approximately) true of the non-mathematical 
domain – the lemmas concerning comprimeness are true of the life-cycle periods of 
cicadas when numbers are years, for instance. But none of this seems to require 
numbers themselves. It requires years and it requires that years exhibit some of the 
structure of numbers (or some of the structure numbers would have, were there any), 
but the numbers themselves do not seem to be playing an essential role in the 
explanation. It is the (presumably false) structure characterizing axioms given an 
(approximately) true interpretation in terms of (presumably nominalistically kosher) 
years that ultimately do the explaining. No need then for mathematical objects (Leng, 
2012, pp.990-992).  
Now if this is correct, then we cannot draw positive ontological conclusions from the 
role of mathematics in scientific explanation. But Colyvan presents the fictionalist 
attracted by this line of reasoning with a challenge. In essence, Colyvan’s challenge 
is to say what motivates the fictionalist’s scepticism about mathematical explanation, 
given that she is not a thoroughgoing scientific anti-realist. Inference to the best 
explanation appears to be ubiquitous in science and if we are going to start doubting 
its efficacy when it delivers unwanted mathematical objects into our ontology, why 
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trust it when its deliverances are more favoured unobservable physical things? As 
Colyvan puts it 
Leng seems to have mathematical explanations singled out for special 
treatment. When an explanation invokes mathematical objects, Leng 
advises us not take the ontological commitments of that claim seriously, 
just read it as a claim about the structural properties of the physical 
system we are interested in. (Colyvan, 2012, p.1037) 
He then asks, “But why stop there? Why not follow van Fraassen (1980) in 
reassessing apparent explanations involving unobservables?” (Colyvan, 2012, 
p.1037) His point is that we are in the vicinity of a slippery slope:  
If the aim is to advance a nominalist account, while remaining a scientific 
realist, more needs to be said about why mathematics is singled out for 
such special treatment and why the special treatment stops there. 
(Colyvan, 2012, p.1037) 
The line of argument is clear: if we are going to start rejecting inference to the best 
explanation in some cases, then we need a principled reason for drawing the 
distinction where we do. In the absence of such a reason, our scepticism is 
unmotivated.  
It is important to recognise that this is not, strictly speaking, an objection to Leng’s 
position. It may well be that there are features of structural explanations involving 
mathematics to which Leng could point that will not carry over to explanations 
involving unobservables. After all, mathematical structural explanations make no 
essential appeal to causal processes or mechanisms, whereas many explanations 
invoking unobservables do. However that may be, it is clear that Colyvan is on to 
something: the mathematical fictionalist does need to say something about why it is 
that she privileges inference to the best unobservable explanation above inference to 
the best abstract explanation. If the fictionalist does not have a principled way of 
drawing this distinction, then it looks as though she is operating with unacceptable 
double standards. 
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 More explicitly, Colyvan’s challenge is to find some principled way of carving up 
the domain of explanation such that some explanations (hopefully the explanations in 
terms of abstracta) end up without ontological import, without abandoning inference 
to the best explanation entirely. In the absence of any principled way of achieving 
this, we would be forced to accept all (scientifically) respectable explanations as 
having the same kind of epistemic authority. And as I read him, Colyvan is betting 
that the nominalist scientific-realist will not be able to make good on the challenge to 
say why abstract explanation is not ontologically committing while explanation in 
terms of unobservables is, that is, she will be unable to find a reasonable principle of 
demarcation. If all that is correct then it looks as though the fictionalist cannot reject 
the particular instance of abductive reasoning embodied in the explanatory 
indispensability argument without endangering her scientific realism.  And if 
Colyvan is correct in his presumption that the nominalist will not be able to meet his 
challenge, then we can see why he believes that only true explanations can be good 
explanations (or that all good explanations must be true). 
 
1.5.3 Bangu’s ‘Question-Begging’ Objection 
What we are after, then, if we are interested in denying premise (1) of the 
explanatory indispensability argument, is some principled way of carving up the 
domain of explanations such that mathematical explanations fall on the ontologically 
harmless side. In this section I discuss an argument of Sorin Bangu (2008), which I 
believe suggests a route to this goal.   
Bangu begins his objection to the explanatory indispensability argument by noting 
two essential presuppositions of what he calls the “inference to the best explanation 
strategy”. The first of these presuppositions is that the explanandum be true (Bangu, 
2008, p.16). If the explanandum featuring in some explanation is not true, then there 
is no reason to demand a true explanans for it. If we were to explain some false or 
fictional explanandum in terms of some equally false or fictional explanans, we 
would have committed no sin against the canons of proper explanation. So, for 
instance, if I explain Sherlock’s torpor in terms of his drug addiction and his lack of 
an interesting case, I am not committed to Sherlock’s drug addiction nor his lack of 
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an interesting case. And I am not so committed because I was never committed to 
Sherlock or his torpor in the first place.  
The second presupposition of the IBE strategy that Bangu notes is that the 
explanandum be independent of mathematics.5 Inference to the best explanation 
based on a mathematical explanation of a mathematical explanandum would simply 
beg the question against the nominalist (Bangu 2008, p.16). The nominalist doesn’t 
believe in the truth of any mathematics. And as we have already noted, a false or 
fictional explanandum doesn’t require a true explanans. So the explanandum had 
better not just be another piece of mathematics, on pain of begging the question 
against the nominalist. 
Now Bangu goes on to clarify what exactly it is that Baker’s explanation explains. 
He notes an ambiguity in Baker’s presentation. Baker begins by asking the question, 
“Why are the life-cycle periods prime?” (Baker, 2005, p.230). But Baker also 
suggests that the phenomenon to be explained is just “the period length of cicadas.” 
(Baker, 2005, p.233). Now Bangu argues that of these two explananda, it is the 
former that is more basic. 
…once we know that the period has to be prime – i.e., once we have 
answered the first question – the number 13 [the life-cycle period in 
years of one of the species of cicada] comes out as the only acceptable 
answer. So, the first question “Why are the life-cycle periods prime?” is 
more basic and the central question to answer. (Bangu, 2008, p.17) 
I certainly do not disagree with this, but I believe there is a stronger argument for the 
claim that it is the phenomenon of the primeness of the life-cycles that demands 
explanation. Were the phenomenon in question just the period length (either 13 or 
17), it is difficult to see why anyone would have bothered looking for an explanation 
at all. Primeness aside, these seem like fairly unremarkable numbers and not at all in 
need of the kind of sophisticated explanatory attention they have received. So I 
                                                          
5 Baker himself insists on this as a requirement of the explanatory indispensability argument, 
and his reasons for doing so are much the same as Bangu’s. 
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contend that we should follow Bangu in regarding the most basic fact in need of 
explanation as the primeness of the life-cycle periods.  
But if this reasoning is correct, the rot immediately sets in. As Bangu points out, the 
fact we are now explaining is that a certain number (that associated with the life-
cycle period of a certain species of insect) has a certain mathematical property, 
namely, the property of primeness. Is this claim, this ascription of a mathematical 
property to a number (itself associated with some natural phenomenon), really 
independent of mathematics in the way that Baker requires? It would seem not; 
attributing primeness to some number looks to be a mathematical claim if ever there 
was one. But now remember the first presupposition Bangu identifies: in order to 
require a true explanans, the explanandum must be true. But if the explanandum is 
not sufficiently independent of mathematics, there is no need for the fictionalist to 
regard it as true, given her antecedent scepticism about mathematical claims. And so, 
in particular, there is no need to regard Baker’s number theoretic explanation as true 
(and no need to adopt its existential commitments as our own) (Bangu, 2008, pp.17-
19). 
In other words, Bangu is objecting that Baker’s particular version of the explanatory 
indispensability argument begs the question against the nominalist, by simply 
assuming the truth of precisely those kinds of mathematical claims that the argument 
is supposed to establish. And it is not at all clear how the explanatory indispensabilist 
might evade this challenge. As we have already noted, he must assume the truth of 
the explanandum or else there is nothing requiring a true explanans. And that means 
that the only option left for the indispensabilist is to find a scientific phenomenon 
whose literal truth would not require the existence of mathematical objects, but 
which can be explained by some piece of mathematics. But there are at least two 
reasons for thinking this challenge will not be easily met. In the first place, the 
(regular, non-explanatory) indispensability of mathematics to natural science makes 
it difficult to imagine from what branch of science a non-mathematized explanandum 
might be drawn. In the second, it is difficult to see how an explanandum making no 
mention of mathematics could essentially require mathematics for its explanation.    
Bangu ends his paper by suggesting that this may be one instance of a much more 
general failing in the IBE strategy (Bangu, 2008, p.19). That is, all attempts to 
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employ the explanatory indispensability argument are going to require presupposing 
the truth of the explanandum, and if every example the Platonist can come up with 
involves mathematics featuring in the explanandum in just the same way as Baker’s 
example, then it looks as though no attempts to employ the explanatory 
indispensability argument are going to be effective. In other words, every instance of 
an explanatory indispensability argument is going to beg the question against the 
nominalist, whatever examples are deployed in support of it.  
 
1.5.4 The No Circularity Condition   
In this section I want to suggest a way in which I believe Bangu’s argument can be 
adapted to our purpose of finding a principled reason to distinguish between the 
ordinarily ontologically committing explanations of our best science, and the 
ontologically harmless explanations appealed to in the explanatory indispensability 
argument. In effect, I will claim that Bangu’s question begging argument has 
uncovered a circularity in the kinds of explanations appealed to in the explanatory 
indispensability argument that gives us good scientific reason to be suspicious of 
their ontological credentials.   
Consider, to begin with, the following example. Quark theory includes a posit called 
a gluon. The gluons play a role in Quantum Chromodynamics (the beguilingly 
named theory of the strong force governing interactions within hadrons) similar to 
that of the photon in Quantum Electrodynamics; that is, they are gauge bosons, or 
‘force carrying’ particles, mediating the strong force in interactions between quarks. 
Now the existence of quarks was, for a while anyway, a matter of debate within the 
scientific community, because the behaviour of the strong force (it increases very 
rapidly as a function of distance) made the detection of free quarks (quarks outside of 
a proton or neutron) impossible. Now suppose at this time some enterprising particle 
physicist had had an unfortunate bout of philosophy and argued thusly: “Quarks must 
exist! They are part of our best possible explanation of the behaviour and properties 
of gluons!” I cannot imagine that the scientific community would have been terribly 
impressed. And the reason they would not have been impressed seems relatively 
clear: gluons are a posit of the very theory taken to do the explaining. The fact that 
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they are well explained by that theory gives us no reason to believe it, because we 
would only be interested in the explanation if we had independent grounds for 
believing in gluons. That is, the explanandum is not independent of the explanans. 
Consider another example. Tarot must be true, because it correctly assigns the 
appropriate interpretation to certain arrays of playing cards. Again, the interpretation 
of arrays of playing cards just is part of the theory (if I may call it that) of Tarot. We 
would only accept the explanans (It gets the correct interpretations of arrays of cards) 
if we had a prior reason for thinking that Tarot was true. The explanans just isn’t 
sufficiently independent of the explanandum to license inference to the best 
explanation. 
What I think these two examples suggest is that the weak link in the explanatory 
indispensability argument is the requirement that the explanandum be independent of 
the explanans. In the two examples, the problem was that the entities required for the 
truth of the explanans were not independent of the theory from which the 
explanandum was drawn. In other words, there is a kind of circularity here. We 
conclude that a theory is true, because it provides the best explanation of a 
phenomenon whose existence could only have been established within the very 
theory doing the explaining. Clearly there is something just a little suspicious about 
reasoning of this kind.  
So this suggests the following line of argument: In the Baker case, the phenomenon 
to be explained is the prime numbered life-cycles of the cicadas. And the theory 
doing the explanatory work is number theory. Therefore, we conclude that some 
number theoretic theorems are true from the role they play in explaining the natural 
phenomenon of the prime cycled cicadas. But the property of primeness, the 
attribution of which plays such a vital role in getting the explanatory ball rolling, is 
itself a number theoretic property. So we conclude the truth of number theoretic 
theorems from the role they play in explaining a fact that could only have been 
identified and characterised within number theory itself. Here we seem to have an 
example of just the kind of circularity that vitiated the quark theoretic and Tarot 
theoretic explanations, and if that is correct, Baker’s instance of an explanatory 
indispensability argument looks unsuccessful. Moreover, for reasons very similar to 
those given by Bangu, we can expect this result to generalize. It seems likely that all 
42 
 
mathematical explanations will suffer from this same defect: they will attempt to 
derive the truth of a mathematical theory from the fact that it explains phenomena 
that could only have been identified by the self-same theory.6    
What all this suggests is a more general principle, a principle that will enable us to 
meet Colyvan’s challenge and divide up explanations into those that license and 
those that do not license ontological commitment. The principle is this: an 
explanation is only ontologically committing when the kinds of circularity identified 
above are absent. That is, the explanandum must not be part of the same theory as the 
explanans, in the following sense: it must have been possible to identify the 
phenomena in the explanandum independently of the theory from which the 
explanans is taken.7 In cases where this condition is not met, the use of the posits of a 
theory in some apparently successful explanation can give us no more reason to 
believe in the truth of a theory than we already had. And if we had no reason to 
believe in the truth of the theory in the first place, then its appearance in a circular 
explanation cannot give us one. 
If all this is correct, then we have seen, in particular, how to resist Baker’s 
indispensability argument. We need not conclude that numbers exist from their role 
in the explanation of the life-cycles of periodic cicadas, because the phenomenon in 
question only becomes explanatorily relevant in the context of the number theory 
taken to do the explaining. We have also seen, at a more general level, how to meet 
                                                          
6 For instance: Mark Colyvan gives as an example of a mathematical explanation in science, 
the explanation in terms of the Borsuk-Ulam theorem of the existence of antipodal points on 
the Earth’s surface with identical temperature and barometric pressure (Colyvan, 2001a, 
pp.49-50). But it is difficult to see how this could have been identified as a fact requiring 
explanation independently of the topological theories of which the Borsuk-Ulam theorem is 
a part. 
7 This qualification is important. We cannot simply insist that the explanandum not be part of 
the same theory as the explanans, because the applicability of theories seems to leave the 
question of what is and isn’t a part of our theories somewhat open ended. For instance, 
Newtonian gravitational theory is applicable to the motions of heavenly bodies. And this 
explanatory success (the explanation, for instance, of the elliptical orbits of planets) is taken 
to be a major success of the theory, and evidence for its truth. So are facts about heavenly 
bodies a part of the theory of Newtonian gravitation? Perhaps not (they are not required for 
the truth of the theory), but if we did wish to extend the notion of ‘part of a theory’ to include 
phenomena the theory is applicable to, heavenly phenomena would qualify as part of 
Newton’s theory. And in that case the success of Newton’s theory, given the crude 
requirement of independence of explanandum and explanans, would not count as evidence 
for its truth. 
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Colyvan’s challenge; we have discovered a principle (which we might call the no-
circularity condition) which enables us to divide up explanations in a principled way 
into those that license and those that do not license ontological commitment, without 
succumbing to a thoroughgoing anti-realist disavowal of IBE. 
 
1.6 Conclusion   
The principal focus of this chapter has been on the explanatory indispensability 
argument. My aim has been to establish a principle governing responsible use of 
explanatory arguments, the no-circularity condition, which tells us when we are and 
are not licensed to conclude that a statement is true from the role it plays in scientific 
explanation. The suggestion is that a claim or statement gains nothing from its 
appearance in the explanans of an explanation when the explanandum is not 
sufficiently independent of the theory from which the explanans is taken. As we saw, 
the requisite independence criterion is that it must have been possible to identify the 
explanandum independently of the theory from which the explanans is taken. If this 
criterion is not satisfied, then we have a kind of circularity in which, in a sense, a 
theory is being invoked to explain itself. In this case, it seems that the theory’s 
deployment in an explanation gives us no more reason to believe that it is true than 
we already had for believing the theory in the first place. And if we have no more 
reason than we already had to think that the theory is true, we have no more reason 
than we already had to conclude that any objects required for the truth of its 
sentences must exist. 
We further saw how this argument undermines Baker’s attempt to motivate the 
explanatory indispensability argument on the basis of the example of the periodic 
cicadas. The fact that number theoretic theorems play a vital role in the explanation 
of the life-cycles of periodic cicada is no evidence for number theory (or no more 
evidence than we already had for number theory), because the fact to be explained is 
the unusual prime numbered life-cycles, and this seems to be a partly number 
theoretic explanandum. If we are attracted by the fictionalist response to the original 
indispensability argument, then we are likely to think that we had very little initial 
reason to believe in number theory; and Baker’s number theoretic explanation of the 
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cicada life-cycle periods does not seem to give us any more reason to believe that 
number theory is true. So we have no more reason than we already had to believe in 
the abstract objects necessary for Baker’s number theoretic explanations to be true.  
I further suggested that this is likely to be a general feature of attempts to motivate an 
explanatory indispensability argument. Indeed, the very indispensability of 
mathematics to natural science suggests that Platonists will struggle to find examples 
of mathematical explanations in science where the entities required for the truth of 
the explanation are independent in the right way from the theory within which the 
phenomenon being explained is identified. Of course, it remains open to those 
attracted by the explanatory indispensability argument to prove me wrong, and to 
produce examples of apparent mathematical explanation where the explanandum is 
sufficiently independent (or else to undermine the no-circularity condition by 
evincing respectable examples from the natural sciences in which it is violated). 
Until and unless such a refutation is provided, I submit that we have here a 
convincing reason to reject the explanatory indispensability argument.  
But while my focus has been on rebutting the explanatory indispensability argument 
(and while this is a welcome result for the fictionalist), this chapter serves a 
somewhat different role within the dialectic of the thesis. Part of my aim in resisting 
the Platonists’ explanatory gambit has been to sure up the fictionalist position, but I 
also believe that the failure of the explanatory indispensability argument suggests 
something more. What this result implies is that a Platonist wishing to take a 
naturalist line by defending an indispensability argument was always better served by 
focussing on the role of mathematics in scientific representation. Explanation is a 
dead end for the Platonist, and so, the worries about confirmational holism 
notwithstanding, anyone wishing to defend a naturalist Platonism must return their 
attention to the role of mathematics in scientific representation. That means that if we 
are to defend a nominalist account of mathematics, we too should turn our attention 
to scientific representation, in an effort to pre-empt the kinds of arguments that 
Platonists might devise.  
In the next two chapters I begin this enquiry into the role of mathematics in scientific 
representation, and whether we can continue to defend a fictionalist ontology in light 
of results established during the course of this investigation. In chapter 2, I present a 
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recent attempt to develop a systematic account of the representational role that 
mathematics plays in scientific applications, the so-called ‘mapping account’. In the 
course of this discussion we see a number of ways in which this theory must be 
modified if it is to be successful, but what emerges is a plausible and powerful tool 
for thinking about how mathematics serves to enhance and even enable the scientific 
representation of phenomena. In chapter 3 I then turn to the ontological 
consequences of this theory. As we see, the theory seems, prima facie, to require for 
its truth the existence of very many abstracta. This suggests an alternative 
indispensability argument that starts, not from the role of mathematics in scientific 
explanation, nor from the role of mathematics in science more generally, but from 
the particular role that mathematics seems to play in our best theories of its own 
applicability. The remainder of chapter 3 focuses on how we can deploy fictionalism 
to undercut this line of reasoning, and further suggests ways in which a fictionalized 
mapping account may have advantages over its realist cousin.   
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Chapter 2. The Mapping Account of Applied Mathematics 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter we saw that it is to the role of mathematics in representation 
that we must look if we are to settle questions of mathematical ontology. 
Accordingly the purpose of this chapter is to outline and defend one approach to the 
issue of mathematical representation: the mapping account of how mixed 
mathematical-scientific representations are assigned content (Pincock, 2004). This is 
the claim that for our mathematized scientific representations to have the right kind 
of content (the right kind of representational content to be useful in applications), 
there must exist a structure preserving mapping between the empirical domain under 
investigation and the mathematical structure used to model it.  
This primitive mapping account, due to Pincock, faces challenges from the existence 
of certain uses of mathematics in science that do not appear to be entirely or solely 
representational. In particular, the existence of idealized representations and the 
purported existence of mathematical explanations of physical phenomena seem to 
suggest that the mapping account outlined in (Pincock, 2004) is at best incomplete. 
To plug these gaps I take over some of the machinery of Bueno and Colyvan’s 
Inferential Conception of applications of mathematics (Bueno and Colyvan, 2011), 
but I aim to do so while resisting their claims that an account of applied mathematics 
must be given in terms of mathematics’ inferential role. What results is an enhanced 
mapping account that should be able to handle all cases of applied mathematics at 
least as well as its rivals.  
 Unfortunately, as we will see, the resulting theory is highly ontologically 
inflationary. Bearing in mind the results of the previous chapter, this seems a deeply 
unwelcome result. In the next chapter we will see how to resolve our difficulties with 
the mapping account by embedding it within a fictionalist approach to ontology. The 
result is that an attractive and detailed account of mathematical applications can be 
rendered compatible with an anti-realist position about mathematical ontology. This 
should serve to strengthen the case for mathematical fictionalism as a response to the 
placement problem.              
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2.2 Some Preliminaries 
 
2.2.1 Unreasonable Effectiveness 
Before we begin in earnest, it will be helpful to get clear on the exact nature of the 
problem facing us. There are several ways in which the applicability of mathematics 
might seem philosophically puzzling, but in this section I just want to separate out 
two issues, confusion of which could potentially infect the rest of our discussion.  
On the one hand, we have the so-called “unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics”, 
first addressed by Eugene Wigner (Wigner, 1960). Wigner’s own concerns are 
somewhat amorphous, and it is not entirely clear what is meant by “unreasonable” in 
this context. One suggestion (Mark Colyvan’s) is that some kind of formalist or anti-
realist philosophy of mathematics might lie behind Wigner’s worry (Colyvan, 2001b, 
p.266), in which mathematical concepts are chosen for their aesthetic value and their 
amenability to clever logical manipulation. At no point does the mathematician 
develop his subject with a view to future applications in physics. It is then taken to be 
mysterious why such a logical game, whose standards of evaluation are purely 
aesthetic, should play a useful role in our investigations of the physical world. As 
Wigner puts it: “Most more advanced mathematical concepts…were so devised that 
they are apt subjects on which the mathematician can demonstrate his ingenuity and 
sense of formal beauty.” (Wigner, 1960, p.5) If that is the subject matter of 
mathematics, concepts chosen for their aesthetic qualities, then it may well appear as 
though mathematics must be irrelevant to the natural sciences, a subject whose 
concepts are beholden to more objective standards of appraisal (empirical adequacy, 
perhaps, or representational accuracy).  
 A second way to approach Wigner’s worry is through the work of Mark Steiner 
(Steiner, 1998). Like Wigner, Steiner claims that the introduction of mathematical 
concepts is subject to aesthetic evaluative criteria. Even worse, for Steiner these are 
species specific aesthetic criteria, so we cannot even claim that our mathematical 
aesthetics tracks objective aesthetic standards. Steiner then claims that mathematics 
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has played an essential role in the discovery of new scientific theories. In the more 
recent history of science, scientists have come more and more to rely on 
mathematical analogies in the discovery of new theories of new physical phenomena, 
and in some cases it seems as though these mathematical analogies between 
mathematical models are not underwritten by any corresponding physical analogy 
between the physical domains represented by the models (Steiner, 1998, pp.48-115). 
These kinds of mathematical analogies Steiner calls Pythagorean (Steiner, 1998, p.3) 
and he suggests that they pose a serious problem for naturalists: the incredible 
success of the theories generated by these analogies, together with the fact that the 
analogies are generated by species specific aesthetic judgements (Steiner, 1998, 
pp.65-66), suggests a kind of anthropocentrism. That is, Steiner concludes that the 
structure of the world mirrors the structure of human cognitive activity, and that this 
kind of anthropocentrism must be anathema to any naturalist (Steiner, 1998, p.10).  
 Now it is important to be clear: neither of these is the problem to be discussed in this 
chapter. I will not here address the “unreasonableness” worry in either of the two 
forms just outlined. Instead, the following chapter addresses itself to a rather more 
homely topic: how do our mathematical scientific representations acquire their 
content, or how can we use mathematized models to represent the physical world. 
Another way to put all this is to ask: how are the truth conditions of mixed 
mathematical-scientific statements (statements like “The mass of object A is 40 
grams” that contain both physical and mathematical terminology) fixed?  
 Having an answer to this question may or may not help with the unreasonableness 
puzzles addressed above. Alternatively, we might wish to challenge the assumptions 
underpinning these concerns more directly, arguing against the formalist view of 
mathematics that seems to underpin Wigner’s worry (according to Colyvan) or 
questioning the role or existence of Steiner’s Pythagorean analogies. However that 
may be, at present none of this is our concern. This chapter we will be solely 
concerned with the problem of isolating the representational contents of 
mathematized scientific models. Our interest is entirely in the role mathematics plays 
in scientific representation, and the consequences of that role for mathematical 
ontology. As our wider concern is with defending fictionalism as a response to the 
mathematical placement problem, these further puzzles about mathematics’ 
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‘surprising’ role in science, even if they can be given a substantive formulation, are 
at best tangential to our purpose.  
 
2.2.2 Syntactic and Semantic Views of Theories 
So far I have talked rather loosely of “the contents of mathematical-scientific 
representations”, and before we can make our first pass at a solution to the puzzle of 
how these contents are assigned, we will do well to get clearer about what we mean 
by “representation” in this context. Because, it will have been observed, I have also 
mentioned in passing that one way to approach our problem is by asking how truth-
conditions of mixed mathematical-scientific sentences are ascertained, and it is not 
immediately clear that these are the same problem at all.  
 The problem here is that there are two ways of approaching the question of what a 
scientific representation is, corresponding to two views of the nature of scientific 
theories. On the syntactic view, a scientific theory is a collection of sentences. More 
precisely, following van Fraassen, the syntactic view holds that a theory is to be 
identified “with a body of theorems, stated in one particular language chosen for the 
expression of that theory.” (van Fraassen, 1980, p.44) The semantic view of theories, 
on the other hand, has it that a theory is to be identified with a “class of structures 
[mathematical structures] as its models.” (van Fraassen, 1980, p.44) So the difference 
here is between an identification of theories with some linguistic entities, and 
identification of theories with some model theoretic entities.  
 Now there are questions here about how much of a theory is supposed to be 
representational, and about whether every scientific representation needs to find a 
home in some scientific theory (some philosophers of science have argued that at 
least some of the models employed by practicing scientists are largely independent of 
any fundamental scientific theory (cf. Morgan & Morrison, 1999)). But it should at 
least be plausible that the kind of answer one gives to the question of what a 
scientific theory is will influence the kind of view one takes of the status of scientific 
representations. For instance, on the plausible (moderate realist) assumption that at 
least some parts of some of our scientific theories are intended to represent the world, 
the adoption of the syntactic view of theories will deliver the result that some of our 
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scientific representations are bodies of sentences, while the proponent of the 
semantic view will conclude instead that at least some our scientific representations 
are model theoretic entities, mathematical structures. And for the syntactic view, it 
would perhaps be more natural to talk in terms of truth-conditions for the sentences 
comprising our representations, while for the semantic view some other way of 
talking might feel more congenial. 
 Now as it happens, I believe that the account of mathematical applications to be 
presented below will work just as well for either view of scientific representations. 
For that reason, I believe we can elide over this distinction for now, and persist in our 
loose talk. In what follows I will mostly talk in terms of truth-conditions for 
mathematical-scientific sentences, as this will allow us to focus on some relatively 
simple (and perhaps unrealistic) examples of scientific representations. But this 
should not be interpreted as an endorsement of a syntactic view of scientific 
representations and theories more generally. Once the machinery of Pincock’s 
mapping account is in place, it should be clear enough how to rejig it to fit with a 
more semantic conception (and all this should hold, mutatis mutandis, for the 
enhanced mapping account we end up endorsing). 
 
2.3 Pincock’s Mapping Account 
 With all these preliminaries out of the way, we can turn to Pincock’s presentation of 
his mapping account. Consider, to begin with, an extremely primitive kind of 
application of mathematics: the use of positive integers to enumerate some collection 
of “medium sized dry goods” - fingers will do for our purposes. How is it that we can 
apply the natural numbers to the business of sorting out how many fingers we have? 
Remember that in our case, this question comes to: how can the truth conditions of 
“The number of my fingers is n” be fixed? Let’s suppose that I have five fingers. 
Then, for Pincock, the truth-conditions of the sentence “The number of my fingers is 
five” are fixed by the existence of a structure preserving mapping that associates with 
each one of my digits one of the numbers 1 through 5 (Pincock does not discuss this 
example, but the general approach presented here is based on (Pincock, 2004, 
pp.145-150)). And in this case, the right kind of structure preserving mapping will be 
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an isomorphism between my fingers and the initial segment of the positive integers 
terminating with 5.   
 More generally, Pincock’s proposal can be summed up as: the truth conditions of 
mixed mathematical-scientific sentences are fixed by the existence of a structure 
preserving mapping between the empirical domain of application and some 
appropriate mathematical structure. If an appropriate mapping can be found, then the 
mathematical structure in question can be used to represent our empirical domain; if 
not, then not.  
 What kinds of mappings will do the job? Well, in the very simple case just 
reviewed, we saw that an isomorphism between fingers and numbers enabled us to 
isolate the truth-condition of our bit of applied mathematics. But Pincock notes that 
more complicated applications of mathematics may well require other kinds of 
homomorphisms (Pincock, 2004, pp.149-150), and that most actual applications of 
mathematics in the sciences will indeed be very much more complicated than our 
finger counting problem. In actual, real-world scientific representations we may not 
always have a one-one correspondence between the domain of application and every 
object in the mathematical structure (indeed, it is very unlikely that we will), so we 
cannot just rely on bijective homomorphisms to generate the truth conditions of our 
bits of applied mathematics. Unfortunately, this is about all Pincock says in his initial 
presentation of the mapping account, and as we will see when we come to review 
Bueno and Colyvan’s criticisms of Pincock’s approach (and their proposed 
alternative), it is this lack of specificity about the available mappings that forces the 
move to a slightly more elaborate mapping account.  
 Of course, it is not quite accurate to say that this is all Pincock tells us about the 
relevant mappings: he does insist that constraints need to be placed on the mappings, 
and for this purpose he employs a modification of measurement theory (Pincock, 
2004, pp.147-149). Now I do not want to get bogged down in the specifics of 
measurement theory, but the basic idea is that measurement theory provides a set of 
constraints on a physical domain for a mathematical description of that domain to be 
possible. Or, as Pincock puts it: “what sort of structure must a physical domain have 
if the right kind of mapping between the physical domain and a mathematical domain 
is to exist?” (Pincock, 2004, p.147) Pincock’s idea is to reverse the usual direction of 
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explanation in measurement theory, and to use the results of measurement theory to 
place restrictions on the kinds of mappings that can be used to fix mathematical-
scientific truth-conditions. That is, instead of characterizing the physical domain of 
application, the results of measurement theory are instead employed to constrain the 
choice of mapping between mathematics and world. Using this kind of approach, 
Pincock hopes to generate necessary and sufficient conditions that a mapping must 
satisfy, if it is to be able to provide our mathematical-scientific sentences with their 
truth-conditions.  
 It is this kind of account, then, an account which says that the representational 
content of mathematics is given by structure preserving mappings, that I hope to 
make use of in the fictionalist approach to applied mathematics developed in the next 
chapter. There I will suggest that we view the mapping account as giving us the 
specific fictional content of a fictional representation, a kind of prop-oriented make-
believe taking the empirical world as prop. In the remaining sections of this chapter, 
I will defend the mapping account from objections levelled at it by Bueno and 
Colyvan and Robert Batterman. But, as we will see, this defence will require us to 
move beyond Pincock’s mapping account, to an enhanced mapping account 
incorporating some of Bueno and Colyvan’s suggestions.      
 
2.4 The Inferential Conception and the Enhanced Mapping Account 
In this section we introduce and discuss Bueno and Colyvan’s alternative “Inferential 
Conception” of the application of mathematics (Bueno & Colyvan, 2011). Our aim in 
this section is twofold: on the one hand, we need to get clear the kinds of problems 
facing Pincock’s approach that motivate Bueno and Colyvan to seek an alternative. 
As we will see, these kinds of challenges do require that we take over some of the 
machinery of the inferential conception into the mapping account. On the other hand, 
we will need to assess whether this kind of move on our part will also require us to 
adopt Bueno and Colyvan’s entire approach to applications of mathematics. Here I 
want to make two claims: firstly, whatever inferential role mathematics plays in 
science is underwritten by its representational functions, so it is wrong to claim that 
the fundamental role of mathematics is inferential. Secondly, Bueno and Colyvan 
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need to do much more to establish that the kinds of applications they have in mind – 
prediction, unification, explanation – depend upon establishing inferential relations 
within our scientific representations.        
 If the remaining subsections are successful then we will have a much fuller picture 
of the kind of mapping account that will be used in the next chapter as part of our 
fictional account of mathematics. We will have presented a mapping account, 
supplemented by Bueno and Colyvan’s machinery of immersion and interpretation 
maps, without finding ourselves committed to their further claims about 
mathematics’ specifically inferential role. It is this theory that I will employ as the 
content of the prop-oriented make-believe to be developed in chapter 3.   
 
2.4.1 Bueno and Colyvan’s Objections  
Before we turn to the kind of approach to applications favoured by Bueno and 
Colyvan, it will be helpful to see what kind of problems they identify with Pincock’s 
initial presentation of his mapping account. We will postpone discussion of their 
solutions until a later subsection. Our primary aim here is simply to see why the 
mapping account presented above cannot be the whole story about applications of 
mathematics.       
 The first difficulty noted by Bueno and Colyvan is with the somewhat loose talk we 
have so far employed concerning “the structure of the world.” They begin by 
characterising a structure as “a set of objects (or nodes or positions) and a set of 
relations on these” (Bueno & Colyvan, 2011, p.347). They then claim that “the 
world”, presumably meaning by this the empirical domain of application, is not pre-
theoretically divided into nodes/objects and relations between these in the way the 
mapping account seems to suppose. In order to establish our structure preserving 
map between the empirical domain and the mathematical structure used in modelling 
it, we will need to be able to identify both the objects in the empirical domain and 
the relations between these objects that we want our mapping to preserve. But, claim 
Bueno and Colyvan, the world does not come pre-theoretically carved up in this way; 
it is our scientific theories that identify “the structure of the world.” So until we 
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apply our mathematical-scientific theories there is no reason to expect to discover 
any structure in the empirical world at all (Bueno & Colyvan, 2011, p.347).  
 The second difficulty they identify with Pincock’s approach has to do with the 
mappings themselves. As we noted above, Pincock says very little about the kinds of 
mappings that the applied mathematician will have at her disposal. As Bueno and 
Colyvan see it, one reason for this is that there is very little to be said: the kinds of 
mappings available will be very limited. They begin by agreeing with Pincock that 
for most actual applications of mathematics, isomorphisms will be unsuitable. As 
they put it “the mapping employed will depend on the richness of the two structures 
in question, W and M [“World” and “Mathematics”].” (Bueno & Colyvan, 2011, 
p.348) Should either the structure attributed to the world or the structure of the 
mathematical domain outstrip the other, isomorphisms will no longer be appropriate 
for our application. In such a case we will need to employ some other kind of 
mapping.  
 Bueno and Colyvan identify three types of structure preserving maps we might try to 
employ here: homomorphisms, epimorphisms, and monomorphisms (Bueno & 
Colyvan, 2011, p.348). Of the three though, it seems only monomorphisms will do 
the job. This is because we want to be able to “move back and forth” between the 
empirical domain and the mathematics used in modelling it, rather as we do when 
using a street map. That is, we compare the map with our surroundings in order to 
discover where we are or where we are supposed to be. In a similar sort of way, we 
want the mapping between our empirical structure and our mathematical structure to 
be invertible, so that we can compare the mathematical-scientific representation with 
its domain of application (Bueno & Colyvan, 2011, pp.348-349). If our mapping is to 
be invertible, that leaves us only with monomorphisms , but this in effect rules out 
the possibility of the world having more structure than the mathematics used to 
model it, and this seems a hopelessly unrealistic picture of scientific applications 
(Bueno & Colyvan, 2011, p.349). 
 A further objection raised by Bueno and Colyvan is that the mapping approach 
cannot by itself account for how we assign physical content to some parts of a 
mathematical structure and withhold it from others (Bueno & Colyvan, 2011, 
pp.349-250). In cases where the mathematical structure is richer than the empirical 
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domain we will have these sorts of decisions to make, but the kind of contextual 
information we use to guide these kinds of decision making cannot be accounted for 
in terms of mappings. They consider the case of “a typical projectile problem in 
which one needs to calculate where a projectile (of known initial velocity and 
position whose only acceleration is due to gravity) will land.” (Bueno & Colyvan, 
2011, p.349) They remark that “the displacement function for such a projectile is a 
quadratic with two real solutions—only one of which is physically significant.” 
(Bueno & Colyvan, 2011, p.349) So the decision we have to make is which of these 
solutions is the physically significant one. Of course, in this situation it is clear which 
of the two solutions is physically significant “projectiles do not land in more than 
one place and they typically land forward of their launch site” (Bueno & Colyvan, 
2011, p.349). The problem, as Bueno and Colyvan see it, is that the guidance 
provided by these kinds of physical intuitions cannot be incorporated into the 
mapping account. We use our knowledge of past physical systems, resembling the 
one we are investigating, to decide which of our solutions is physically significant. 
But this sort of information is not coded in the mappings used by the mapping 
account. 
 A further worry for the mapping account is presented by cases of idealization. As 
noted above, it is unrealistic to think that in actual applications of mathematics there 
are no cases in which the structure of the empirical domain outstrips that of the 
mathematics used to represent it. As Bueno and Colyvan see it, we get these sorts of 
cases whenever we encounter idealization in science: 
 “Here there seems to be no mapping between the empirical structures in 
question and the mathematical structures. If anything, there would appear 
to be a mapping between the mathematical structure and some possible, 
but non-actual empirical structure.” (Bueno & Colyvan, 2011, p.351) 
This creates a problem for Pincock, because if there can be no structure preserving 
mapping between the (real) empirical structure and the mathematics used in 
representing it, then it seems we are forced to conclude that the truth-conditions of 
the relevant mixed sentences are undetermined. But given the widespread use of 
idealisation in natural and social science, and the plausible assumption that 
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idealisations can be ranked in terms of their accuracy, this seems like an implausibly 
rigid line to take on idealised mathematical-scientific representations.  
 The final worry Bueno and Colyvan raise for the mapping approach concerns 
explanation. As they see it, the only role the mapping account allows for mathematics 
in applications is as a representational or descriptive device. But if, as some 
philosophers believe, mathematics plays an explanatory role in our best scientific 
theories, then the purely descriptive role allowed for on the mapping approach will 
be at best an incomplete account of mathematical applications (Bueno & Colyvan, 
2011, pp.351-352). If these philosophers can substantiate their claims about the 
explanatory role of mathematics in science, then it seems that the kind of indexing 
strategy employed by the mapping account cannot be successful as a complete 
account of applications of mathematics within the sciences (Bueno & Colyvan, 2011, 
p.352).  
 These, then, are the kind of problems facing Pincock’s mapping account that suggest 
that we must at least revise his approach to mathematical applicability. As Bueno and 
Colyvan see it, these kinds of worries require an entirely new approach to the 
problem of applied mathematics. In the next subsection we present their “inferential 
conception.” We will then see how they employ this alternative account to solve the 
kinds of problems they have outlined for Pincock’s approach. In the process we will 
discover that much of their added machinery is either compatible with an enhanced 
mapping account of applications or else unnecessary. Before closing this section, we 
will turn to the evaluation of their claim that the primary role of mathematics in 
applications is inferential.  
 
2.4.2 The Inferential Conception 
Bueno and Colyvan’s alternative account of mathematical applicability starts from 
the claim that the role of mathematics in applications is inferential: “by embedding 
certain features of the empirical world into a mathematical structure, it is possible to 
obtain inferences that would otherwise be extraordinarily hard (if not impossible) to 
obtain.” (Bueno & Colyvan, 2011, p.352) As they point out, this does not rule out 
other uses of mathematics, in explanation or unification for instance. It is just that 
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these further uses depend on using mathematics to establish inferential relations 
between empirical phenomena (Bueno & Colyvan, 2011, p.352).  
 It is interesting to note at this point that the inferentialist claim is not necessarily 
unwelcome to the anti-realist. After all, Hartry Field in Science without Numbers 
(Field, 1980) suggested that the principal role of mathematics in science was 
inferential, as part of his nominalist strategy to disarm the indispensability argument. 
For Field, mathematics is just a “theoretical juice extractor” (Hempel, 1945, p.554), a 
device for facilitating inferences that would be much more difficult using a purely 
nominalistic theory. So, if anything, the fictionalist ought to see the claim that the 
fundamental role of mathematics is inferential as grist to her mill, lending further 
support to the idea that mathematics’ role in science does not support the Platonist’s 
ontological commitments. Unfortunately, as we will see, I feel that Bueno and 
Colyvan have done far too little to establish their claim that the mathematics used in 
science has a fundamentally inferential role. 
 However that may be, Bueno and Colyvan suggest that in order to establish these 
inferential relations, we need to have in place some mappings between the 
mathematics and the empirical domain under investigation (Bueno & Colyvan, 2011, 
p.353). Bearing in mind their criticisms of the original mapping account they offer a 
three stage approach to the application of mathematics. 
 In the first step, immersion, we set up a mapping between the empirical domain and 
some appropriate mathematical structure. We will have a choice of mappings at this 
stage and our choice will be guided by contextual factors having to do with the 
details of the application. Nor need this be just a one-step process. Bueno and 
Colyvan allow that we may map the empirical structure onto some mathematical 
domain, and then proceed to map this mathematical structure straight on to some new 
mathematical structure (Bueno & Colyvan, 2011, p.353).   
The next step is derivation. This consists in drawing consequences from the 
mathematical formalism by purely mathematical means. Bueno and Colyvan take 
this to be the key step in the application process (Bueno & Colyvan, 2011, p.353). 
The third and final step is interpretation. Here we interpret the mathematical 
consequences derived in the derivation step in terms of our original empirical set-up. 
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This is done by establishing a mapping between these mathematical results and the 
empirical domain. These mappings need not be the inverse of our immersion map, 
but can be completely new mappings between the two domains. (And so we see how 
Bueno and Colyvan propose to increase the stock of available mappings. Because our 
immersion maps no longer need to be invertible, we are free to use any structure-
preserving mapping at the immersion stage and any structure-preserving mapping at 
the interpretation stage. We are no longer limited only to monomorphisms). Once 
again, there is no need for this to be a one-step process. We may interpret the results 
of our mathematical derivations by first mapping them onto a new mathematical 
structure, and only then mapping the new structure back on to the empirical domain 
(Bueno & Colyvan, 2011, pp.353-354). 
 
2.4.3 Bueno and Colyvan’s Solutions 
Now let us turn our attention to how Bueno and Colyvan propose to use their new 
account to deal with the problems they outlined for Pincock’s mapping approach. In 
the first place, we saw that for Bueno and Colyvan the mapping account looked as 
though it was going to have trouble locating an empirical structure for the mapping 
to latch on to. Now one way they suggest the mapping account might get around this 
is for the applied mathematician to posit the existence of some “assumed structure”, 
and use this as the basis for their application of mathematics to the empirical domain. 
The applied mathematician can then “treat this initial assumed structure as defeasible 
and let the resulting mathematical model help inform refinements or revisions to the 
initial assumed structure.” (Bueno & Colyvan, 2011, p.357) 
 The advantage that Bueno and Colyvan see with their proposal is that this process of 
assuming and revising empirical structure will go much more smoothly given their 
more flexible account of the immersion mappings (Bueno & Colyvan, 2011, p.357). 
Remember that during the immersion process, we were permitted to map our 
(assumed) empirical structure onto some mathematical structure, and then map that 
structure onto a further mathematical structure. In principle there is no limit to the 
number of times we can do this, and this allows us to see the revision of our assumed 
structure as the interpolation of further steps in this immersion process. In effect, this 
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frees the applied mathematician from having to scrap her representations every time 
she revises the initial assumed structure, and this increased flexibility appears as a 
considerable advance over the original mapping account (Bueno & Colyvan, 2011, 
p.357).  
 In the next chapter we will return to the issue of assumed empirical structure, and we 
will note some further worries we might have about the identification of empirical 
structure independent of or prior to the application of mathematics, further worries 
that it seems to me Bueno and Colyvan’s response fails to address. There we will see 
how a fictionalized version of the mapping account gives us a particularly attractive 
solution to these remaining problems, lending further support to this version of the 
theory.    
The second difficulty we noted was with the impoverished range of mappings 
available to the mapping account. The inferential conception is able to deliver a 
richer supply of mappings, because by separating the immersion and interpretation 
stages, it has effectively removed the need for the mappings to be invertible. Because 
the mappings no longer need to be invertible, we are free to employ any of the 
structure preserving mappings Bueno and Colyvan identify at both the immersion 
and interpretation stages. And so we are no longer limited just to monomorphisms 
and no longer faced with the problem that we cannot account for the case in which 
the world has surplus structure over the mathematics used to represent it (Bueno & 
Colyvan, 2011, pp.354-355). 
I will return to the problem of idealisation in the next section. Bueno and Colyvan’s 
solution to this issue is somewhat more technical than their other solutions, and it 
will save time if we discuss their suggestions in tandem with our evaluation of them.  
 The third problem Bueno and Colyvan identify for the mapping account is with the 
case in which the mathematical structure outstrips the empirical domain of 
application. In particular, we saw that when some parts of the mathematical structure 
did not receive a physical interpretation whilst others did, we need to say something 
about what distinguished the two pieces of mathematics. And, recall, we saw that the 
relevant distinctions would depend upon contextual factors which the mapping 
approach was poorly situated to account for. Now we simply note that Bueno and 
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Colyvan build into their account of the immersion stage the existence of contextual 
features determining the choice of appropriate mapping (Bueno & Colyvan, 2011, 
pp.356-357).  
 We will return to the problem of explanation, and how Bueno and Colyvan propose 
to address this, in a later section on the inferential portion of their inferential account. 
For now, though, we note that the existence of a derivation stage in their account 
allows for the use of mathematics in more than an indexing capacity, and so it is 
within this stage that Bueno and Colyvan believe their inferential account can 
accommodate other applications of mathematics beyond mere representation (Bueno 
& Colyvan, 2011, pp.363-366). As we will see, it is not at all clear how this is 
supposed to work, and so it is not entirely clear that the case for a derivation stage 
has been established. Nonetheless, at this point we should note that there is nothing 
about this derivation stage itself that cannot be accommodated within an enhanced 
mapping account. It is the claim that the inferential relationships established at this 
stage are the fundamental or most basic use of mathematics in scientific applications 
that seems to make the difference between the inferential approach and the mapping 
account. Absent the former claim, and the mere existence of a derivation stage seems 
perfectly compatible with an enhanced mapping account of mathematical-scientific 
representation.     
 
2.4.4 Evaluating the Solutions and an Enhanced Mapping Account 
In this section we turn to the evaluation of these various responses, and we begin by 
noting that our response to each will be fairly similar. As we will see, because the 
inferential conception seems to make little use of mathematically established 
inferential relationships in accounting for the problems we have discussed so far 
(despite this supposedly been its raison d’etre), and because the existence of 
mappings plays such a central role in the machinery Bueno and Colyvan employ, an 
enhanced mapping account should be able to help itself to much of the inferential 
conception’s elaborations without feeling a great deal of compunction.  
In response to their solution of the first problem, we note that Bueno and Colyvan 
have done little to establish that the mapping account can only incorporate a 
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defeasible assumed structure “via more ad hoc and trial-and-error methods” (Bueno 
& Colyvan, 2011, p.357) than their own two-step immersion approach. But perhaps 
more importantly, there is nothing in this two-step mapping account that cannot be 
taken over by a more elaborate mapping account than Pincock’s. Indeed, there is 
nothing to stop Pincock adding to his mapping account the claim that we can map 
empirical structure onto mathematical structure onto new mathematical structure in 
just the same way Bueno and Colyvan do. Clearly this device is not present in the 
original presentation of the mapping account, but nor is it incompatible with it. I 
conclude that the mapping account can deal with this challenge, then, in just the 
same way as the inferential conception. 
 Again, with respect to the role of contextual features in settling the choice of 
mapping, I propose that the mapping account simply be supplemented to allow for 
the existence of contextual decision making. Nothing about the mapping account is 
inconsistent with this; and as the use of context to settle these kinds of decisions does 
not seem to depend on any inferential role of the mathematics used in applications, I 
conclude that if the inferential conception is entitled to this contextual supplement, so 
is the mapping account.  
 The problem of the impoverished range of mappings available to the mapping 
account is more of a challenge to Pincock’s approach. There was no place in 
Pincock’s original presentation of the mapping account for the two stages of 
immersion and interpretation, and it is clear that incorporating these two features 
would be a significant structural change in the mapping approach to applications. 
Nonetheless, I take it that the upshot of Bueno and Colyvan’s discussion is that this 
is precisely what the mapping theorist should do. Once more, I see nothing 
precluding a mapping account from incorporating these two stages of mapping, and 
so nothing requiring the mapping theorist to limit herself only to monomorphisms. 
And once again, I see no especially inferential role for mathematics in Bueno and 
Colyvan’s solution to this problem. 
Indeed, this is a very general feature of Bueno and Colyvan’s discussion of their 
alternative account of applications. With the possible exception of the problem of 
explanatory uses of mathematics, none of the problems identified by Bueno and 
Colyvan for the mapping account requires the existence of an inferential relationship 
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facilitated by the mathematics. This is true also of the problem of idealisation we are 
about to discuss. And because the inferential conception is in other respects so 
closely related to the mapping account, there is nothing to prevent the creation of an 
enhanced mapping account utilizing the same machinery of immersion and 
interpretation stages as the inferential conception.  
 The problem of idealisation and its proposed solution is somewhat more 
complicated than those we have so far discussed, and would require a greater degree 
of technical exposition to discuss fully. As I do not want to become bogged down in 
a morass of technical details, this brief discussion will unfortunately be extremely 
condensed. For a fuller presentation, I direct the reader to (Bueno & Colyvan, 2011, 
pp.357-363) In short: Bueno and Colyvan propose to account for idealisations in 
terms of the theory of partial structures. That is, because there can be no full mapping 
in these cases between the empirical and mathematical structures, we need to make 
use of partial mappings instead, in which some “features of the empirical set up – 
although not all – can be mapped into appropriate mathematical structures.” (Bueno 
and Colyvan 2011, p.358) These partial mappings are then analysed in terms of the 
formal framework of partial structures (I will not attempt a formal presentation of 
this theory here, which is adequately discussed in the paper already referenced). The 
idea, then, is that in cases of idealisation, when our mappings must perforce be 
partial, “certain aspects of the actual empirical situation can still be mapped to 
relevant features of the mathematical structures invoked.” (Bueno & Colyvan, 2011, 
p.359)  
Now there are two things that could be said in response to this solution. The first is to 
note again that nothing here requires the existence of inferential relationships 
facilitated by mathematics, and so nothing seems to prevent the mapping account 
from being supplemented with these partial mappings. Indeed, as partial mappings 
could be seen as just a species of mapping, it might simply look like an oversight on 
Pincock’s part not to make use of them in the first place. 
 But I believe that this extra machinery is in fact unnecessary (or, at least, that it has 
not shown to be necessary). I believe that with the flexibility of the two stage 
immersion and interpretation mappings, there will be no need to make this extra 
machinery available. To see this, remember that for Bueno and Colyvan, we had a 
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case of idealisation when we had a case of the world possessing greater structure 
than the mathematics used to represent it. This was a problem for the mapping 
account, because the original Pincockian approach was limited to the use of 
monomorphisms. But as we saw above, once the two stage approach is adopted, we 
are no longer limited to monomorphisms, and so we are no longer stymied when we 
attempt to account for those cases, like idealisation, in which world outstrips 
mathematics.  
 Bueno and Colyvan’s final objection to the mapping account was based around the 
concept of mathematical explanation. As we saw above, the mapping account is 
largely a theory of the descriptive use of mathematics in science. But, as we saw in 
the previous chapter, in recent years some philosophers have urged that mathematics 
plays a more than descriptive role in applications; some uses of mathematics, they 
have suggested, are genuinely explanatory (cf. Baker, 2005). Bueno and Colyvan 
suggest that this threatens the completeness of the mapping account’s theory of 
applied mathematics: because explanatory power is not simply a function of 
descriptive adequacy, and the mapping account is only a theory of the latter, there is 
no way to account for explanations using the mapping approach to applicability.  
How might we respond to this line of objection? Well, in part, a fully developed 
response to Bueno and Colyvan will have to await the next two sections, in which we 
discuss the inferential portion of the inferential conception and a related worry raised 
by Robert Batterman (Batterman, 2010); but there are some things we can say right 
now. Firstly, Bueno and Colyvan’s paper gives us little reason to believe that 
mathematical explanations exist within science. This is a controversial matter within 
the philosophy of science, and it is certainly not an established fact. So one way out 
might be to challenge the claims made about mathematical explanations in science, 
ie. to counterclaim: “there aren’t any”. This is not an option I want to pursue at 
present; as we saw in the previous chapter, there are no ontological pressures 
motivating this line of argument, so if we are to reject the existence of mathematical 
explanation in science we will have to do so on the basis of independent 
methodological considerations I cannot, for reasons of space, address here. 
Nonetheless, I do not believe the matter of mathematical-scientific explanation has 
been definitively settled, and so I believe this response may be a live one.   
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Another way out of the quagmire would be to establish some way in which the 
mapping account can account for explanations. One way of doing this might be to 
incorporate the derivation stage of the inferential approach into the mapping account. 
But for now we might as well observe, anticipating some of our later arguments, that 
while explanatory power is not a function of descriptive adequacy, it is a plausible 
claim that some descriptive machinery must be in place before any explanation can 
be possible. This makes some form of descriptive adequacy at least a necessary 
condition on explanation, and so the mapping account is not totally silent on how 
explanatory mathematical applications might be possible. 
 I think it is also important to note, before we move on to a more thorough discussion 
of these matters, that the outcome of this debate is likely to have little bearing on the 
issue of mathematical ontology. We have already established, in the previous 
chapter, that mathematical explanation, if there is any, is unlikely to commit us to the 
existence of mathematical objects. It is description or representation that fixes our 
ontological commitments in this case, the descriptive role mathematics plays in our 
best theories; that is the only reason we have found ourselves investigating the nature 
of mathematical representation in science at all.  
 Now, should this objection to the mapping account stick, that would certainly be 
unfortunate: I would be forced to alter the account I hope to give of the nature of 
applied mathematics, adopting a different theory of how mathematics relates to the 
empirical world, and embedding that new theory within my fictionalist account. 
Nonetheless, the basic structure of that fictionalist account would remain intact. Once 
again, it is important to bear in mind that mathematical explanation (if there is any) is 
not a threat to mathematical anti-realism.      
The final point (and this will become much more important in the next section): 
Bueno and Colyvan offer no characterisation of explanatory power. In particular, 
they offer no real reason to think that explanatory power is a function of inferential 
relationships, and so we are given no real reason to think that the inferential 
conception is any better placed to deal with explanatory uses of mathematics than the 
mapping account. Even worse, as will become apparent in the next section, it is not 
at all clear that a theory of representation is required to also be a theory of 
explanation. One reason that both the inferential and mapping accounts are equally 
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silent on this issue might be that neither is really the kind of theory that would have 
anything to say about explanation.  
 
2.4.5 The Inferential Conception: How Inferential? 
So far we have seen ways in which an enhanced mapping account can take over 
much of the machinery of Bueno and Colyvan’s conception of applied mathematics, 
and use it to solve the problems faced by Pincock’s initial presentation of a mapping 
theory. But it remains that all our hard work might be undone, unless we can resist 
the claim that the primary role of mathematics in science is inferential. With that in 
mind we turn to an evaluation of Bueno and Colyvan’s inferential component of their 
inferential conception. 
We saw above that the main difference between Bueno and Colyvan’s proposal, and 
Pincock’s mapping account was that the former takes the fundamental role of 
mathematics to be inferential: “by embedding certain features of the empirical world 
into a mathematical structure, it is possible to obtain inferences that would otherwise 
be extraordinarily hard (if not impossible) to obtain.” (Bueno & Colyvan, 2011, 
p.352) It is these inferential relationships that Bueno and Colyvan believe will 
underpin the use of mathematics in generating predictions, unifying theories, and 
providing explanations. And it is the supposed failure of the mapping account to deal 
with these kinds of applications that requires the move to the richer inferential 
conception.  
The problem with this line of argument is that Bueno and Colyvan say very little 
about how it is that inferential relationships underpin these further uses of 
mathematics. We are simply told that the establishing of inferential relationships is 
essential to these three features of scientific activity. Now, it would clearly be a large 
project to review every extant approach to the unification of scientific theories, 
prediction and confirmation, and scientific explanation. And it is equally clear that 
this chapter is not the place for sorting out all of that. But without having some 
account of these aspects of scientific methodology, it is very difficult to know what 
to say about the role of inference, and so very difficult to know what to say in 
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response to Bueno and Colyvan’s claim that the fundamental role of mathematics in 
applications is inferential.  
In order to make some progress here, I suggest we shelve for the moment the 
question of mathematics’ role in generating predictions and unifying theories. It is 
here that Bueno and Colyvan’s claims about the importance of inference looks most 
plausible, and this may well provide some evidence of the need to incorporate 
mathematics’ inferential role into our enhanced mapping account. If this is correct, 
we may have here some (tentative) evidence of the need for a derivation stage in 
between the immersion and interpretation steps.   
 But what of explanation? Here the waters are less clear, and it will help to very 
briefly consider the kinds of accounts of explanation for which an inferential role 
might be essential and those for which inference might be less important. It is clear 
that a deductive-nomological model would make explanation a function of inferential 
relationships. On this kind of account of explanation, giving an explanation depends 
upon providing an argument, at least one of whose premises is a law of nature, and 
whose conclusion is the explanandum (Hempel and Oppenheim, 1948). This is about 
as clear an instance of the establishing of an inferential relationship as you could ask, 
but sadly the D-N account of explanation cannot, for very familiar reasons, which I 
will not review, be the correct account of explanation.   
  So what about the alternatives? Well, once again, without some clear statement of 
the theory of explanatory power preferred by Bueno and Colyvan, it is difficult to 
know what to say. We begin by noting that there is at least one theory of explanatory 
power for which inferential relationships might not be of fundamental importance. 
This is van Fraassen’s pragmatic account, according to which the giving of 
explanations consists in an answer to a “why question” (van Fraassen, 1980, 126-
129). Because the kind of answer appropriate will depend upon contextual and 
pragmatic features, it is unlikely that every explanation will consist in evincing some 
inferential relationships. It is reasonable to think that for some audiences, and for 
some “why? questions”, a complex inference might be a truly useless explanation. 
 The remaining alternatives are causal accounts, statistical relevance accounts, or 
some kind of unificationist account. It would take far too long to review all of these 
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different approaches to explanation, but for now we can note one more problem 
Bueno and Colyvan’s proposal faces: we are told very little about the kinds of 
inference they believe mathematics aids. For some of the accounts of explanation just 
named (statistical relevance, and unificationist) it is plausible that inferential 
relationships will play an important role. But what about the causal mechanical 
account? It may be possible for Bueno and Colyvan to argue that the identification of 
causal mechanisms involves inference, but it is not clear at all that this will be the 
same kind of inference employed in establishing statistical relevance or unifying two 
theories. Here the challenge for Bueno and Colyvan is to say what mathematics in 
particular can contribute to these kinds of causal inferences. 
 This ambiguity about explanations on the part of Bueno and Colyvan ultimately 
makes the task of knowing how to respond to the objection canvassed in the previous 
section unmanageably difficult. That is, it is just not clear how the mapping theorist 
should respond to the objection that mathematical explanations cannot be accounted 
for within the mapping approach. As we saw in the previous section, one way in 
which the mapping theorist might want to go is to adopt the derivation stage into her 
mapping account, while resisting Bueno and Colyvan’s further claim that this 
inferential machinery is the whole point of mathematical applications in science 
(something we will turn to in the remainder of this section). The problem here is that 
it is just not clear how the derivation stage is supposed to help in providing 
explanations, nor how drawing inferences within a mathematical model could 
possibly amount to explaining anything. Nor is it obvious that it is within a 
mathematical representation that explanation ought to take place. Explanation looks 
like something we do with representations, not something we do within them. For 
these kinds of reasons, I am chary about adopting Bueno and Colyvan’s solution to 
this particular problem (the derivation stage). In short, I am not convinced that 
mathematical explanation even is a problem to be solved by a theory of mathematical 
representation (and this explains why even Bueno and Colyvan finally seem 
uncertain about what exactly to say about it).    
The two main conclusions to take from all this are: firstly, that at the very least, 
Bueno and Colyvan need to say much more about what they take explanatory power 
to consist in, and what kinds of inference they believe mathematics assists with, 
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before they can establish their conclusion that the fundamental role for mathematics 
in applications is inferential. And secondly, because they do not address these issues, 
it is unclear how their own solution to the challenge from mathematical explanation 
is supposed to work, and even unclear whether a theory of mathematical 
representation is the appropriate place to address issues of explanation.    
The previous line of argument, if it has been successful, has established the existence 
of a lacuna in Bueno and Colyvan’s presentation of their inferential conception. 
Before closing this section, I want to present a more direct argument against the 
claim that facilitating inference is the primary or fundamental role of applied 
mathematics. I propose that the fundamental role of mathematics in applications is in 
facilitating the representation of scientific phenomena, and, moreover, that whatever 
inferential role mathematics plays in science is underwritten by this representational 
function (It is important to note, before continuing, that this should not be taken as 
ruling out an inferentialist account of representation (cf. Brandom, 2000). The claim 
is just that whatever the fundamental philosophical character of the representation 
relation, representational uses of mathematics are more fundamental than specifically 
inferential ones, such as facilitating otherwise complex or impossible inferences).  
 In essence, the claim I want to make is very simple: before we can apply our 
mathematical-scientific representations inferentially, we need to have in place a 
mapping establishing the representational adequacy of our representations. If this 
mapping is not in place, and our mathematical model is not a description or 
representation of some scientific structure, then it is unclear what relevance our 
inferences or derivations employing that mathematics could have for the empirical 
phenomena being investigated. Here we would have only a mathematical formalism, 
floating free of any interpretation, and so floating free of any actual application. 
 If the above reasoning is correct, then it seems that the existence of representational 
applications of mathematics is prior to and necessary for the specifically inferential 
applications of mathematics. Or to put all this another way: every inferential 
application is already, of necessity, a representational application. That is, the set of 
inferential applications is a subset of the set of descriptive applications, and if that is 
correct, then there is no way inference could be fundamental; it is representation that 
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is fundamental, and the primary use of mathematics in science must be to facilitate 
these representations.    
 To conclude this evaluative section: we have seen that Bueno and Colyvan fail to 
sustain their suggestion that the principle role of mathematics is inferential. On the 
one hand, they must say more about the role of inference in explanation, before they 
can establish their claim that all the applications of mathematics they identify depend 
upon mathematics’ role in facilitating inference. On the other, we have seen good 
reason to think that even if they can establish this vital role for mathematical 
inference, such inferences must, of necessity, be underwritten by mathematics’ 
representational role, and so it is representation not inference that turns out to be 
essential for understanding the applicability of mathematics. We have seen further 
that without some good reason to think that explanatory uses of mathematics must be 
addressed by a theory of mathematical representation, the objection Bueno and 
Colyvan raise to the mapping account from the existence of mathematical 
explanations of physical phenomena lapses.  
 
2.5 Batterman on Explanation 
In this section I want to consider one final challenge for the mapping theorist, 
introduced by Robert Batterman in his On the Explanatory Role of Mathematics in 
Empirical Science (2010). Like Bueno and Colyvan, Batterman believes that the 
mapping account will struggle with both idealisation and explanation, but 
Batterman’s unique focus is on the intersection of these two kinds of application. 
That is, Batterman raises a worry for the mapping account from the direction of 
idealised explanations, especially insofar as these involve the taking of limits and the 
generation of singularities that these limiting operations can give rise to.  
   As Batterman sees it, the problem with mapping accounts is that they focus on 
static relationships between mathematical structures and the physical domain 
(Batterman, 2010, p.11). But in many cases the explanatorily relevant features of 
some application of mathematics involve the use of limiting operations, and these 
cannot be understood in terms of a structural relation between the mathematics and 
the physical world. This is because, if “the limits are not regular, then they yield 
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various types of divergences and singularities for which there are no physical 
analogs.” (Batterman, 2010, pp.21-22) Batterman then argues that these singularities 
are essential to the explanatory role of mathematics. Having the limiting idealisation 
in place allows us to discard or ignore aspects of the physical system that are 
irrelevant to the features we are interested in explaining (Batterman 2010, p.23). If 
this is correct, and if we cannot find physical analogues for these limiting operations 
and the singularities they yield, then it is hard to see how the mapping account could 
accommodate explanatory applications of mathematics.  
 As an example of the explanatory use of limiting operations, Batterman considers 
the explanation offered by condensed matter physics for “the existence of phase 
transitions and of the universality of critical phenomena” (Batterman, 2010, pp.5-8). 
We will not go into the details of this example here, but the upshot of Batterman’s 
discussion is that the explanation presented by condensed matter physicists involves 
taking the thermodynamic limit. This is the limit in which (roughly speaking) the 
number of particles of the system, for example, the number of water molecules in a 
kettle, approaches infinity. This is a fairly clear instance of idealisation: tea kettles 
can only hold a finite number of water molecules. But nonetheless, this idealization 
is an essential part of the explanation of phase transitions. “The existence of a phase 
transition requires an infinite system. No phase transitions occur in systems with a 
finite number of degrees of freedom.” (Kadanoff, 2000) (quoted at (Batterman, 2010, 
p.8)) So it seems as though we have an explanatorily essential use of a limiting 
operation, where the limiting operation has no physical analogue. And it is 
Batterman’s contention that the majority of idealising explanations in physics should 
be viewed as instances of the use of limiting operations in this way (Batterman, 
2010, p.8).  
 Batterman goes on to suggest that the best line for a mapping theorist to take with 
respect to idealisation is to adopt what he calls the Galilean conception (Batterman, 
2010, p.16). The idea here is to claim that what makes an idealisation useful is the (in 
principle) possibility of removing it by telling some de-idealising story. That is, 
idealisations are useful in science to the extent that they can be eliminated by filling 
in the details ignored and distorted by the original idealised model.  
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 But, Batterman goes on to argue (Batterman, 2010, pp.17-19), the kinds of idealised 
explanations he has in mind cannot be accounted for in this way. The existence of 
explanatorily essential idealisations, like that of the thermodynamic limit in the 
explanation of phase transitions, rules out this Galilean approach to idealisation. The 
idealisation cannot be removed by filling in the details glossed over in the original 
model, because, if the model is “corrected” in this way, the explanation is no longer 
possible. In these cases, adding more details counts as “explanatory noise” 
(Batterman, 2010, p.17), drowning out the features of the system that are actually of 
interest to the investigator.  
 Batterman then claims that what makes the provision of such a “promissory back-
ground story” (Batterman, 2010, p.17) impossible is the fact that the limits involved 
in the explanations are singular (a singular limit is one in which the behaviour as one 
approaches the limit is qualitatively different from the behaviour at the limit). So 
adding more detail in order to remove the limiting operation makes a qualitative 
change in the behaviour of the model. In most cases this will lead to the explanatory 
features of the model being lost. 
 Now if Batterman is correct about all this, then we have one more piece of evidence 
of the need to incorporate a “derivation” stage into our enriched mapping account. 
Note that the use of limiting operations in the kind of examples Batterman has in 
mind is exactly the kind of mathematical transformation for which Bueno and 
Colyvan make room in the derivation stage of their application procedure. But two 
things need to be said about this move.  
 First, contra Bueno and Colyvan, while this does involve an important role for 
mathematics in facilitating inferences (in this case, inferences about what will 
happen when some physical feature is ignored or deliberately simplified), this 
inferential role is still underpinned by the vital representational relations established 
at the immersion and interpretation stages. So even if we must accommodate an 
inferential role for mathematics, we still have no reason to think that this role is 
fundamental.  
Secondly, contra Batterman, none of this gives us a reason for abandoning the 
mapping approach altogether. If the immersion and interpretation stages were 
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removed entirely, we would be left with a piece of uninterpreted formalism, and the 
kinds of mathematical operations Batterman is so keen to focus on would not amount 
to explanations at all. As Pincock puts it: “Batterman’s proposal risks turning his 
explanations into purely mathematical derivations.” (Pincock, 2011, p.216)  
 But, of course, all of this is only hypothetical: “If Batterman is correct, then…” Can 
we find any reasons to doubt the antecedent? Well, first off, we might worry about 
Batterman’s claim that most idealised explanatory applications of mathematics will 
involve limiting operations. One reason for hesitation here is that we might think of 
apparently explanatory uses of idealised mathematical representations that do not 
involve the taking of limits or the appearance of singularities. For instance, some 
instances of what Pincock (Pincock, 2012, p.6) calls “abstract acausal” 
representations (a representation in which mathematics is used to abstract away from 
particular causal details of the empirical situation under investigation) seem to be 
used explanatorily, but do not rely on some parameter tending to a limit.  
 Consider, for instance, Euler’s proof that there is no way of walking over each of the 
bridges of Konigsberg just once and returning to one’s starting point. In brief, the 
explanation here is that the bridges form a non-Eulerian graph, for which there is no 
such path. Here the explanation depends upon the existence of a map between the 
physical arrangement of bridges, and a certain mathematical structure; no limiting 
operation is involved. And yet the usefulness of this explanation perfectly fits 
Batterman’s diagnosis of the explanatory power of asymptotic techniques. That is, 
the explanation is perfectly general—it ignores completely the causal and material 
features of the particular bridges of Konigsberg, and focuses solely on their abstract 
structure. And by focussing on this abstract structure, it enables us to see how the 
same result will hold for any system of bridges with that structure, regardless of 
material constitution or any particular causal details about the kind of walk 
attempted. 
 Of course, it would be a large task (and an empirical matter) to decide whether the 
majority of idealised explanations in science fit Pincock’s or Batterman’s model. But 
there is another, more fundamental reason to worry about Batterman’s focus on the 
use of singularity generating limiting operations. In short, Batterman seems to think 
that the kinds of asymptotic techniques he discusses will take us from a 
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representation in which every parameter is physically interpreted to one in which 
some features of the representation can no longer receive a physical interpretation, 
and that that is how idealisations are generated. But in many actual scientific 
applications, we may not have such a fully physically interpreted model in the first 
place. That is, our use of limiting operations may well take us from one idealised 
model to another idealised model. And if the representations to which asymptotic 
techniques are applied are already themselves idealisations, the use of asymptotic 
techniques cannot be the key to idealisation in quite the way Batterman assumes. 
 I think this point important, because it undermines one of Batterman’s central claims 
in his argument against the mapping approach. Remember that for Batterman, any 
mapping approach will be committed to a Galilean view of idealisation, in which 
every idealisation is, in principle, eliminable in favour of a completely accurate 
representation of the empirical scenario. But in the light of the previous paragraph, 
this seems an extremely implausible requirement for the mapping account to meet. In 
many cases, the mapping account will be attempting to describe a situation in which 
we already know that the empirical domain is unfaithfully represented by the 
mathematical model we map onto. In other words, it is beginning to look as though 
Batterman’s objection is just that the mapping account cannot handle any cases of 
idealisation, because it can never allow that the empirical domain might have more 
structure than its mathematical counterpart. But this is just the objection from 
idealisation that we addressed when discussing Bueno and Colyvan’s inferential 
conception, and we have already seen how to solve this difficultly by taking over 
some of their modifications.                  
 A final worry about Batterman’s objection involves paying closer attention to the 
way the explanatory payoffs are generated. As we saw above, having the idealisation 
in place allows us to discard or ignore aspects of the physical system that are 
irrelevant to the features we are interested in explaining. Or in other words, if we 
tried to make our representation of the empirical phenomena physically complete, we 
would only be adding “explanatory noise”, obscuring those features of the empirical 
structure that are actually responsible for the phenomena of interest. It is this feature 
of the explanatory uses of idealised mathematical representations that is actually 
pulling the explanatory weight, and it is this feature that makes the telling of a de-
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idealising “Galilean” story impossible. It is the loss of explanatory clarity, not the use 
of limiting operations that renders the Galilean conception an implausible account of 
idealisation. But now note that this makes the usefulness of idealised mathematical-
scientific representations a function of their impoverished content, and we have 
already seen above that both the enhanced mapping account and Bueno and 
Colyvan’s partial structures approach can handle impoverished representation at the 
immersion stage.  
 Once again, then, we have seen reason to regard whatever evidence there is of the 
need for a derivation stage as inconclusive. It is important to note that I am not ruling 
against incorporating a place for mathematical derivations into the enhanced 
mapping account once and for all: I believe that as long as we bear in mind the 
primacy of representation, there is nothing to stop us from doing so. Indeed, it may 
well remain that predictive and unificatory uses of mathematics in science require us 
to make a place for mathematical derivation in our model. But pending a detailed 
investigation of the way in which mathematics functions in generating scientific 
predictions and unifying scientific theories, I hold that we have so far been given no 
convincing reason for regarding derivation as an essential part of our model of 
applied mathematics.  
 
2.6 Conclusion 
Before closing it will be helpful to recap the material of this chapter and discuss 
some of the further challenges facing the mapping account.  
We have seen that by incorporating the immersion and interpretation stages of Bueno 
and Colyvan’s inferential conception into an enhanced mapping account, we have 
been able to meet some of the challenges facing a mapping theory of applied 
mathematics. Moreover, we have argued that it is the representational role of 
mathematics, and not its inferential role that is fundamental for understanding how 
mathematics is applied within the sciences. If this is correct, then we can help 
ourselves to the more sophisticated machinery introduced by Bueno and Colyvan, 
without endorsing their full inferential conception of mathematical applicability. We 
then saw ways in which we might resist Batterman’s claims that asymptotic 
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techniques cannot be handled by the mapping theorist, either by following Bueno and 
Colyvan and introducing a derivation stage into our model, or else by challenging 
Batterman’s claim that it is the generation of singularities at the limit that is doing the 
explanatory work.  
 The eventual picture of how the contents of mathematical-scientific representations 
are fixed looks like this: the contents of mathematical-scientific representations (the 
truth-conditions of mixed mathematical-scientific sentences) are given by the 
existence of a structure preserving mapping between the empirical domain under 
investigation and a suitable mathematical structure, and the existence of another 
mapping (not necessarily the inverse of the first) from the mathematical model back 
onto the empirical domain—remembering, of course, that the number of mappings at 
both the earlier immersion and later interpretation stages can be as large as we 
require to get the representation to function. At this stage of the investigation I want 
to leave open the question of the need for a derivation stage, noting only that we have 
not so far been required to make use of one in our model of applied mathematics, and 
that only a detailed examination of mathematics’ role in prediction, confirmation, 
unification, and explanation will settle the matter finally.  
 In the next chapter I discuss a number of outstanding challenges to this kind of 
account of applications, and suggest that by incorporating the mapping account into a 
kind of ontological fictionalism we can solve these worries. In particular, and 
perhaps most disturbingly for the mathematical anti-realist, the mapping account as 
developed here seems highly ontologically inflationary. As we will see, this initial 
impression of ontological profligacy can be bulked up into a novel version of the 
indispensability argument for mathematical platonism.  
 It is here that fictionalism will prove useful, allowing us to move the story 
developed in this chapter into a kind of make-believe setting, within which its 
unpalatable ontological commitments can be contained. As we will see, the 
fictionalised version of the mapping account helps with some further worries we 
might have about the theory, so the resulting package of fictionalism plus the 
mapping account is attractive for more than just its ontological parsimony.    
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Chapter 3. Fictionalism and the Mapping Account 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter we saw how the mapping account of mathematical 
applications proposes to explain how mathematical-scientific representations get 
their content. Drawing on Pincock’s work, I suggested that when mathematics is 
applied to some phenomenon of scientific interest, a structure preserving mapping is 
established between the empirical domain and some suitable mathematical structure; 
it is this mathematical structure that is then employed to represent the structure of the 
empirical domain. I then went on to argue that Pincock’s approach already possesses 
the resources to adequately respond to a number of concerns raised for mapping 
account by Bueno and Colyvan, and that even if this were not the case, there is 
nothing to prevent the development of an enhanced mapping account, incorporating 
the elaborations suggested by Bueno and Colyvan. The conclusion, then, was that 
little reason had so far been found for abandoning Pincock’s attractive and 
informative approach to scientific representation.  
 In this chapter we will look at the prospects for a fictionalised version of the 
mapping theory, one in which the dominant representational role is played by an 
account of pretence. At first this might seem like something of a change in direction, 
so before outlining the pretence theory I propose to adopt, I will briefly say 
something by way of motivation.  
 The first thing to note is that the mapping account is, at least prima facie, a 
platonistic theory. It talks of structure preserving mappings, and mathematical 
structures, and seems to quantify over these things. As we will see in the final section 
of this chapter, this raises the worrying possibility that adopting the mapping account 
may open us up to a variant of the indispensability argument in which the 
indispensable appearance of mathematical posits in our theory of mathematical 
applications argues for their inclusion in our ontology. If we are attracted to 
something like the mapping account of scientific representation, but independently 
suspicious of mathematical objects, this creates an unwelcome conflict.  
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 Secondly, as we will see when we come to discuss the fictionalised mapping 
account, this pretence based approach solves a number of outstanding worries with 
the Pincock's version of the theory. In particular, we will see how an account of 
mathematical-scientific representation in terms of imagined structure preserving 
mappings can solve problems with the empirical side of the relation – in particular, 
how some non-mathematical stuff can be related by a mathematical function, and 
what we should say about the existence of the requisite structure within the empirical 
domain. 
 Finally, by incorporating the mapping account into a pretence based theory of 
mathematical-scientific representation we get an attractively detailed picture of the 
content of the applied-mathematical fiction. In this case, when mathematics is 
applied we are invited to pretend that there exists an appropriate structure-preserving 
mapping between the empirical domain and a suitable mathematical structure. In 
essence, then, applied mathematics is the story we tell about such mappings and 
mathematical structures. 
 The topics I have just discussed by way of motivation will be more fully treated of 
in the final section of this chapter. Before that, I need to introduce and motivate a 
pretence based account of mathematics that can do the job of incorporating the 
mapping account and drawing its platonistic sting. In the first section I will introduce 
the pretence theory of Kendall Walton (Walton, 1993), and suggest that his account 
of prop-oriented make-believe can supply the kind of anti-realist account of 
fictionalism a nominalist needs for applied mathematics. Much of this ground has 
already been covered adequately elsewhere and by others (Yablo, 2005; Leng, 2010), 
so I do not intend to spend very long discussing this aspect of my fictionalist 
account. It should also be noted that I am not wedded to a Waltonian pretence theory 
of fiction. Should it turn out that there are insuperable difficulties with the Waltonian 
account, I am happy to switch to some other pretence theory, that is, so long as the 
alternative theory is suitably anti-realist. The exact details of the workings of the 
pretence are not of the first importance for the mathematical fictionalist. What 
matters is that the resulting theory allows one to speak speak as if there are some 
things or entities, without being committed to the existence of those things. One way 
of doing that is via pretence, and it is Walton’s pretence theory with which I am most 
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familiar. But should it transpire that there is a better theory out there, then I reserve 
the right to help myself to that.  
 Nor should it be supposed that the mathematical fictionalist is a hostage to the 
fortunes of debates in the philosophy of literature about the correct account of fiction 
and its ontology. The question of how best to account for mathematical ontology is 
independent of the question of how best to account for the ontology of fiction. 
Should it transpire that an anti-realist account of fiction was, for some reason local to 
the philosophy of fiction, untenable, then that might be a setback for the general 
project of defending a nominalist account of metaphysics across the board, but it 
would not show that mathematical objects exist. If pretence is not how fiction works, 
it might still be how applied mathematics works.  
 Nor, finally, am I particularly wedded to a pretence theory at all. The fictionalist 
claim is that mathematics is like fiction, in that it can be good without being true. 
This claim seems to be compatible with any anti-realist account of fiction, not only 
with a pretence theory. So I further reserve the right to help myself to any anti-realist 
account of fiction that will work, that is, that will underwrite the claim that 
mathematics is good without being true.  
 In the second section of this chapter, we will discuss the question of whether the 
mathematical fictionalist should be a hermeneutic fictionalist (mathematics, correctly 
interpreted, already is like a fiction; mathematicians already are engaged in 
something like pretence) or a revolutionary fictionalist (mathematics should be 
treated as a fiction; whatever mathematicians think they are up to, philosophers 
should treat mathematics as pretence).  
This issue matters for two reasons. Firstly, the revolutionary fictionalist makes 
claims that, according to some, contravene the Naturalist’s obligation to take 
seriously our best scientific theories. In other words, they are offering corrections to 
best science that no Naturalist philosopher is licensed to make. Secondly, the 
hermeneutic fictionalist makes claims that have empirical consequences. 
Hermeneutic fictionalism is a theory about the actual behaviour of agents engaged in 
applied mathematical discourse, and as such it makes claims about the best 
interpretation of that behaviour. But these empirical claims could be false, and some 
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have argued that evidence exists to show that they are false. This means that we 
cannot just prevaricate between revolutionary and hermeneutic fictionalism, as we 
can with accounts of fiction, just helping ourselves to whatever works or whatever 
we are most familiar with. There are arguments to the effect that neither approach 
will work, and these arguments need to be countered if we are to defend the 
legitimacy of either way of being a fictionalist.  
 So in the second section we will investigate and respond to these arguments against 
revolutionary and hermeneutic fictionalism. The upshot of all this will be to favour, 
very slightly, the revolutionary variety. As we will see in the course of our 
discussion, hermeneutic fictionalism is just much more provisional than the 
revolutionary fictionalism, and there are simply more ways for it to fail. There may 
currently be no knock-down argument against it, but there are suggestive lines of 
enquiry that make a positive outcome for hermeneutic fictionalism seem unlikely, 
and should any of those lines of enquiry present negative results, we will have very 
good reasons to abandon fictionalism. The safe money, then, is on revolutionary 
fictionalism.  
 In brief, then, what I propose to defend in this chapter is a revolutionary fictionalist 
account of applied mathematics, whose content is given by a pretence involving the 
existence of structure preserving mappings between the empirical domain and some 
suitable mathematical structure. It is a kind of prop-oriented make-believe (to use 
Walton’s terminology (1993, p.39)), with the empirical domain serving as the prop, 
and so an anti-realist account of the things (mappings, structures) we talk about 
within the pretence. We begin, then, with prop-oriented make-believe. 
 
3.2 Walton and Prop-Oriented Make-Believe  
 Consider the following children’s game. Some children are playing in the garden a 
game called Avoid the Bears (the example is Walton’s (Walton, 1993, p.53); the 
name is mine). Clearly, at least if they are playing the game in an ordinary garden, 
their game does not involve escaping from the clutches of actual bears. Instead the 
children run around, avoiding tree stumps. Wherever they find a tree stump, they are 
moved to exclaim, “Oh, no! A bear!” Often they will then change direction, and seek 
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to place some distance between themselves and the tree stump. This odd behaviour 
may be accompanied by cries of, “Run away from the Bear!” Upon stumbling onto a 
tree stump hidden within some weeds, Timmy is declared by the other children to 
have been “eaten by the bear”. Upon examining Timmy we find no tooth marks, 
claw marks, or any other signs of recent ursine ingestion. Moreover, it was a tree 
stump, and not a bear he stumbled into.  
 How are we to make sense of the childrens’ strange performance? We might 
consider the children insane or the victims of some febrile hallucination, and seek 
medical advice. We might check the medicine chest or the drinks cupboard to see if 
anything is missing. But most likely, at least if we are ordinary adults, we will regard 
the children as engaged in make-believe. The children are playing a game, one 
feature of which is that participants in the game are invited to make-believe that the 
tree stumps are bears. Wherever there are tree stumps, there are bears. The bears are 
to be imagined as large, and dangerous bears, and, moreover, to touch a tree stump is 
to be invited to make-believe that one has been mauled or that one has been eaten by 
the bear. It is this kind of activity, making-believe, that Kendall Walton makes the 
basis of his anti-realist theory of fiction (Walton, 1990), and more importantly for 
our purposes, his account of metaphor as prop-oriented make-believe (Walton, 
1993).  
 We can see make-believe clearly in such children’s games as Avoid the Bear. But 
Walton suggests that this mechanism of pretence also plays a role in more adult 
activities of artistic engagement. In particular, for our purposes, Walton argues that 
make-believe is central to our activity of creating fictional representations. A 
fictional representation, for Walton, is one that represents its objects by prescribing 
imaginings concerning those objects (Leng, 2010, p.158). So, for instance, the game 
Avoid the Bears represents the tree stumps as bears by prescribing participants in the 
game to imagine of the tree stumps that they are bears.  
 How is this prescription to imagine, of the tree stumps that they are bears, 
established? It is at this point in his theory that Walton introduces the technical 
vocabulary of props and principles of generation (Walton, 1990, pp.35-43). 
Principles of generation are the often implicit rules of our games of make-believe 
that tell us when we are to imagine that something is the case, and what we are to 
81 
 
imagine. So, for instance, in the game Avoid the Bears, we have the following 
principles of generation: (i) wherever there is a tree stump, there is a bear; (ii) if you 
step on a tree stump, you get eaten by a bear; (iii) if you are eaten by a bear, then you 
are dead; and so on. Notice that the first principle, (i), establishes that whenever we 
encounter a tree stump, we are to imagine of it that it is a bear. By so doing the 
principle ensures that our game represents tree stumps as bears.  
 In the children’s game the rules of generation are largely explicit; indeed, they may 
have been agreed upon in advance, with the children stipulating, vocally, that this is 
how the game is to be played. But principles of generation need not be explicit. So it 
is a convention of novel reading that, other things being equal, one is to imagine that 
the sentences of the novel express truths. In so doing, we generate a prescription to 
imagine that what the sentences relate has actually happened. In other words, in our 
games of make-believe with novels, we represent the sentences of the novel as true, 
and thereby represent their contents as true, and the events they relate as having 
actually occurred. But notice that in this case, the principle of generation, that we are 
to imagine of the sentences in novels that they are true, is not explicit. We do not 
open a novel to a reminder that the sentences therein are to be imagined as relating 
real events. We already, implicitly, understand how to engage with novels, and how 
to use them as fictional representations. This is an important point, because very 
many games of make-believe work on the basis of principles of generation that are 
implicit. In particular, if our theory of applied mathematics is to be given a 
fictionalized treatment, it will likely be in terms of principles of generation of which 
the users of those mathematical-scientific representations are only implicitly aware.  
Notice that in the case of principle (i) of the children’s game, the children are 
instructed to imagine of the tree stumps that they are bears. The tree stump here is 
functioning as a prop in the game of make-believe. Again, in the case of novel 
reading, we are instructed to imagine of the sentences contained in the text of the 
novel that they are true. The text of the novel here is the prop. What is a prop? A 
prop is something like an occasion for the application of the principles of generation 
of our games of make-believe (Leng, 2010, pp.161-163). A prop is anything, a 
sentence, a physical object, a suitable situation or event, which, in concert with the 
principles of generation, generates a prescription to imagine that something is the 
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case. Together, then, the principles of generation and the props of our games of 
make-believe prescribe certain imaginings, and it is on the basis of these prescribed 
imaginings that they represent things as being thus-and-so.  
 So far, our discussion has focussed on the way in which fictional representations 
represent certain real objects in certain ways. In particular, we have focussed on the 
way in which fictional representations misrepresent certain real objects, representing 
them as thus-and-so when, in fact, they are not thus-and-so. So the children’s game, 
Avoid the Bears, misrepresents real tree stumps as bears. And in reading a novel, we 
misrepresent real sentences in the text of the novel as true, when in reality they are 
false (or mostly false). But fictional representation is not limited just to representing 
real world objects. Novel reading is instructive here, because by representing the 
sentences of the novel as true, the novel can further represent certain events that may 
never have happened, and certain people who have never existed. Consider the 
Sherlock Holmes stories of Conan Doyle. On the basis of the implicit rule of 
generation that the sentences of the stories are to be imagined as true (established, in 
part, by the presentation of those stories as factual reports authored by Dr James 
Watson), and the text of the stories functioning as a prop, we represent the career of a 
consulting detective, Sherlock Holmes, even though such a consulting detective 
never existed. This is an important point to bear in mind, for, when we come to 
discuss a fictionalized version of the mapping account, our fictional mathematical-
scientific representations will involve us representing the physical world as standing 
in certain relations to a world of mathematical objects we do not believe exist. It is 
this feature of Walton’s account that enables us to evade commitment to a world of 
morphisms, and mathematical structures.  
 Now for the most part, when we are engaged with a fictional representation like a 
Sherlock Holmes story or a game of Avoid the Bears, we are interested in the content 
of the fiction itself. We play the game of make-believe for its own sake, because we 
find it fun, or exciting, or aesthetically pleasing, or intellectually challenging. But 
this will clearly not do if we are looking to adapt this kind of approach to fiction to 
the case of mathematical-scientific representation. We do not build mathematical-
scientific theories of the world just for the sheer fun of doing so. We expect them, at 
the very least, to be empirically adequate, and most of us sincerely hope that they are 
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accurate representations of the world itself. Now fortunately, because the props of 
our make-believe games exist in the real world, there are forms of engagement with 
fictional representations that are not what Walton calls content-oriented (Walton, 
1993, p.39); that is, there are ways of engaging with make-believe that focus on the 
props themselves, not on the content of the fictional representation. In this sense, 
fictional representations are Janus-faced: they can face inward, from the props, via 
the principles of generation, to the content of the fictional representation, which is 
what we are really interested in learning about; but they can also face outward, from 
the content of the representation, back via the principles of generation, to the props. 
In this way we can learn about the props, from the fictional representation. Walton 
calls this kind of make-believe prop-oriented (Walton, 1993, p.39), and it is this kind 
of prop-oriented fictional representation that we will make the basis of our account of 
applied mathematics. 
 To see how prop-oriented make-believe works, consider a case of Walton’s chosen 
example of prop-oriented fiction, metaphor. So, for instance, suppose I say to you, 
“There are butterflies in my stomach.” Now, unless you suppose me to have some 
very outré dining habits, you are likely to regard a literal reading of this sentence as 
totally false. I do not, and never have had, a belly full of butterflies. But nonetheless, 
you are unlikely to dismiss my utterance of this sentence as a bare-faced lie. Instead, 
you are likely to suppose that, far from telling you about the contents of my digestive 
tract, I am actually trying to convey some information about my mental state and 
associated physical sensations. I am, in fact, telling you I am nervous, and what that 
nervousness feels like.  
 How do I achieve this by uttering the false sentence “There are butterflies in my 
stomach”? Here is how Walton thinks prop-oriented make-believe can help give an 
account of metaphors like this (Walton, 1993, pp.45-46). If you hear me utter the 
sentence “There are butterflies in my stomach”, you are entitled to treat this as a 
move in a game of make-believe. What kind of game of make-believe? One 
governed by the following rule, “when you are feeling nervous and experience a 
certain sensation linked to that nervousness, then you have butterflies in your 
stomach.” In this game, the sensation and associated nervousness are the props; the 
principle of generation tells you that on the occasion of the symptoms of 
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nervousness, you are to imagine that there are butterflies in your stomach. By 
uttering the sentence “There are butterflies in my stomach”, I invite you to join in the 
game of make-believe according to which there are butterflies in my stomach. And 
because you are familiar (implicitly) with the principle of generation for this game, 
you are able to work backwards from the content of the game (the pretend butterflies 
in my stomach) to learn about the props, namely, to learn that I am nervous and 
experiencing a concomitant digestive discomfort.  
 What we are doing in the case of metaphor, according to Walton (Walton, 1993, 
p.43), is indirectly representing, via a fictional (mis)representation, that the props are 
such as to make our pretences appropriate. As Yablo puts it: ‘A metaphor on this 
view is an utterance that represents its objects as being like so: the way that they need 
to be to make the utterance pretence-worthy in a game that it [the metaphor] itself 
suggests’ (Yablo, 1998, p.247) So, by uttering the sentence “There are butterflies in 
my stomach”, and inviting you to participate in the ensuing game of make-believe, I 
am indirectly representing my psychological state and physical sensations to be the 
way they need to be to make this pretence appropriate in the ensuing game.  
Notice that, on this account, we may not be able to say very much about how the 
props need to be situated in order to make our pretence appropriate (indeed, that 
might be the very reason we are using a metaphor and not a literal declarative in the 
first place). So, the hypothesized, implicit principle of generation we were supposing 
to govern the game of make-believe suggested by the stomach butterflies metaphor 
says that, when we are experiencing a certain nervous sensation, we have butterflies 
in our stomach. But we may not be able to be very exact in our description of this 
sensation; its phenomenology may defeat our powers of expression. Indeed, we 
might not be able to say any more about it than that it is a nervous sensation or that 
feeling you get when there are butterflies in your stomach. But this doesn’t mean we 
don’t know how to work with the metaphor. We know that whatever the feeling is 
like exactly, it’s the one that licenses the game involving stomach butterflies.  
Again, this is a point we will need to bear in mind when we come to the fictionalised 
account of applied mathematics below. We will probably not be able to say very 
much about the nominalistic portion of our theories that licenses the make-believe 
involving mathematics, precisely because mathematics is indispensable to our 
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scientific representations. But this doesn’t mean we cannot work with those 
representations, any more than it means we cannot work with metaphorical 
representations. The nominalistic content we are trying to express will just be what 
our theory says about the physical stuff that licenses the make-believe that that 
physical stuff is related to some imaginary mathematical stuff in the way that our 
make-believe says it is. The nominalistic content of our theories will turn out to be 
that things are such with the physical props to make appropriate our use of the 
mathematical metaphor. Applied mathematics, then, is just more stomach butterflies.   
 Hopefully the preceding material will have made clear what kind of use I intend to 
make of Walton’s theory of make-believe. In particular, the account of applied 
mathematics given here will make use of the concept of prop-oriented make-believe 
to argue that mathematical-scientific representations are best seen as analogous to 
metaphorical representations, with the fictional content of the metaphor given by the 
prescription to imagine that there exists a suitable morphism between the physical 
stuff on the one hand, and a suitable mathematical structure on the other. The real, 
nominalistic content of the metaphor, on the other hand (analogous to the emotional 
state and concomitant sensations in the stomach butterflies metaphor), is that things 
are such with the physical props as to make our use of the mathematical-scientific 
make-believe appropriate. We will return to the discussion of this material in the 
final section of this chapter. But first, we turn to the discussion of revolutionary and 
hermeneutic fictionalisms, in order to precisify our account of applied mathematics 
still further. We have tentatively adopted Walton’s account of fictional representation 
as make-believe. Can we say anything more definite about whether our adoption of 
Walton’s theory should be undertaken in a revolutionary or more conservative, 
hermeneutic spirit?                           
 
3.3 The Revolution Will be Fictionalised 
3.3.1 Revolutionary and Hermeneutic Fictionalism 
John Burgess (2004) has raised the following worry for mathematical fictionalists: 
either the fictionalist must claim that mathematicians actually intend their utterances 
of mathematical sentences as contributing to a developing communal fiction or else 
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they must claim that that is how mathematical utterances ought to be regarded. In the 
former case the fictionalist is committing herself to hermeneutic fictionalism and in 
the latter she is endorsing a revolutionary fictionalism. The problem, as Burgess sees 
it (Burgess, 2004, pp.23-30), is that neither of these positions is tenable.  
The problem for the hermeneutic fictionalist is that she has endorsed a controversial 
empirical claim about the actual linguistic intentions of practising mathematicians. 
Not only is this claim controversial, it looks, prima facie (but more on this later), 
downright implausible (Burgess, 2004, pp.25-28). It just seems incredibly unlikely 
that mathematicians intend their utterances of mathematical sentences as parts of a 
developing communal fiction. The problem for the revolutionary fictionalist on the 
other hand is that it looks as though she is contradicting mathematicians on 
mathematical matters (Burgess, 2004, p.30). All mathematicians think that 7 is a 
prime number, but the fictionalist doesn’t. She doesn’t believe that there are any 
prime numbers, so a fortiori she doesn’t believe that 7 is one of them. But offering 
philosophical correctives of this sort to actual mathematical practice just seems 
misguided. Good (naturalist) methodology frown upon this sort of philosophical 
interference. Even if we are not naturalists, we might wonder how appropriate it is 
for philosophers to correct mathematicians on just those matters mathematicians are 
supposed to be expert about. Indeed, given the respective track records of the two 
disciplines, such an approach seems “comically immodest.” (Burgess, 2004, p.30) 
In what follows I will attempt to defend a version of revolutionary fictionalism from 
the claim that it is comically immodest. My final conclusion will be similar to that of 
Mark Balaguer (Balaguer, 2009), that is, I will try to defend the claim that the 
revolution in question is limited in its ambitions. The revolution in question is 
limited to the ontological consequences of mathematical discourse; we are not 
interested in correcting or revising mathematical practice. Further, we should not 
expect mathematicians to be interested in the ontological consequences of their 
mathematical utterances (indeed, I will argue that we should not expect the average 
mathematician to have any attitudes towards the ontological consequences of his 
utterances) and so we should not expert mathematicians to be expert in these matters 
at all. In the division of theoretical labour, it is the philosophers who are (or at least 
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ought to be) experts in ontological matters. So there is no comic immodesty in their 
correcting or advising mathematicians on these matters.  
 I have said that my position resembles that of Mark Balaguer, but it is not quite 
identical to his view. In particular, I motivate revolutionary fictionalism via a slightly 
different argument from that employed by Balaguer and the result, I believe, is a 
position that more closely fits with actual mathematical practice. If this is correct 
then we have one plausible version of fictionalism, revolutionary fictionalism, which 
we can then employ in our account of mathematical applications.   
 
3.3.2 Mark Balaguer on Revolutionary Fictionalism  
In his (2009) Mark Balaguer attempts a defence of mathematical fictionalism on two 
fronts. On the one hand, he endorses a variety of revolutionary fictionalism that he 
believes is immune to Burgess’ “comic immodesty” objection (Balaguer, 2009, 
pp.153-157). On the other, he resists Burgess’ claim that mathematical fictionalist is 
forced to choose between revolutionary fictionalism and hermeneutic fictionalism. 
He does this by outlining a third option for the fictionalist, Hermeneutic Non-
Assertivism (HNA), that he believes is neither a revolutionary fictionalism nor a 
hermeneutic fictionalism. While his official position is revolutionary, he suggests 
that the fictionalist could endorse HNA instead (Balaguer, 2009, pp.157-161).  
 While this section primarily aims to defend revolutionary fictionalism, we will 
actually spend a great deal of time discussing HNA. Hopefully the reason for this 
dialectic strategy will become clear as we proceed. Before that can happen, though, I 
must first briefly sketch Balaguer’s defence of revolutionary mathematical 
fictionalism.   
 In short, Balaguer’s defence of revolutionary mathematical fictionalism rests on the 
claim that the revolution in question is not mathematically interesting and so not 
something we should expect mathematicians to be experts about. In Balaguer’s 
words: 
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(i) the fictionalist thesis—or if you would rather, the fictionalist 
revolution—is mathematically unimportant and uninteresting (it is only 
philosophically interesting, and the main target of fictionalism is not 
mathematicians or mathematical theory, but a certain philosophical view, 
namely, platonism); and (ii) the mathematically uninteresting issue that 
fictionalists raise—the one that leads to their disagreement with 
mathematicians—is not something that most mathematicians think or 
care very much about, and it is not something that they have any 
substantive expertise or training in. (Balaguer, 2009, p.154) 
Balaguer has two arguments for (i). Firstly, no corrective is being offered to actual 
mathematical practice and no revisions or rejections are being suggested to 
established mathematical results (Balaguer, 2009, p.154). In this sense, the revolution 
the fictionalist agitates for is very different from the revolution that the intuitionists 
advocated (Brouwer, 1983; Heyting, 1983). Had mathematicians been convinced by 
the philosophical arguments of the intuitionists, then that would have necessitated a 
wholesale revision both of mathematical methods and mathematical results. That 
certainly would have been a mathematically interesting revolution. But the 
mathematical fictionalist agrees with the mathematician on which mathematical 
results are correct (in the sense of mathematically acceptable) and which methods are 
likely to produce correct results. The only place the mathematician and the 
philosopher are supposed to disagree is on the existence or otherwise of abstract 
mathematical objects and the existence or otherwise of abstract mathematical objects 
makes no substantive difference to mathematical practice.  
 Now I certainly think that Balaguer is on to something here, but it is not clear that it 
is enough to establish the innocuousness of revolutionary mathematical fictionalism. 
It does seem very plausible that the existence of mathematical objects as abstracta 
makes no real difference to actual mathematical practice, but the problem is that this 
just doesn’t establish (i). What we need is to establish that mathematicians do not 
regard ontological matters as important (or as mathematically important) and 
pointing out that mathematical practice would be unaffected by their existence or 
non-existence doesn’t achieve yet this. Even if mathematical objects would make no 
difference to mathematical practice, it might still be the case that mathematicians 
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regarded speculating on their existence as important and important qua mathematics. 
So what we need to establish is that mathematicians do not believe this, that they do 
not regard the issue of mathematical ontology as important qua mathematics.  
 Balaguer’s second argument for (i) attempts to establish this. Balaguer notes that 
mathematical proofs and arguments in mathematics do not seem to settle the question 
of the existence of abstracta one way or the other. But this is prima facie suspicious: 
if mathematicians thought the issue of mathematical ontology important qua 
mathematics, then it would seem that there is a lacuna in all existing mathematical 
proofs. But, of course, there is no such lacuna (or no such lacuna is perceived to 
exist), mathematical arguments and proofs are all right as they are. This suggests that 
the fact that mathematical methods do not settle ontological questions is down to the 
fact that these questions just are not important mathematically (Balaguer, 2009, 
pp.154-159).  
Now Balaguer goes on to gloss this by saying that mathematical methods provide no 
evidence for the existence of abstract mathematical objects, because “they essentially 
assume that there exist mathematical objects.” (Balaguer, 2009, p.55) It is here that I 
demur. I think that Balaguer has identified one important phenomenon, namely the 
absence of mathematical evidence for the existence of abstract mathematical objects, 
but I believe he has misdiagnosed the reasons for this absence. In short, I will go on 
to argue that the reason ontological matters are absent from mathematical practice is 
that mathematicians have no attitude towards them whatsoever. They do not assume 
the existence of mathematical objects, they simply don’t know or understand what 
that existence would involve, and so have no beliefs (or any propositional attitudes) 
towards mathematical existence at all. The defence of this claim though will have to 
await an evaluation of Balaguer’s HNA (hence the rather circuitous dialectic).  
 Balaguer doesn’t really attempt to argue for (ii) at all, just noting that it “is entirely 
obvious.” (Balaguer, 2009, p.55) I certainly think that it is obvious that 
mathematicians do not think or care about ontology, but again I hope that my defence 
of revolutionary fictionalism will show why this is. In short, I want to suggest that the 
reason mathematicians do not think or care about ontology is because they have no 
attitudes towards ontological matters at all. They do not need to possess such 
attitudes in order to understand and do mathematics and so (in general) they fail to 
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develop them. Again, though, the defence of this claim must wait until later in the 
chapter. For now I merely want to indicate my points of agreement and disagreement 
with Balaguer. I agree with Balaguer that mathematical existence (in the 
ontologically robust sense: existence as abstracta) is mathematically unimportant, but 
I disagree that this is down to mathematicians simply assuming in their proofs and 
arguments the existence of mathematical objects (one way to see this is to consider 
the plausibility of hermeneutic realism, the thesis that mathematicians intend their 
utterances as literal truths about a realm of acausal entities outside of space and time. 
Put so baldly, this thesis seems no more plausible than hermeneutic fictionalism). 
And I agree with Balaguer that mathematicians are simply not interested (or most 
mathematicians are not often interested) in ontological matters. But again, I think 
that we can say a great deal more than Balaguer does about why this should be so. 
Sadly, the elaboration of these points must await the resolution of our discussion of 
Hermeneutic Non-Assertivism.       
 
3.3.3 Balaguer on Hermeneutic Non-Assertivism 
Balaguer agrees with Burgess about the viability of hermeneutic fictionalism 
(Balaguer, 2009, p.152), that is, he believes the claim that mathematicians actually 
intend their utterances to be parts of a work of fiction is hopelessly implausible. One 
might worry that this is a very swift dismissal. After all, hermeneutic fictionalism is 
an empirical claim, a claim about the actual linguistic behaviours and intentions of 
actual real world language users. One would expect the rejection of such a claim to 
be backed up by actual empirical evidence about what those language users really are 
up to. Unfortunately Balaguer (and Burgess) fail to provide such evidence; they 
simply assume that were the relevant tests to be carried out, the results would be 
unfavourable to the hermeneutic fictionalist.   
 We will return to this issue in the next section of the chapter, so for now we can set 
it aside. Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that Burgess and Balaguer are 
correct that hermeneutic fictionalism is a non-starter. As we have seen, one way in 
which we can nonetheless endorse fictionalism, despite Burgess’ worry is by going 
revolutionary. But Balaguer does not leave things here; he thinks, further, that 
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Burgess is wrong that these are the only items on the menu. Fictionalists, contra 
Burgess, do not have to choose between hermeneutic and revolutionary fictionalism, 
they might try Hermeneutic Non-Assertivism instead (Balaguer, 2009, p.159).  
 Here is how Balaguer defines HNA: 
Hermeneutic non-assertivism: When typical mathematicians utter 
sentences like ‘Every number has a successor’ and ‘4 is even’, they 
should not be interpreted as saying what these sentences say, and indeed, 
they should not be interpreted as saying anything, i.e., as asserting 
propositions at all. (Balaguer, 2009, p.158) 
As he sees it, given the failure of hermeneutic fictionalism, this is the only viable 
option left to the fictionalist whose conservative instincts baulk at revolution. That is, 
the conservative fictionalist doesn’t want to regard the mathematician as saying 
something untrue, but if hermeneutic fictionalism is off the table and we cannot 
regard what the mathematician is saying as part of a fiction, the only option left is to 
claim that mathematicians are not saying anything at all. In other words “one might 
claim that ordinary mathematical discourse is a “language game” in which the 
“players” typically do not assert what their sentences actually say.” (Balaguer, 2009, 
p.159) 
 Now Balaguer does not claim that HNA is true. He doesn’t even attempt to defend 
its plausibility. What he does argue is that HNA is not obviously false in the way that 
he takes hermeneutic fictionalism to be (Balaguer, 2009, p.159). In order to establish 
this he defends HNA against one objection (presumably he believes that this is the 
kind of objection that is most likely to present itself to a philosopher upon first 
learning of Hermeneutic Non-Assertivism). The objection Balaguer responds to is 
that mathematicians intend their mathematical utterances as assertions of 
propositions, because they think that the sentences they utter are true. Balaguer 
responds to this by asking whether a mathematician is likely to have the right sense 
of true in mind (Balaguer, 2009, pp.160-161). He does not dispute that 
mathematicians in some sense believe that their mathematical utterances are true, but 
“it is not clear they think their utterances are true in the way that fictionalists have in 
mind when they claim that our mathematical theories are not true.” (Balaguer, 2009, 
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p.160) And Balaguer thinks that the sense of true that fictionalists have in mind is “a 
kind of truth that, for the sentences in question, requires accurate description of 
actually existing objects”. (Balaguer, 2009, p.160) 
 Now it is contentious whether this is the kind of truth fictionalists have in mind; as 
Armour-Garb points out (Armour-Garb, 2011a, p.343), this seems to rule out any 
combination of fictionalism with a deflationary account of truth. Nonetheless, I think 
Balaguer’s point can be made without the questionable metaphysics of truth. The 
point, in short, is that whatever the correct metaphysics of truth, the chances are that 
when mathematicians say that their utterances are true, they probably don’t have that 
metaphysics in mind. What they actually mean is something more like: this is a 
mathematically correct thing to utter. And this latter construal of the claim that 
mathematical utterances are true is consistent with HNA.8      
 This, then, is the position Balaguer suggests as an alternative to revolutionary 
fictionalism: mathematicians do not intend to assert propositions when they utter 
mathematical sentences (they do not say what those sentences say), and they do not 
have a philosophically interesting sense of true in mind when they claim that those 
sentences are true. In the next section we will examine an objection to this position, 
due to Armour-Garb. My primary interest, though, is not in the question of whether 
Balaguer or Armour-Garb is correct about HNA, but in what Armour-Garb’s account 
of mathematical understanding tells us about revolutionary fictionalism.     
 
3.3.4 Armour-Garb on Mathematical Understanding 
 As we noted above, Balaguer does not really offer a defence of HNA and what he 
does say in its favour is intended only to head off a certain prima facie plausible 
objection that he believes is likely to prejudice philosophers against the view. But as 
                                                          
8 It may be thought that mathematicians intend their uses of the truth predicate to be 
continuous with their uses of that predicate in other, non-mathematical contexts, and hence, 
that even if they have no specific metaphysics of truth in mind, they do intend their 
mathematical utterances as true in the same way as their more quotidian utterances are true. 
My suspicion is that this kind of argument is susceptible to a similar kind of objection to the 
one presented above: is it actually obvious that this is how mathematicians intend their 
deployment of the truth predicate? I suspect the question, if asked of mathematicians, would 
be more likely to elicit frustration or confusion than any firm avowal. 
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Armour-Garb reads Balaguer (Armour-Garb, 2011a), there are certain remarks that 
suggest one reason why we might take mathematicians not to be asserting what it is 
their utterances say. As Armour-Garb sees it, Balaguer is working with a 
presupposition about assertion, namely “The presupposition...that there are 
conditions that have to be met in order for an assertoric utterance to count as an 
assertion and that mathematicians do not satisfy those conditions.” (Armour-Garb, 
2011a, p.339) In particular, Armour-Garb thinks that Balaguer is committing himself 
to the claim that if mathematicians understand (in a certain technical sense) the 
mathematical sentences they assertively utter, then they should be interpreted as 
asserting those sentences. A defence of HNA must then show that mathematicians do 
not understand the sentences they assertively utter.    
Armour-Garb’s idea here is that when mathematicians deploy mathematical 
concepts, they do so in virtue of their possessing what Balaguer calls a Full 
Conception (Balaguer, 2009, pp.141-144). So, for instance, when mathematicians 
deploy the concept of a natural number, they do so in virtue of their Full Conception 
of the Natural Numbers (FCNN). The FCNN is essentially a set of sentences, 
certainly including the axioms and (perhaps some) theorems of standard arithmetic, 
but also perhaps containing sentences expressing mathematicians’ intuitions about 
the natural numbers. But, Armour-Garb notes (Armour-Garb, 2011a, p.140), the 
existence (or otherwise) of mathematical objects as abstracta does not seem to be a 
part of the Full Conception of any mathematical domain. When, for example, 
mathematicians deploy the concept of Natural Number, they do so in virtue of a 
FCNN that says nothing (contains no sentences) about the metaphysical status of 
natural numbers.9   
 What Armour-Garb seems to be getting at here is that anything not part of the Full 
Conception of some mathematical domain need not be understood in order to do 
successful mathematics within that domain (Armour-Garb, 2011a, p.140). And, 
presumably, if something need not be understood by mathematicians in order to do 
                                                          
9 Obviously the FCNN will contain sentences like “There exists a number,” and “There are 
an infinite number of primes,” that on their surface seem to claim that, at a bare minimum, 
some numbers exist. What Armour-Garb seems to have in mind here is that these sentences 
say nothing about the metaphysical nature of the numbers, their existence as abstracta, and 
that this is this what matters in the debate between the fictionalist and the Platonist. 
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mathematics, then it is unlikely that they will (in general) understand it. So if the 
metaphysical status of numbers is not part of the FCNN and the FCNN is all that is 
necessary to do arithmetic, then it is unlikely that mathematicians will understand the 
metaphysical consequences of their arithmetical utterances. And given that 
understanding of one’s utterances was a necessary condition for assertive utterance, 
it seems that mathematicians’ utterances of mathematical sentences cannot be 
assertive. This leads Armour-Garb to formulate the following revised (or precisified) 
version of HNA:    
HNA∗: When typical mathematicians utter M sentences, they should not 
be interpreted as either understanding or believing what those sentences 
say about the world and should not be interpreted as saying – that is, as 
asserting – any such propositions at all about the world. (Armour-Garb, 
2011a, p.339) 
 This, then, is the position that Armour-Garb goes on to criticise.  
The gist of Armour-Garb’s criticism is that HNA* incorporates a false picture of 
mathematical understanding. In short, Armour-Garb endorses the presupposition that 
assertion involves understanding, but he disagrees with Balaguer (or, at least, with 
his reading of Balaguer) on just what it takes to understand mathematical sentences. 
As Armour-Garb reads Balaguer (Armour-Garb, 2011a, p.340) he is committed to 
the view that in order to understand our mathematical utterances, we must understand 
what the sentences we utter say, in the particular sense of what they say about the 
world. But, Armour-Garb argues, that just isn’t a sensible way of construing the verb 
‘say’ here. Instead, Armour-Garb suggests that we should construe ‘say’ in the above 
account of understanding as requiring that we know what the sentences we utter 
mean (Armour-Garb, 2011a, p.341). And, as Armour-Garb sees it, knowing what the 
sentences we utter mean can, on occasion, require much less than knowing what our 
sentences say about the world and its denizens (Armour-Garb, 2011a, p.341).  
 In order to motivate this claim, Armour-Garb considers the case of truth talk 
(Armour-Garb, 2011a, pp.341-342). Most ordinary speakers, it seems, understand 
truth talk perfectly well. We can have true beliefs about which sentences are true and 
we can understand what others mean when they say that certain sentences are true 
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and others false. But it seems very unlikely that ordinary speakers of English have 
any views or attitudes about the correct philosophical interpretation of truth talk. As 
Armour-Garb puts it “...understanding ‘true’ does not require that one have any 
attitude at all about what truth is.” (Armour-Garb, 2011a, p.341) In other words, 
knowing what the word true means (in the sense of being a competent participant in 
truth-discourse) does not require knowing what one’s truth-sentences say about the 
world. We do not need to know what property the word “true” stands for, nor even 
that there is such a property (if there is) in order successfully to communicate using 
the word “true”. And if we need not know or have any attitude at all about the 
metaphysical status of the truth predicate in order to understand sentences containing 
it, then it seems we need not have any knowledge of or attitude about the 
metaphysical status of the truth predicate to assert sentences containing it.    
 The case (or so Armour-Garb claims (Armour-Garb, 2011a, p.342)) is the same for 
mathematical sentences. It is not necessary for mathematicians to understand the 
sentences that they utter that they know what those sentences entail about the 
metaphysical feng-shui of the world. For mathematicians to understand the 
mathematical sentences they utter, they need only know what those sentences mean 
(in the sense of being able to communicate successfully using those sentences). And, 
Armour-Garb contends (Armour-Garb, 2011a, pp.342-343), there is no more to this 
latter accomplishment than possessing the Full Conception of whatever mathematical 
concepts are involved in the sentences in question.  
 Returning once more to the arithmetical case, the FCNN contained both the axioms 
of arithmetic and mathematicians’ informed intuitions about the natural numbers. But 
what more could be required to do mathematics? And what more could be required 
to communicate successfully with other mathematicians? It seems nothing. And so it 
seems as though the FCNN is all mathematicians would need to know in order to 
know what their arithmetical sentences meant. But the metaphysical status of 
numbers was no part of the FCNN, and that strongly suggests that knowing the 
metaphysical status of the natural numbers is not required in order to understand 
what arithmetical sentences say. And if all that is true, then it seems mathematicians 
do not need to understand the metaphysical consequences of their assertive 
utterances in order to be interpreted as actually asserting the sentences those 
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utterances say. As Armour-Garb concludes, “if understanding one’s M 
[mathematical] sentences is sufficient for us to interpret one as asserting, when one 
(assertorically, sincerely) utters the sentences that one does, then it seems to follow, 
contra HNA, that mathematicians, when they utter the M sentences, are asserting.” 
(Armour-Garb, 2011a, p.343)     
 
3.3.5 Balaguer vs. Armour-Garb 
It is not my intention to adjudicate between Balaguer and Armour-Garb here. Instead 
I would like to put Armour-Garb’s account of mathematical understanding to work in 
a defence of revolutionary fictionalism. But before turning to that I suppose I should 
say something about the arguments we have just reviewed. The first thing to note is 
that it is not clear that the position Armour-Garb is attacking is the same as the one 
Balaguer defends. Balaguer says nothing about what mathematical understanding 
involves and certainly doesn’t motivate Hermeneutic Non-Assertivism on the 
grounds that mathematicians do not understand what the sentences they utter mean. 
What Balaguer does say on this score is:  
it seems to me that the most plausible versions of HNA involve the idea 
that when typical mathematicians utter mathematical sentences, they are 
doing something that differs from asserting (or W-asserting [W-assertion 
is just ordinary assertion, assertion of propositions]) in a pretty subtle 
way, so that the difference between W-asserting and this other kind of 
speech act is not obvious. (Balaguer, 2011, pp.346-347)  
 This strongly suggests that Balaguer is not interested in whether mathematicians 
understand the sentences they utter, but in a difference between apparent assertoric 
utterances that is much more subtle and insidious than the difference between 
understanding and ignorance. Indeed Balaguer says as much. He characterises 
Armour-Garb’s argument thus: 
1. Mathematicians have the concept number, and they accept various 
number sentences, e.g., ‘3 is prime’, ‘2+2=4’, and so on. Therefore, 
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2. Mathematicians understand their mathematical sentences. But 
3. If mathematicians understand these sentences, then the best account of 
what they are doing when they utter them is that they are making 
assertions. Thus, 
4.When mathematicians utter mathematical sentences, they are making 
assertions, and so HNA is false.  (Balaguer, 2011, p.346) 
And, after noting that Armour-Garb spends most of his time arguing for 2, he 
suggests that his own target is actually 3 (Balaguer, 2011, p.346). That is, what 
Balaguer wants to establish is that even if mathematicians understand the sentences 
they utter, they still need not be regarded as actually asserting. In short, what 
Balaguer rejects is Armour-Garb’s presupposition that understanding an apparent 
(sincere) assertoric utterance is sufficient for assertion. The distinction between 
assertion and what Balaguer thinks mathematicians are up to is just too subtle for 
that.  
 Now this, of course, raises further difficult questions for Balaguer. If the distinction 
between assertion and whatever it is mathematicians are up to is as subtle as all that, 
then how on earth are we tell them apart? It seems a plausible constraint on 
interpretation that when someone sincerely, assertorically utters a sentence that they 
understand, we should treat them as actually asserting what it is their utterance says. 
After all, if understanding and assertoric utterance combined are not evidence of 
assertion, what is? How could we ever tell, if Balaguer was correct, whether anybody 
was asserting the sentences their utterances expressed? I think these are certainly 
huge challenges for Hermeneutic Non-Assertivism, but it is worth noting that 
nothing Armour-Garb says either suggests or develops them. I suggest, then, that the 
case on HNA is still open. 
      
3.3.6 Understanding and Revolutionary Fictionalism 
So far, so inconclusive. But, after all, our interest was not really in HNA, but in 
revolutionary fictionalism and I believe that Armour-Garb has given us the tools 
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necessary to respond to Burgess’ argument. Remember that what we needed was 
some way of showing that, even if fictionalists are committed to a mathematical 
revolution of sorts, the revolution in question is not objectionable since it concerns 
only parts of mathematics that mathematicians themselves are not interested in. Now 
Balaguer attempted to argue for this conclusion by suggesting that the revolution is 
mathematically innocuous because mathematical methods simply presuppose the 
existence of mathematical objects, they do not establish them. Now I think this is 
troubling and one reason that I think this is troubling is that it is not clear that 
mathematical methods do presuppose the existence of abstract mathematical objects. 
Indeed, one of the motivations for nominalism (one of the psychological motivations, 
perhaps; I am not sure it could be bulked up into a substantial philosophical objection 
to Platonism) is that it seems to make no difference to mathematical practice whether 
or not abstracta exist. And if mathematical methods would remain unchanged, even 
if the world were devoid (as it is) of all non-concrete things, that strongly suggests 
that mathematical existence (in the Platonic sense) is not presupposed in 
mathematical practice.  
 We also saw Balaguer defend revolutionary fictionalism on the grounds that 
mathematicians (in general) do not understand ontological issues. They are not 
experts on whether abstract objects exist or how one might go about establishing this. 
But Balaguer was content to leave things here, noting the lack of understanding 
without explaining it. Now I believe we can deploy Armour-Garb’s ideas about 
mathematical understanding to clear up these two issues; that is, we can use Armour-
Garb’s account of mathematical understanding to show why mathematical methods 
are not regarded as faulty, even though they say nothing about Platonic mathematical 
existence (and we can do so without claiming that mathematical methods simply 
assume there are Platonic mathematical objects). And we can explain why it is that, 
in general, mathematicians fail to have any understanding of or attitudes towards 
ontological matters. That would establish Balaguer’s thesis that the revolution in 
question is not a mathematically objectionable one. But I believe we may be able to 
do even more: we may be able to say that the revolution in question is not a 
mathematical revolution at all.  
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 We will start with the question of mathematicians’ understanding of ontological 
matters. Let us agree with Armour-Garb that all there is to understanding 
mathematical sentences is possession of the Full Conception of whatever 
mathematical domain is under discussion. That is, let’s agree with Armour-Garb that 
all there is to knowing what mathematical sentences mean is possessing the relevant 
Full Conception. Now we recall that the Full Conception of a mathematical domain 
never seems to include sentences about the metaphysical status of the objects of that 
domain. That is, mathematical understanding never involves knowing about the 
metaphysical status of mathematical objects. Nor does it involve taking any attitude 
towards the metaphysical status of mathematical objects whatsoever. Because one 
can understand mathematical sentences perfectly well without knowing or believing 
or having any attitude at all about the metaphysics of mathematics (precisely because 
this is not part of the one thing, the Full Conception, upon which mathematical 
understanding depends), it seems one can do mathematics, one can even become 
quite expert about mathematics, without knowing or believing or having any attitude 
about the metaphysics of mathematics at all.  
 Why then should we expect mathematicians to know or believe or have attitudes 
about the metaphysical status of mathematical objects? At best, such a proceeding 
would count only as a hobby, and a somewhat outré one at that. Certainly there 
seems no reason to expect mathematicians to become experts about something so 
utterly nugatory from the point of view of their professional interests. So we cannot 
be treading on mathematicians’ toes if we presume to correct them on something 
they may know, believe, etc. nothing about.  
 What about the first point, the point about mathematical methodology? Well, it 
certainly cannot be that mathematical methods fail to decide ontological questions 
because they presuppose the existence of abstracta. Suppose, in order to see this, that 
we enlarge the full conception so that it includes, not only axioms and informed 
intuitions, but also however much proof theory is required to understand how to 
construct and evaluate proofs, and perhaps practising mathematicians’ mature 
hunches about which kinds of strategies are likely to be fruitful in the domain in 
question.  
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 Once again, this seems like all that is necessary to do mathematics successfully. And 
once again, our Full Conception, even engorged with proof theory and conventional 
wisdom, says nothing about the metaphysical status of its own posits. Platonic 
existence is not so much assumed as ignored. But this suggests an alternative reason 
why we feel there is no lacuna in our mathematical methods: understanding of 
mathematics and application of its methods can be achieved perfectly successfully 
without our having any attitudes whatsoever, not knowledge, not belief, not ardent 
desire, not anything, towards abstract mathematical objects. We do not presuppose 
their existence; we just don’t care. Nor need we care. And now we can see why it is 
that we feel the existence and non-existence of abstract mathematical objects makes 
no difference to mathematical practice: there is nothing in the Full Conception, the 
only thing, we are assuming, that matters for mathematical understanding, that could 
settle the matter either way.     
 If the preceding arguments have been anywhere near the mark, we have now 
established the conclusion that the revolution the fictionalist recommends is not a 
mathematically interesting one (and so, not a philosophically troubling one); and it is 
not a mathematically interesting revolution precisely because no part of 
mathematical understanding is involved in or corrected by it. But now I want to 
attempt to go further. As Balaguer points out, one way in which we might try to 
defend revolutionary fictionalism is by arguing that the revolution in question is not a 
mathematical revolution at all (Balaguer, 2009, p.156). Leaving mathematical 
practice untouched and concerning itself only with the ontological issue of the 
existence of abstract mathematical objects, the revolution the fictionalist desires is a 
paradigmatically philosophical one. As we have seen, this is not the position that 
Balaguer himself defends, partly on the grounds that he can see no way of separating 
the philosophical sentences from the mathematical ones (is “Prime numbers exist in 
Platonic heaven” mathematical or philosophical? It seems a bit of both) (Balaguer, 
2011, p.346). What I want to do before concluding is to (tentatively) suggest that 
Armour-Garb’s notion of mathematical understanding may help us here as well.  
First, let us say that something counts as a mathematical claim only if it is part of the 
Full Conception of some recognised part of mathematics (perhaps we will have to 
enlarge our Full Conception, as we did previously, so as to include methods and 
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methodological hunches). Now one reason we might argue that this is all there is to 
being a mathematical claim (I say might; I don’t claim to be certain of this) is that 
this is all it takes to understand mathematical sentences, all it takes to communicate 
with other mathematicians using mathematical sentences, and all it takes to do 
mathematical work successfully. Now, of course, beyond this there are the text 
books, the professional associations, the journals, and conferences and so on and so 
forth that go to make up Mathematics as a discipline. I do not mean to claim that all 
there is to Mathematics is what is included in all the Full Conceptions of all the 
various mathematical domains. But it might be that inclusion in some Full 
Conception is what it takes to counts as a mathematical claim.  
 If that is the case, if the mark of a distinctively mathematical claim is its presence in 
some full conception, then we can at least attempt a defence of the stronger position 
that, not only is the fictionalist revolution not mathematically interesting, it is not a 
mathematical revolution at all. And we might argue that it is not a mathematical 
revolution because it is a revolution in the way we interpret certain sentences (from a 
realist interpretation to a non-realist one). And, of course, questions of the correct 
interpretation of sentences from the full conception will not be be part of the full 
conception of any mathematical domain. Hence, claims made about the correct 
interpretation of mathematical sentences, whether, that is, we construe them 
realistically or nominalistically, are better thought of as philosophical claims, not as 
mathematical claims at all. And if that is correct, then, because the fictionalist 
revolution only affects this question of the correct interpretation of mathematical 
sentences, it is a philosophical, and not a mathematical revolution. We cannot, 
therefore, object to the revolutionary fictionalist that she is trespassing on 
mathematical territory.  
 
3.3.7 Concluding Remarks 
In this section I have attempted to defend revolutionary fictionalism from the 
objection that it is “comically immodest”. In doing so I have taken over some ideas 
about mathematical understanding developed by Armour-Garb in response to Mark 
Balaguer’s Hermeneutic Non-Assertivism. In short, the idea is that all that is 
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involved in understanding mathematical sentences (and to some extent in doing 
mathematical work) is what is contained in the Full Conception of the mathematical 
domain in question. If this is true, then we can see why we should expect the 
fictionalist’s revolution to be so mathematically uninteresting: the Full Conception of 
a mathematical domain never contains sentences about the metaphysical status of the 
entities in that domain. And because the Full Conception is all there is to 
mathematical understanding, we should not expect mathematicians to develop 
attitudes towards issues (like the ontological question) that contribute little to 
understanding and developing their professional work.    
 I have also attempted to defend the stronger claim that, not only is the fictionalist 
revolution not mathematically interesting, it is not really a mathematical revolution at 
all. I have done so on the grounds that the fictionalist revolution involves the 
reinterpretation of sentences from the Full Conception of some mathematical 
domain, and that claims about the correct interpretation of sentences within the Full 
Conception are not themselves part of the Full Conception. And because all there is 
to being a mathematical claim is being part of some Full Conception, the fictionalist 
revolution does not affect any mathematical claims at all.   
If either of these strategies is successful, then revolutionary fictionalism is 
vindicated.  
In the next section of this chapter we turn to the evaluation of hermeneutic 
fictionalism. Can we discover any reasons for preferring a revolutionary to a 
hermeneutic fictionalism (or vice versa)? Once we have an answer to this question, 
we will have a better idea of the shape of the fictionalist account of mathematical 
practice to be developed in the final section of this chapter, and within which we will 
embed the mapping approach to applications.    
 
3.4 Hermeneutic Mathematical Fictionalism 
In this section, we turn to the evaluation of hermeneutic fictionalism. Hermeneutic 
mathematical fictionalism, by contrast with the revolutionary variety we discussed 
previously, is the view that, while a face value reading of mathematical sentences 
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makes them come out false, nonetheless everything is all right with mathematical 
discourse. And everything is all right with mathematical discourse, because sincere 
utterance of mathematical sentences is not assertion of the contents of those 
sentences, and acceptance of mathematical sentences need not be belief (Kalderon, 
2005a, p.112). The sentences are already put forward in a make believe spirit, or it is 
merely pretended that they are true, or else we hedge with fictionalist prefixes or 
prefaces our utterances of them. And this is supposed to be an interpretation of what 
mathematicians are up to; making up mathematical fictions is not just something we 
(philosophers) can do, it is a game in which mathematicians can and already do 
indulge.   
We saw in the last section Burgess arguing that the revolutionary fictionalist is 
committed to revising mathematicians’ considered judgments about the truth and 
falsity of mathematical sentences. This was taken to involve the fictionalist in a 
criminal trespass on the mathematician’s territory. It is the mathematician who is 
expert in which mathematical sentences are true, not the philosopher. And no 
philosophical argument or prejudice should be permitted to overturn mathematicians’ 
considered judgments about which mathematical sentences are true or false. To this 
we objected that facts about mathematical understanding suggest that the revolution 
the fictionalist recommends is less radical than it appears. There is no need to 
recapitulate this defense here.  
So what does Burgess think is wrong with hermeneutic mathematical fictionalism? In 
contrast with the revolutionary fictionalist, the hermeneuticist’s problems are not 
philosophical – involving a transgression of the proper boundaries of philosophy – 
but scientific. In short, Burgess suggests (Burgess, 2004, pp.25-28), there simply is 
no evidence to back up the hermeneutic fictionalist’s claims. Hermeneutic 
fictionalism is an empirical thesis about the pragmatics of mathematicians’ 
utterances of mathematical sentences. It says that those sentences are not assertions, 
and the attitude of mathematicians towards those sentences is not belief. But surely 
this should be backed up by empirical evidence? And the evidence has not been 
provided (we will return to this point below. More accurately, I think that Burgess 
would argue that the limited evidence hermeneutic fictionalists have offered does not 
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actually support their fictionalist reading of mathematical discourse (Burgess, 2004, 
p.28). 
In this section I want to draw on some arguments of Mark Eli Kalderon (Kalderon, 
2005a) to defend the hermeneutic mathematical fictionalist from Burgess’ 
arguments. In short, I will argue that Burgess’ attempts to undermine the evidence 
provided for hermeneutic fictionalism fail, and that they fail because Burgess thinks 
that evidence for Hermeneutic fictionalism must be evidence about what 
mathematicians intend by their utterances (that they intend them to be non-literal, for 
instance). On the contrary, hermeneutic fictionalism proposes that mathematicians 
actually engage in a fiction when uttering mathematical sentences, regardless of their 
intentions. I will conclude by noting a striking similarity between Kalderon’s defense 
of hermeneutic fictionalism and various defenses of revolutionary fictionalism, and 
suggest a way forward for deciding between these two kinds of anti-realist approach.  
 
3.4.1 Against Hermeneutic Fictionalism 
Consider the following argument. There are no numbers, therefore there are no prime 
numbers, therefore there are not an infinite number of prime numbers, therefore 
Euclid’s theorem is wrong. Consider submitting the preceding argument to a 
mathematics journal. Then consider one’s chagrin when the submission is found not 
even to warrant a revise and resubmit. 
Or consider the following philosophical argument. I have two hands, therefore the 
number of my hands is two. But two is an abstract object, therefore abstract objects 
exist, Consider submitting the preceding argument to a philosophical journal. Well, 
perhaps the submission would not be found quite so ridiculous as the attempted 
disproof of Euclid’s theorem, but it is hard to imagine the philosophy of maths 
community converting, en masse, to mathematical Platonism.  
What might we say about these examples? Well, we might, following Stephen Yablo 
(Yablo, 2005, p.88), take them to support hermeneutic fictionalism. That is, when we 
consider mathematical practice, we notice that it is curiously immune to arguments 
like these about mathematical ontology. Euclid’s theorem is not a hostage to the 
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fortunes of mathematical Platonism, and facts about our ordinary counting practices 
seem insufficient to establish mathematical Platonism. But this suggests that 
mathematicians are, on the whole, indifferent to the existence of mathematical 
objects. As Burgess puts it: 
On the one hand, objections to what mathematicians and others would 
ordinarily say about mathematical entities on the grounds of their alleged 
non-existence are regarded with scorn, while on the other hand, 
purported proofs of their existence are viewed with suspicion. (Burgess, 
2004, p.25) 
But this curious indifference to mathematical ontology on the part of mathematicians 
can be explained if we take utterance of mathematical sentences to be non-literal, 
part of some fictional or metaphorical practice. In that case, attempts to prove the 
literal truth of mathematical sentences or attempts to prove their literal untruth are 
both misguided, in the same way that attempts to prove the literal truth or untruth of 
a Sherlock Holmes story would be misguided. In both cases, questions about the 
truth of the participants’ apparent assertions are in fact just silly questions, because 
the apparent assertions were never genuine assertions in the first place.     
Or suppose we were to question mathematicians about their ontological beliefs, and 
were to discover that, on the whole, they don’t have any. Perhaps they express 
puzzlement at our question, or offer confused or incoherent answers, or repudiate 
commitment to any ontology, or are willing to accept what philosophers tell them is 
the correct ontological view. We might think that this too suggests that 
mathematicians are engaged in a fictional practice, that their utterances of 
mathematical sentences are not assertions, that their attitude towards their sentences 
is not belief. And we might think that this is evidence for hermeneutic fictionalism, 
for much the same reason that we thought that the arguments considered above were 
arguments for fictionalism: namely, that it evinces a lack of interest on the part of 
mathematicians, qua mathematicians, in mathematical ontology, a lack of interest 
that would be adequately explained if they didn’t really mean what they were saying 
(Burgess attributes the preceding argument to Charles Chihara (Burgess, 2004, p.24), 
though it is worth noting that Chihara is not himself a fictionalist).   
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Burgess objects to both lines of argument that they are founded on a mistake about 
the meanings of the words ‘commitment’ and ‘literal’ (Burgess, 2004, pp.25-26). In 
the case of the commitments of a discourse, for instance, those commitments are 
signaled by what the sentences of the discourse quantify over (once they have been 
translated into the idiom of first order logic with identity). Commitments are not 
signaled by what the participants of the discourse intend to refer to. A participant in 
mathematical discourse incurs a commitment to numbers just if she actually asserts 
‘There are an infinite number of prime numbers.’ She incurs this commitment 
because she asserts the sentence, and because the sentence quantifies over prime 
numbers. What her further beliefs or intentions about the matter might be are taken 
by Burgess to be irrelevant (Burgess, 2004, p.25).  
In the case of literalness, Burgess (Burgess, 2004, pp.25-26) thinks that both Chihara 
and Yablo require use of the word ‘literal’ (qualifying a particular utterance) to 
indicate the presence of something positive, something extra we add to our utterance 
of a sentence, like a particular kind of emphasis – the ontological equivalent of 
raising one’s voice. The fact that this positive feature is absent in mathematical 
discourse is then taken to be evidence that mathematicians do not intend their 
utterances literally. But Burgess (Burgess, 2004, pp.25-26) suggests instead that the 
word signals the absence of something negative, the absence of a particular kind of 
emphasis – the ontological equivalent of the upwards inflection. In that case, the 
literal reading of the sentence is the default, a non-literal reading requires finding 
evidence for, as Burgess puts it, 'mental reservation and purpose of evasion' 
(Burgess, 2004, p.25). That is, the hermeneutic fictionalist must find evidence that 
mathematicians actually intend their utterances to have a non-literal reading. And, 
Burgess, contends, such evidence has not been provided, hermeneutic fictionalists 
have not shown that mathematicians positively intend their utterances to be taken in a 
non-literal spirit. 
 
3.4.2 Kalderon’s Defence of Hermeneutic Fictionalism  
 In this section I will argue that some comments due to Mark Kalderon suggest that 
Burgess’ objections fall flat. In particular, I want to suggest that how mathematicians 
107 
 
intend their utterances to be taken, whether they intend utterance of mathematical 
sentences to be assertion of the contents of those sentences, even whether they intend 
their attitude to the sentences in question to be belief, may be irrelevant to the 
assessment of hermeneutic fictionalism. If Kalderon is correct, then mathematicians 
could mistakenly believe their utterances of mathematical sentences to be assertions, 
when in fact they are not. Again, they may mistakenly think that they believe the 
sentences in question, when they do not. In that case, the absence of a negative 
psychological feature underwriting our ascriptions of non-literalness to the sentences 
of mathematical discourse, the inability to locate the ‘mental reservation and purpose 
of evasion’, may only be a feature of mathematicians’ own mistakes about the 
character of their discourse, and not evidence for the literalness of that discourse. In 
other words, mathematicians could be engaged in a gigantic game of make believe 
without intending to be, indeed, without even realising that that is what they are 
doing.  
I think we can be pretty brief with Burgess’ comments about commitments. Of 
course, we are committed to those objects whose existence is required to make true 
the quantificational claims we seriously assert. But what is at issue between the 
hermeneutic fictionalist and the realist is whether the sentences of mathematical 
discourse are actually asserted. I cannot see that anything that Burgess says about 
ontological commitment undermines the fictionalist’s claim that the sentences of 
mathematical discourse are not in fact asserted. And if Burgess is just supposing that 
they are, then he is begging the question against the hermeneutic fictionalist.  
 Perhaps Burgess intends his remarks on commitment to link with his remarks on 
literalness: that is, both sides ought to agree that commitment is signalled by 
quantification within asserted sentences. What the hermeneutic fictionalist contends 
is that mathematical utterances, being non-literal, are not asserted. So, if the 
fictionalist is wrong about the non-literalness of mathematical discourse, then, given 
this account of ontological commitment, she must also be wrong about the 
commitments of mathematical discourse. However that may be, the important point 
is Burgess’ claim that non-literalness requires evidence about the intentions of 
mathematicians in uttering mathematical sentences.         
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As we saw above, Burgess objects to the hermeneutic fictionalist that she must find 
some positive evidence for the existence of a certain kind of mental state, a unique 
kind of reservation or diffidence that marks the non-literalness of an utterance. We 
cannot assume that an utterance of a mathematical sentence is intended non-literally 
just because we cannot plausibly attribute to the utterer a positive intention to speak 
literally. Assumption of literalness is the default in interpretation. Nonetheless, I 
believe that this focus on the intentions and mental states of mathematicians is a 
distraction, and that by examining Kalderon’s defense of his moral hermeneutic 
fictionalism we can see why.   
The first thing to note is that Kalderon is responding to a somewhat different 
objection to hermeneutic fictionalism to the one we are considering here. Kalderon 
imagines a critic of his moral hermeneutic fictionalism offering the following 
challenge: “We, as speakers of moral language typically take our utterances of moral 
sentences to be assertions of the contents of those sentences. And typically we take 
ourselves to believe the moral propositions so expressed. Therefore, your 
fictionalism is not, after all, a hermeneutic one, for it requires making revisions to 
our moral beliefs and our attitudes towards our moral sentences.” (Kalderon, 2005a, 
pp.140-142)  
Kalderon responds by noting that, in the first place, first order moral practice will 
remain very much as it was (Kalderon 2005a, p.142). The moral sentences we 
accepted before we discovered the fictional nature of our moral practice, we will 
continue to accept. What will change is a set of what we might call second order 
beliefs about the practice, namely, our belief that acceptance of moral sentences is 
belief, and our belief that utterance of moral sentences is assertion. But, Kalderon 
claims, it is the first order stuff that matters for the fictionalist (Kalderon 2005a, 
p.142). Moral fictionalism would be revolutionary if it required us to revise our 
attitude towards, for instance, the sentence ‘stealing is wrong’, if we should go from 
accepting this sentence to rejecting it. But, Kalderon maintains (Kalderon, 2005a, 
p.141), this will never happen, even if we come to believe that moral acceptance does 
not involve belief. Moral fictionalism is hermeneutic because it leaves unrevised our 
attitudes towards our moral sentences.  
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 Our second order beliefs about the practice will have to change, though (Kalderon, 
2005a, pp.141-142). That is, while we may well believe that moral acceptance is 
belief, it is not in fact belief. So our beliefs about our moral attitudes require revision. 
Again, we may well believe that moral utterances are assertions, but, again, they are 
not. So we should cease to believe that moral utterance is assertion. But this need not 
trouble the hermeneutic fictionalist. First order moral practice doesn’t really require 
us to have any beliefs about these second order matters (as is indicated by the 
independence of patterns of first order moral acceptance from the discovery that 
fictionalism is true of that practice). Nor should we expect ordinary users of moral 
language to have sophisticated beliefs about these second order matters, given that 
they seem to lie in the domain of linguistics and psychology. In short, hermeneutic 
fictionalism is not revolutionary fictionalism in disguise, because the revisions it 
makes are not really revisions to moral practice at all: they are revisions to beliefs 
about the pragmatics and psychology of moral practice. Furthermore, these are not 
implausible revisions to make, as we should not expect ordinary moral practitioners 
to be experts in linguistics and psychology (Kalderon, 2005a, p.154).     
As I have remarked, this is a defense of hermeneutic fictionalism against a somewhat 
different objection to the one we are considering here. Our problem is to defend 
hermeneutic fictionalism from the criticism that it has failed to locate, in the kinds of 
evidence offered in its favour, a suitable mental reservation or ontological diffidence 
marking the fictional character of mathematical utterances. But I believe that what 
Kalderon says in defense of moral hermeneutic fictionalism will carry over to the 
mathematical case. Note, to begin with, that Kalderon is, in effect, attributing to 
ordinary moral practitioners systematic error in their beliefs about their own attitudes 
and actions. Speakers of moral language think they are asserting the sentences they 
utter, when they are in fact performing some quite different speech act with those 
sentences. And speakers of moral language think that they believe the moral 
sentences they accept, when in fact their attitude towards those sentences is some 
quite different attitude. This might initially strike us as implausible. How could we 
be so radically mistaken about our actions and attitudes? Kalderon attempts to 
mitigate the prima facie implausibility in two ways (Kalderon, 2005a, pp.154-156).  
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 First, he notes that we can readily imagine situations in which a person is mistaken 
about her attitudes and mistaken about the character of her actions (Kalderon, 2005a, 
p.154). Imagine a philosopher who is, unbeknownst to herself, jealous of a successful 
colleague. She is rude to the colleague in meetings, unjustly critical in department 
colloquia, she makes sarcastic remarks behind her colleague’s back about her 
professionalism, intellectual attainments, alma mater, personal hygiene, etc. 
Nonetheless, when called out about her unprofessional conduct by a (different) 
colleague, she denies that she is jealous at all. Her attitude towards her colleague, she 
insists, is one of indifferent appraisal of the colleague’s myriad personal failings. Her 
actions are not in fact instances of unjustifiable rudeness, but are in fact just and 
constructive criticism aimed, not at destroying the colleague’s confidence and 
departmental standing, but at reform of her deplorable character. Such instances of 
self-deception are, I suspect, somewhat less rare than we would like them to be.  
So it is not that rare for our attitudes and actions to fail to be transparent to us. But, 
further, Kalderon wants to motivate the specific claim that our actions and attitudes 
in the moral case might not be transparent to us. As he notes, most speakers of moral 
language are not experts in linguistics, nor are they likely to have thought deeply and 
reflectively about moral psychology (Kalderon, 2005a, p.142). So it is perhaps not 
that surprising to discover that they make routine mistakes about these matters. 
Kalderon also notes that the semantics of moral discourse is apt to lead us astray 
(Kalderon, 2005a, pp.155-156). Because moral sentences are declarative sentences, 
and moral semantics is just Tarskian semantics, moral sentences seem to attribute 
moral properties to worldly inhabitants. But because moral sentences seem to 
represent facts about the instantiation of moral properties, it is very easy to assume, 
when we utter those sentences, that is what we are doing: just representing facts 
about the instantiation of moral properties (Kalderon, 2005a, pp.155-156). In other 
words, the representational semantics of moral discourse blinds us to its non-
representational pragmatics. 
Now I think that both of these points will carry over to the mathematical case. 
Suppose we are assessing mathematicians’ utterances in order to establish whether 
they intend these utterances in a make-believe or fictional spirit. That is, we are 
looking for some kind of mental state on the part of mathematicians that would 
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indicate the presence of an intention not to mean what they say. To our dismay, we 
are unable to find one. Mathematicians, it seems, when we ask them whether they 
believe in numbers, reply that they really do believe in numbers. Or else they return 
conflicting responses, both individually and as a community, but these conflicting 
responses seem explicable without attributing to the mathematicians an intention not 
to mean what they say. Should we conclude that hermeneutic mathematical 
fictionalism has been defeated?  
Well, no. After all, what Burgess has demanded is that the hermeneutic fictionalist 
locate a certain kind of attitude on the part of mathematicians towards their 
sentences, and to extract this attitude from mathematicians’ utterances. But as we 
have just discovered, our attitudes need not be completely transparent to us. 
Mathematicians may well give every indication in their explicit statements that they 
believe in the existence of numbers, and intend their utterances literally. But they 
might just be mistaken. We cannot expect mathematicians to be experts on 
mathematical psychology any more than we can expect day to day moralists to be 
experts on moral psychology. Again, we should not expect mathematicians to be 
experts in the pragmatics of mathematical discourse, any more than we should expect 
ordinary speakers of moral language to be experts in the pragmatics of moral 
discourse. And just as in the moral case, the very semantics of mathematical 
language, which is just as representational, just as Tarskian as in the moral case, may 
well conspire to lead us astray. We may just assume that a representational semantics 
entails an intention to represent, when, in fact, the two can come apart.  
It may well be, then, that any intention on the part of mathematicians not to mean 
what they say is hidden from them, in such a way that it is unlikely to come out in 
the kinds of explicit evidence for ontological commitment that Yablo and Chihara 
consider. This might suggest that simply polling mathematicians on their ontological 
beliefs is not the way to proceed in the assessment of hermeneutic fictionalism, and 
to a certain extent I would concur. But I think that it also suggests something much 
stronger. I think that what the hiddenness of mathematicians’ attitudes suggests is 
that looking for an intention to make-believe or to speak non-literally is just the 
wrong way to proceed entirely. That is, I believe that what Kalderon shows is that 
hermeneutic fictionalism may well be the best account of a practice even if it 
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conflicts with the psychological states of the participants in the discourse. In other 
words, the participants in the discourse may well have no intention to speak non-
literally, they may intend to believe what they say, they may intend assertion and not 
quasi-assertion when they utter sentences of the discourse. Nonetheless, when we 
come to interpret what it is that participants in the discourse are up to, we may 
discover that what makes best sense of their behaviour, both linguistic and non-
linguistic, is that they do not really believe and do not really assert. To cut a long 
story short, even an intention to believe doesn’t guarantee that one is not in fact 
pretending to believe: between the intention and the act falls the shadow of 
attitudinal opacity.  
To put all this another way, I believe that we should follow Gabor Forrai (Forrai, 
2010) in recognizing that hermeneutic mathematical fictionalism is part of an 
interpretative exercise, an attempt to make the best possible sense of all aspects of 
mathematical practice. And as Forrai points out (Forrai, 2010, p.200), sometimes, in 
making sense of what participants in a discourse are up to, we need to disregard what 
the participants themselves think they are up to. We may even need to ignore (or at 
least confer less weight upon) evidence about what they intend to be up to.  
Consider, for instance, an anthropological interpretation of some religious practice. 
The practitioners themselves may believe that they are in communication with the 
spirits of their ancestors. They almost certainly intend to be in communication with 
the spirits of their ancestors. The anthropologist, though, is likely to be sceptical of 
the existence of spirits and otherworldly communications, and when offering an 
explanation that makes best sense of the community’s religious practice it is unlikely 
that the anthropologist will take the practitioners’ beliefs and intentions at face value. 
Instead, the explanation is likely to appeal to purely naturalistic features of the 
community’s situation, naturalistic features that the community may well be unaware 
of, naturalistic features that they may not intend to play a role in their practice at all. 
Nonetheless, we would hardly take this psychological unfaithfulness to be a 
deficiency in the anthropologist’s explanation, if in other respects she had provided 
the best interpretation of the practice, that is, the explanation that makes best sense of 
what the community is up to.    
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I believe that the case is the same for the hermeneutic mathematical fictionalist’s 
interpretation of mathematical practice. Given the opacity of our attitudes and given 
that we are sometimes mistaken about the kind of speech acts that we are performing, 
these can only form part of the evidence for an interpretation of mathematical 
practice. Burgess is simply placing too stringent a limitation on the kinds of evidence 
that are available to the hermeneutic fictionalist in defense of her view. Instead, we 
should consider the whole practice, both the explicit avowals of mathematicians of 
their own ontological beliefs (if any), and the kinds of utterances made by 
mathematicians in the prosecution of their day to day mathematical business (and 
any other evidence that might be relevant). And if we find that, over all, hermeneutic 
fictionalism makes the best possible sense of this practice, then it will not do to 
object that mathematicians do not intend to speak fictionally or to make-believe, any 
more than it would do to object to the anthropologist that because the members of a 
community do not intend to enhance social cohesiveness or reinforce social status, 
that they must really be in communication with the mighty dead.    
 
3.4.3 The Way Forward 
So what should we conclude about the debate between revolutionary and 
hermeneutic fictionalism? Is mathematical discourse already a pretense or should we 
revise our attitudes towards mathematical sentences so as to treat them in a make-
believe spirit? Unfortunately, I believe the outcome of our previous discussion has 
been to call into question the availability of a quick answer to this question. That is, 
we cannot appeal to the prima facie implausibility of hermeneutic fictionalism in 
order to discount it, precisely because such prima facie implausibility is poor 
evidence of its viability as an interpretative theory. So we seem to be faced with 
viable defenses of both hermeneutic and revolutionary fictionalism.  
Indeed, it might even seem that we are forced in the direction of scepticism about the 
very possibility of deciding between revolutionary and hermeneutic fictionalism. To 
see this, note an apparent symmetry between the kind of defense of revolutionary 
fictionalism developed earlier in this chapter, and the kind of defense of hermeneutic 
fictionalism offered by Kalderon. In both cases, what is appealed to is the 
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independence of mathematical practice from certain kinds of seemingly 
philosophical considerations. In the case of revolutionary fictionalism, we saw that 
facts about mathematical understanding make it unlikely that mathematicians will 
need to have any kind of attitude at all towards the abstract objects their sentences 
apparently quantify over. And because understanding of ontological matters is 
unnecessary for mathematical practice to go smoothly, we should not expect 
revisions to our ontological beliefs to have any effect on first order mathematical 
practice. Analogously, Kalderon argues that because moral practice is independent of 
the kinds of sophisticated second order beliefs about moral psychology and 
pragmatics hermeneutic fictionalism needs to revise, his view is not in fact 
revisionary in any important way.  
Now this might suggest that if the preceding defense of hermeneutic mathematical 
fictionalism works – that is, if we should expect mathematicians’ attitudes to be 
opaque to them in a way that undermines Burgess’ suggestion that evidence about 
their intentions is the only admissible evidence for hermeneutic fictionalism – then 
the analogous defense of revolutionary fictionalism will work. In other words, if 
mathematical practice is independent of one’s beliefs about one’s own attitudes in 
the way the hermeneutic fictionalist requires, then it is plausible to think that 
mathematical practice will be independent of mathematicians’ ontological beliefs in 
the way the revolutionary fictionalist requires, and, of course, vice versa. And that 
would leave us unable to distinguish between revolutionary and hermeneutic 
fictionalism.  
In the next section, I want to turn to a way in which we can resist this sceptical result. 
I will begin by introducing the so called autism objection to hermeneutic 
fictionalism, which suggests that empirical results about the mathematical 
capabilities of autistic children are incompatible with hermeneutic fictionalism’s 
interpretative claims. As we will see, drawing on work by David Liggins, this 
argument is not entirely successful (Liggins, 2010). Nonetheless, I believe that the 
very vulnerability of hermeneutic fictionalism to this kind of empirical evidence 
gives us good reason to favour the revolutionary variety. In short, revolutionary 
fictionalism is, ironically enough, the more conservative option: it leaves fewer 
hostages to scientific fortune. And as philosophers do not control the winds of 
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empirical research, they would be well advised to endorse revolutionary and not 
hermeneutic fictionalism. In the final section of the chapter, we will apply this 
revolutionary fictionalism to solve our outstanding concerns with the mapping 
account.  
  
3.4.4 Jason Stanley’s Autism Objection 
The previous section left us at an apparent impasse. We saw there how some 
considerations from Kalderon’s Moral Fictionalism could be used to resist the 
objection that hermeneutic mathematical fictionalism gives a hopelessly implausible 
account of the behaviour of mathematicians. We saw further a symmetry between the 
kind of response Kalderon develops, and our defence of revolutionary fictionalism, 
which led to an apparently sceptical outcome. In this section I want to suggest a way 
in which we might break that impasse.  
 In his 2001 paper Hermeneutic Fictionalism, Jason Stanley puts forward an 
argument that he believes provides empirical refutation of the hermeneutic 
fictionalist’s core interpretative claim. According to the hermeneutic fictionalist, 
when uttering mathematical sentences, we do not really believe the propositions our 
sentences express, and we are not really asserting the propositions our sentences say. 
As we saw in the introduction to this chapter, one way of fleshing out this proposal is 
to suggest that our attitude to mathematical propositions is the kind of attitude we 
adopt to explicitly fictional propositions, that is, it is some kind of make-believe or 
pretence. But, Stanley argues (Stanley, 2001, pp.47-49), people with autism are not 
able to engage in pretence/make-believe, and so, if the hermeneutic fictionalist is 
correct, we should expect their arithmetical ability to be similarly impaired. But, 
people with autism display no such arithmetical impairment. Therefore, hermeneutic 
fictionalism is false.10  
                                                          
10 It is worth noting that, as formulated, this argument applies only to pretence based 
varieties of hermeneutic fictionalism. As our focus in this chapter is on pretence theories, 
this need not concern us. 
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 Following Liggins (2010, p.769) we can formalize this argument in the following 
manner. Where M is some mathematical discourse,  
 Suppose M is in fact fictional, then: 
1. Engagement with M involves pretence/make-believe. 
2. People with autism are capable of engaging in M. 
3. People who lack the capacity to pretend/make-believe are incapable of 
engaging in M. 
4. People with autism lack the capacity to pretend. 
From 1, 3, 4: 
5. Therefore people with autism are incapable of engaging with M. 
But 5 contradicts 2, hence our supposition that M is in fact fictional must be 
abandoned: hermeneutic fictionalism is false.   
 
3.4.5 Liggins’ Response to Stanley’s Autism Objection 
If our interest is in breaking the deadlock between hermeneutic and revolutionary 
fictionalism, then Stanley’s argument seems like exactly what we were hoping for. If 
successful, then we have convincing empirical reasons for thinking that the 
hermeneutic interpretative strategy is unlikely to work. And that means that if we 
still wish to defend a fictionalist account of applied mathematics, then revolutionary 
fictionalism is our only option. We have broken the impasse, and can move on.  
 Unfortunately, however, things are not quite so simple. After presenting the previous 
formalization of Stanley’s argument, Liggins goes on to consider four ways in which 
the hermeneutic fictionalist might respond to the autism objection. We will begin by 
briefly setting out the four possible lines of response Liggins considers, before going 
on to present his more detailed comments on each objection: 
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“(a) Reject (4): refuse to assert that people with autism are incapable of 
pretending; argue that the evidence that is supposed to show this does not 
succeed in showing it.” (Liggins, 2010, p.769) 
“(b) Reject (2): refuse to admit that people with autism are capable of 
engaging in the discourse in question.” (Liggins, 2010, p.770)  
“(c) Withdraw (1): replace (1) with the claim that discourse D involves 
something similar to, but distinct from, pretence.” (ibid.) 
“(d) Restrict (1): rather than claiming that everyone who engages in D is 
pretending, claim instead that most of the people who engage in D are 
pretending, or that people who engage in D are pretending unless they 
have autism.” (ibid.) 
 In short, Liggins sees the possible lines of response as the denial of 4, or 2, a 
reworking of 1, or the restriction of 1 to non-autistic people. He does not consider a 
line of response that denies 3, and in this we will follow him. Even if it is possible to 
defend the view that M involves pretence/make-believe, but doesn’t require it, so that 
people incapable of pretence/make-believe could still engage with M, my suspicion 
is that this would not alter the general line of argument I wish to pursue in this 
section. We can, then, safely disregard this option, trusting that what I will go on to 
say will apply, mutatis mutandis, should this be a live option for the hermeneutic 
fictionalist.   
 Liggins begins his more detailed examination of these responses with (a), the denial 
of premise 4 (Liggins, 2010, p.770). According to this defence of hermeneutic 
fictionalism, it is simply incorrect to say that people with autism cannot pretend. The 
evidence presented for this claim is insufficient to establish the conclusion that 
autistic people lack a capacity for pretence, or else the evidence has been 
misinterpreted.  
 If this is meant as a straight denial of the scientific evidence, then it is clearly an 
unattractive response. If the evidence from psychological studies is that autistic 
people lack a capacity, then it is surely overstepping our professional boundaries to 
contradict this evidence merely because it sits uncomfortably with a chosen 
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philosophical theory. But, of course, this is not the only way to read the claim. 
Instead, we might argue that Stanley has drawn an over-strong philosophical 
conclusion from the actual scientific evidence. The evidence as it is does not support 
the interpretation Stanley places upon it.  
 Drawing on work presented in (Jarrold, 2003) Liggins goes on to do just this. He 
concedes to Stanley that psychological studies have shown that autistic children 
“exhibit a striking lack of spontaneous make-believe play” (Liggins, 2010, p.770), 
but he notes that this is consistent with autistic children possessing a capacity that 
they simply do not spontaneously exercise. It is going beyond the evidence to 
conclude that autistic children lack this capacity altogether.  
 Indeed, Liggins goes on to present a number of results from Jarrold’s review paper 
that suggest that, at the very least, the question of whether autistic children can 
engage in acts of make-believe remains open. As Liggins reports, “Some children 
with autism do spontaneously behave in ways that at least resemble make-believe 
play.” (Liggins, 2010, p.770) Furthermore, some studies seem to suggest that 
children with autism, when prompted by an adult to engage in activities involving 
pretence, perform these activities at least as well as non-autistic children (Liggins, 
2010, pp.770-771). He notes that some researchers have suggested that in these cases 
autistic children might not be really pretending, but were merely guessing how they 
were meant to act. But at the very least, the question seems an open one whether 
autistic children in these kinds of studies are pretending or not.  And if that is correct, 
premise 4 of Stanley’s argument seems questionable; we are well within our rights to 
deny that people with autism cannot pretend/make-believe, at least until more 
decisive evidence has been presented.  
 We can be fairly brief with discussion of (b). Taking this line against the autism 
objection in the specifically mathematical case of interest to us, would involve the 
claim that people with autism cannot in fact engage in mathematical discourse. But 
this is clearly implausible: Stanley is surely correct in his claim that the mathematical 
abilities of people with autism are not impaired by their condition in the way that this 
response would require. Indeed, Liggins suggests that this response is likely to be 
implausible for most of the discourses of interest to the hermeneutic fictionalist 
(Liggins 2010, p.772). He identifies only one case where this response might be an 
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attractive reply to the autism objection, Egan’s account of idiomatic expressions. As 
our interests lie elsewhere, there is no need to discuss this response further.  
 Response (c) involves retracting 1, and replacing it with a new claim 1*. According 
to 1*: 
1*. Engagement with M involves something like/analogous to 
pretence/make-believe.  
We then go on to claim that this new mental state and speech act that is 
like/analogous to pretence or make-believe is one that autistic people can be in or 
engage in. As Liggins puts it, we “water-down” (Liggins, 2010, p.773) the original 
fictionalist claim that mathematics involves pretence/make-believe, conceding to the 
anti-fictionalist that autistic people cannot engage with discourses involving this, but 
claim that the discourse nonetheless involves something similar to make-
believe/pretence that autistic people can engage in.  
 To this, Stanley objects that watering down premise 1 correspondingly waters down 
the motivation for fictionalism (Stanley, 2001, p.50). If our reason for being a 
fictionalist was the existence of apparent analogies between mathematics and more 
explicitly fictional discourse, then this motivation is weakened if it turns out that the 
psychological mechanism at work is not the same in each case (Stanley, 2001, p.50). 
In response, we might object that so long as the psychological mechanism at work in 
each case is sufficiently similar, then we still have an adequate explanation of the 
analogies between mathematical and explicitly fictional discourse.  
 Liggins responds differently (Liggins, 2010, p.773), noting that the range of 
evidence for a fictionalist account of some discourse could well go beyond apparent 
analogies between that discourse and explicit fictions. In the mathematical case, we 
might cite our pre-theoretical intuition that the existence of mathematical entities 
makes no difference to the world, or the Balaguer-Field epistemological challenge, or 
the advantages of a simplified ontology (though, as we will see later, it is unclear that 
these kinds of evidence would distinguish revolutionary from hermeneutic 
fictionalism). Stanley just fails to appreciate the range of evidence the fictionalist can 
adduce (Liggins, 2010, p.773). 
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 Liggins then goes on to raise a worry for this approach: that it requires finding a 
mental state sufficiently similar to, but distinct from make-believe/pretence, that 
autistic people are capable of engaging in, even though they cannot (ex hypothesi) 
engage in make-believe/pretence. But, Liggins argues, the chances of finding such a 
mental state are slim (liggins 2010, p.773). How could the state in question be similar 
enough to pretence to serve the fictionalist’s needs, but also distinct enough from 
pretence that autistic people could engage with it (assuming, for the sake of 
argument, that they cannot engage in pretence)? If the fictionalist cannot find such a 
mental state, then their position seems empirically under-motivated.   
 Response (d) involves restricting 1 to the case of people without autism. In that case 
we would have 1’: 
1’. Engagement with M involves pretence/make-believe in the case of 
non-autistic people. In the case of autistic people, it involves belief.       
Most people are pretending when they engage with mathematics, but autistic people 
are not. They really believe the propositions their mathematical sentences express, 
and their utterances of those sentences are assertions.  
 Stanley objects to this line of reasoning in two ways (Stanley, 2001, pp.49-50), but 
as his responses are so similar (both depend on the fact that, as he sees it, the 
fictionalist who takes this line will have to claim that autistic and non-autistic users 
of mathematical discourse will be behaviourally indistinguishable) I will limit 
attention to his first response. According to Stanley, 
Someone who cannot engage in the make-believe we engage in when 
discussing arithmetic will nevertheless be able to add, subtract, and 
multiply. Though such a person will be operating under the 
misapprehension that she is adding and subtracting things that really 
exist, she will nevertheless be behaviourally no different from those of us 
who do engage in the make-believe. (Stanley, 2001, p.49)                                                                                    
If that is the case, there will be nothing to distinguish between the autistic users of 
mathematical discourse, and the non-autistic users of mathematical discourse, at the 
level of behaviour. And if there is nothing to choose between them at the level of 
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behaviour, then we should say that either all are pretending or none are. And as the 
default assumption when someone behaves as if they are not pretending is that they 
are not pretending (Stanley, 2001, p.50), we should say that none of the participants 
in mathematical discourse is pretending.11  
 Liggins responds to this objection in two ways. We will begin with his second 
response, as it is less useful for our purposes. According to Liggins (2010, p.774), 
hermeneutic fictionalists are not limited solely to behavioural evidence for their 
theories. So even if it should turn out that there are no behavioural differences 
between autistic and non-autistic users of mathematical discourse, that needn’t 
undermine the motivation for fictionalism. We might instead motivate mathematical 
fictionalism by appeal to its ontological simplicity, epistemological considerations, 
etc.  
 But it seems to me that this kind of response will not help us decide between 
hermeneutic and revolutionary fictionalism (our current focus), because both kinds of 
fictionalist seem capable of appealing to the same sorts of evidence to motivate their 
fictionalism. In other words, if this response entails that there is nothing to choose 
between realist and non-realist construals of the discourse at the level of behaviour, 
nothing at all that would separate them, then we have no means of choosing between 
hermeneutic and revolutionary fictionalism.    
 Liggins’ second objection is that the hermeneutic fictionalist is under no obligation 
to say that there is no behavioural difference between autistic and non-autistic users 
of mathematical discourse (Liggins 2010, p.774). As he goes on to note in the 
particular case of Yablo’s arithmetical fictionalism (Liggins 2010, p.776), it is open 
to Yablo to respond to Stanley by claiming that, in fact, there are behavioural 
differences between autistic and non-autistic participants in arithmetic discourse. The 
fact that autistic people believe the arithmetical sentences they utter, and the rest of 
                                                          
11 Stanley’s second objection rests on the contention that the kind of speech act performed by 
a person has consequences for their subsequent behaviour. So if autistic people are really 
asserting their mathematical sentences, then this should have some detectable behavioural 
consequences. But the fictionalist must claim there are no such behavioural consequences. 
Ergo, hermeneutic fictionalism is false (Liggins, 2010, p775).  
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us do not predicts that, under certain circumstances, autistic people will behave 
differently to non-autistic people.  
 For example, Liggins takes the case of Yablo’s philosophical oracle (Liggins, 2010, 
p.778), who is omniscient, and who has just informed us that there are no natural 
numbers. Upon learning about the non-existence of the apparent referents of our 
arithmetical discourse, what do we do? Yablo imagines that most of us would be 
unperturbed (Yablo, 2005, p.88). We would go on with our ordinary counting 
practices, go on adding and subtracting, unconcerned by the philosophical bombshell 
the oracle has landed us with. But perhaps the intuitions of autistic people differ here 
(Liggins, 2010, p.779). Perhaps if we were to ask them about their intuitions in this 
thought experiment, they would tell us that they would feel forced to abandon all 
their ordinary arithmetical practices, and give up mathematical discourse for good. In 
that case, we would have a behavioural difference that we could detect, and that 
would argue in favour of hermeneutic mathematical fictionalism.  
 Indeed, Liggins goes on to suggest that so far from being a problem for the 
hermeneutic fictionalist, this is in fact an advantage of her view. If the hermeneutic 
fictionalist takes this line, then she is in a position to claim that there are empirically 
detectable traces of the non-literalness of our ordinary mathematical discourse in the 
unusual behaviour of autistic people (Liggins, 2010, p.779). It is open to the 
hermeneutic fictionalist to claim that, because autistic participants in the discourse 
actually believe the arithmetical propositions they assert, they behave in detectably 
different ways from ordinary participants in the discourse. And if this were the case, 
then it would be evidence that the rest of us do not believe the propositions we assert. 
As Liggins puts it “Far from refuting Yablo’s position, therefore, Stanley’s argument 
suggests where one might look for evidence to support it.” (Liggins, 2010, p.779) 
 
3.4.6 How to Break the Impasse 
What can we conclude from the arguments presented above? Well on the face of it, it 
seems we are right back where we started. If Liggins is correct then it seems like 
there are a number of attractive options for the hermeneutic mathematical fictionalist 
to consider in replying to the autism objection. Any one of (a), (c), or (d) seems to be 
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a live option, with (a) and (d) seeming particularly attractive (Liggins, 2010, p.782). 
That is, the hermeneutic mathematical fictionalist seems perfectly entitled to deny 
premise 4, and claim that autistic people can engage in pretence. She seems equally 
entitled to restrict premise 1 to 1’, and claim that autistic people actually believe the 
mathematical sentences they utter, while the rest of us don’t. And if she takes (d) as 
her response to Stanley’s objection, she gets the added bonus of suggesting possible 
empirical corroboration of her view.  
 On the surface, Stanley’s autism objection seemed like exactly what we needed to 
break the deadlock between hermeneutic and revolutionary fictionalism. It was 
exactly the kind of empirical dis-confirmation of hermeneutic mathematical 
fictionalism that would have left us sitting pretty, with revolutionary fictionalism our 
only viable option. Is there, then, given the failure of the autism objection, any way 
forward?  
 Well, it seems unlikely that we will be able to rely on any argument that 
straightforwardly empirically dis-confirms hermeneutic fictionalism, for the simple 
reason that the evidence is not yet in. But perhaps we can find a reason to favour 
revolutionary fictionalism in this very openness of the hermeneutic variety to 
empirical dis-confirmation. In short, perhaps the fact that hermeneutic fictionalism 
leaves so many hostages to fortune is itself a reason to favour its more tentative 
revolutionary cousin. 
 Let us begin elaborating this line of thought by looking again at response (a). We 
saw in Liggins’ discussion of (a) that the issue of whether autistic children are 
capable of pretence is an open question among psychological researchers, and he 
concluded from this that the hermeneutic fictionalist is perfectly entitled to deny 
premise 4. But as he goes on to note, this leaves significant hostages to scientific 
fortune (Liggins, 2010, p.771). If the winds of psychological research change, then it 
could turn out that the only viable interpretation of the data is that autistic children 
cannot engage in pretence, and the autism objection would seem to be a compelling 
response to hermeneutic fictionalism once more. As Liggins notes: “psychology has 
not refuted (4); indeed, it is not unlikely that it will eventually conﬁrm (4).” (Liggins, 
2010, p.771) And if psychology were to confirm premise 4, then hermeneutic 
mathematical fictionalism would once more be in trouble.     
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 Alternatively, it leaves Stanley or some other anti-fictionalist philosopher perfectly 
free to return to the psychological literature and find some other psychological 
condition that really does prohibit make-believe or pretence, but which does not 
impair mathematical ability (Liggins, 2010, p.771). In that case the objection could 
be run again, with this new condition in place of autism. Once again, response (a) to 
the autism objection would be blocked.   
 But revolutionary fictionalism leaves neither of these kinds of routes open, because 
as a claim about the correct philosophical approach to mathematical discourse, it is 
not open to empirical dis-confirmation in the way that hermeneutic fictionalism is. 
Because hermeneutic fictionalism makes interpretative claims about actual real world 
language users, it is open to empirical challenge. Ironically, in this respect at least, 
revolutionary fictionalism is in fact more conservative than the hermeneutic variety: 
revolutionary fictionalism can stand whichever way the empirical winds are blowing.  
 Or consider response (d). According to Liggins, far from being a problem for the 
hermeneutic fictionalist, the potential existence of behavioural differences between 
autistic and non-autistic participants in mathematical discourse gives us a route to the 
empirical confirmation of hermeneutic fictionalism (Liggins, 2010, p.779). But now 
suppose that we present an autistic person with the Oracle thought experiment, and 
his reaction is no different from that of any other person. That is, suppose that our 
hypothetical autistic person possesses the same intuition as the rest of us (assuming 
that we do all possess this intuition), that upon being told by the Oracle of 
Philosophy that there are no natural numbers, he would just carry on with all his 
usual arithmetical practices unfazed by his new found ontological scepticism. In that 
case, the hermeneutic mathematical fictionalist seems to have made a prediction 
about the behaviour of autistic participants in arithmetical discourse that is not borne 
out by the empirical evidence. Autistic people behave just like the rest of us who (ex 
hypothesi) do not believe that numbers exist. It seems reasonable, then, to conclude 
that either: (1) neither autistic nor non-autistic people believe in the existence of 
numbers; or (2) both autistic and non-autistic people do. And given that the default is 
that when people say they mean what they say, they mean what they say, we should 
conclude that (2) is the case: hermeneutic fictionalism has been refuted by the 
evidence.  
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Once again, revolutionary fictionalism is just not open to this kind of empirical 
challenge. The revolutionary fictionalist is perfectly happy to concede that the 
semantics of mathematical discourse is perfectly ordinary Tarskian semantics, and 
that participants in that discourse assert the sentences they appear to be asserting. 
Therefore, the revolutionary fictionalist will not be troubled by evidence that 
suggests that a fictionalist interpretation of mathematical discourse is untenable. The 
revolutionary fictionalist is not defending an empirical thesis about what 
mathematical discourse actually means, but instead is defending a philosophical 
thesis about what philosophers, qua philosophers, should make of that discourse.    
 So perhaps this gives us one reason to prefer revolutionary over hermeneutic 
fictionalism. The hermeneutic fictionalist leaves a number of hostages to empirical 
fortune, precisely because her doctrine is an empirical claim about what 
mathematical discourse really means or what mathematicians are really up to. But 
this means that hermeneutic fictionalism is only ever provisional, in permanent 
danger of being withdrawn should the evidence from psychology or linguistics prove 
uncongenial. This makes the entire project of defending a fictionalist account of 
mathematical ontology contingent upon a hospitable empirical environment; should 
that environment change, the hermeneutic fictionalist will either have to give up on 
fictionalism or switch to a revolutionary variety anyway. To put it bluntly, 
revolutionary fictionalism is the safer bet.  
 Of course, this is not a knock-down argument for favouring revolutionary 
fictionalism. Those who feel certain that the empirical evidence will go the way the 
hermeneutic fictionalist needs it to, or who are competent to perform the relevant 
scientific studies themselves, may well feel themselves capable of mounting a 
defence of hermeneutic fictionalism. But for the purposes of this thesis, we need only 
defend the claim that there is a viable fictionalism about mathematics, within which 
we can embed the mapping account of applied mathematics outlined in the previous 
chapter. And if that is our only interest, then it seems unnecessary to involve 
ourselves in empirical complexities that can only render our fictionalism about 
mathematical ontology contingent upon scientific studies that could go either way. 
For that reason, in the remainder of this chapter, we will work within a revolutionary 
variety of fictionalism about mathematics.  
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 In the next and final section of this chapter, we will set to work applying this variety 
of fictionalism to the mapping account of the previous chapter. Before doing this, 
though, it will be helpful to remind ourselves what has been achieved so far. In the 
first section of this chapter we suggested that a pretence theory of mathematical 
discourse, based on Walton’s prop-oriented make-believe, would do the job we 
needed in deflating the apparent Platonism of the mapping account, though we 
argued that nothing terribly important hangs on this particular way of doing things. If 
some other brand of fictionalism works better, we reserved the right to cross the 
floor, and switch our allegiance to a new variety of fictionalism. We then outlined 
two defences of revolutionary and hermeneutic fictionalism respectively, and turned 
to the autism objection to give us a way to decide between them. Unfortunately, even 
this apparent empirical refutation failed to settle the issue, and we have eventually 
settled on a revolutionary approach for the simple reason that it leaves less to chance, 
and insulates our fictionalist project from empirical dis-confirmation. In the 
remainder of the thesis, then, it is to be understood that this is the variety of 
fictionalism we are defending: a revolutionary prop-oriented make-believe about 
applied mathematics.     
 
3.5 Fictionalism and the Mapping Account  
In this final section of this chapter, we will deploy the account of fictionalism already 
developed, in order to solve some outstanding concerns with the mapping account of 
mathematical-scientific representation. In particular, our focus will be on evading the 
apparent Platonistic commitments of the mapping account. To that end, we will 
begin by discussing a variant of the familiar indispensability argument for Platonism, 
focusing specifically on the role of mathematical posits in our best account of 
mathematical applications. 
Following this, we will then consider two more worries that remain for the mapping 
account presented in chapter 2, before moving on to present a fictionalist solution to 
all three problems. The basic idea is that we can treat the mapping account itself as a 
kind of prop-oriented make-believe, taking the empirical world as its prop, and so 
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evade the apparent Platonic ontological commitments of the original mapping 
account.  
We conclude by discussing the purpose of the pretense, and how it can be useful to 
pretend that there are structure-preserving mappings between some empirical domain 
and a suitable mathematical structure. 
 
3.5.1 The Mapping Account and The Indispensability Argument 
The account of the applications of mathematics developed in the previous chapter 
seemed, prima facie, to bring with it a swarm of abstract entities. We saw there that 
the representational content of a mathematical-scientific representation was secured 
by the existence of a suitable mapping between the empirical domain being 
represented and the mathematical structure doing the representing. But this seems to 
leave us committed to the existence of, at least, structures and mappings. And given 
that structures are themselves usually regarded as sets of object with relations 
defined over them, we seem to be landed with ordinary mathematical objects aplenty: 
objects, relations, mappings.  
 What I want to do in this short section is develop this intuitive argument into a kind 
of indispensability argument, an argument from our best theory of mathematical 
applications in science to the existence of abstract objects. I make no claims of 
novelty for the argument about to be presented. I suspect that it is just a special case 
of the original indispensability argument, a case in which, instead of focusing on the 
presence of mathematics in our best total theory of the world, we focus on the 
specific case of our best theory of mathematics’ applications to the world. However 
that may be, my aim is simply to bring out more clearly the worry expressed in the 
previous paragraph.  
 With that in mind, I offer the following as an attempt to render the above worry into 
a more formal indispensability argument.  
1. Our best theory of applications of mathematics within the natural 
sciences seems to be committed to the existence of mathematical objects. 
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2. We should believe our best theory of applications of mathematics in 
the natural sciences to be true. 
3. Therefore we should believe in the existence of mathematical objects. 
Some comments on the first premise first. When I initially presented the worry that 
the mapping account would bring with it a host of abstracta, I suggested that we 
could find ourselves committed to mappings, relations, and as many mathematical 
objects as found employment in representational structures within the natural 
sciences. We can now see exactly why the mapping account seems to be committed 
to such things: in short, it quantifies over them. If we accept that theory then we 
believe that something like the following schema characterizes mathematical 
applications within natural science:  
(*) Mathematical-scientific theory A represents empirical domain B iff there exists a 
suitable mapping between some mathematical structure C (employed within theory 
A) and the empirical domain B. 
And schema (*), as it stands, quantifies over both mappings and structures. 
 The second premise is where the action is. This tells us that we are ontologically 
committed to whatever is quantified over by our best theory of applications of 
mathematics in the natural sciences. But should we believe this? After all, unlike 
physical theory, philosophical theories about mathematical applications do not on the 
face of it appear to be part of our best scientific theory of the world. But the second 
premise of the original indispensability argument got its traction from the plausible 
naturalist assumption that our best scientific theory is our best guide to what there is. 
Can the same kind of plausibility be claimed for this variant of the indispensability 
argument? 
I want to suggest that it can. If we are naturalists, then we are likely to see our 
philosophizing as taking place within natural science (Quine, 1980). And if we see 
our philosophizing as taking place within natural science, then we are likely to think 
that our best attempts to develop theories about the mechanisms of application are 
themselves a part of our overall best scientific theory of the world. In short, if we are 
naturalists and if we are attracted to the mapping account as an account of the 
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representation relation at work in scientific applications of mathematics, then we will 
probably want to say that the mapping account, appearances notwithstanding, is a 
part of our best total scientific theory. And if we say that, then it seems we have all 
the reasons a naturalist inherits in the case of physics for taking the posits of our 
theory seriously.  
If the above is correct, then the conclusion follows as a matter of course: we have 
every reason to take the posits of our best theory of applications seriously and, 
mathematical entities being among those posits, we have every reason to believe in 
the existence of mathematical entities. And if mathematical entities are, as is 
generally thought, abstract objects, then we have every reason to believe in the 
existence of abstract objects. The account of applications developed in the previous 
chapter, then, is unavailable for the committed nominalist.        
 
3.5.2 Two More Worries 
Before returning to the ontological issue, and presenting a solution drawing on the 
groundwork already laid down in this chapter, I want to develop two related worries 
facing the mapping account. I introduce these here because I believe that our solution 
to the ontological problem will also provide us with the resources to resolve these 
worries also. The first worry we have, in part, already encountered. In the previous 
chapter we noted that Bueno and Colyvan objected to Pincock’s mapping account on 
the grounds that it presupposed the existence of a suitable structure in the empirical 
domain (Bueno & Colyvan, 2011, p.347). But this assumption is itself a controversial 
metaphysical hypothesis: what if the world doesn’t come pre-carved at the joints in 
such a way as to make it a suitable input into our mappings? Even if we are 
unconvinced by this metaphysical possibility, it seems likely that whatever structure 
the world does have is identified, at least in part, by the scientific theories we employ 
in its investigation. And that would require that we apply our mathematical 
representations in order to secure the necessary structure in order to apply those 
representations (Bueno & Colyvan, 2011, p.347). Clearly that is not an acceptable 
result.  
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Bueno and Colyvan suggested that one way out of the difficulty might be to assume 
the existence of a suitable structure in the empirical domain, a structure that may 
even be characterized mathematically (Bueno & Colyvan, 2011, p.347). As we saw, 
this assumption is a defeasible one, required to get our representations off the 
ground, but in principal revisable if further investigation demands it. And in the last 
chapter we let this suggestion slide, noting only that the mapping account could be 
modified to include a similar mechanism. But, in fact, this suggestion introduces a 
fatal fault into our account of mathematical applications. If we assume the existence 
of some mathematically characterized structure in the empirical domain, then it 
seems we must already have some way of applying mathematics. We were supposed 
to be accounting for the relationship whereby a piece of mathematics comes to be 
employed in a representation of the empirical world, but it seems that in order for 
this relationship to be established, we must already have some way of employing 
mathematics to represent the empirical world. In that case, it would appear that it is 
not in fact the mappings that do the representing: there must already exist a 
representational relationship between the empirical world and a mathematical 
structure. And we haven’t accounted for that at all.       
Our second worry also concerns the relationship between the mapping account's 
maps and the empirical domain. This time we note that mappings are mathematical 
entities, functions or morphisms, and they hold only between mathematical 
structures. But the mapping account maps empirical structures onto mathematical 
structures. Ordinary mathematical maps cannot do this. So, at the very least, we are 
forced to conclude that the maps talked about in the mapping account cannot be 
ordinary mathematical ones. In that case, what kinds of mappings are they? What 
kind of entity is it that takes an empirical structure as input and produces a 
mathematical one as output? As it stands, the mapping account doesn’t answer this 
question and so it leaves us totally in the dark as to the status of its central 
representational machinery. 
Now one solution to this worry might be to claim that the maps in question are some 
kind of sui generis entity: a structure preserving relation between an empirical 
structure and a mathematical structure. They are, in short, not mathematical maps at 
all, they just behave like them. Let us call these new, sui generis entities ur-maps. 
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We can then amend our account of applications so that it claims that: we have an 
application of some piece of mathematics within natural science iff there exists a 
suitable ur-map between some mathematical structure and the empirical domain 
under investigation.  
One downside to the ur-map proposal is that it introduces a new kind of entity into 
our ontology, a sui generis entity. This is especially problematic when we consider 
that we were hoping to explain how applications of mathematics function, and we 
did so by employing a previously understood concept: that of a mapping. We now 
seem to have retreated to explaining applications in terms of a previously unknown 
concept: an ur-map. This seems, prima facie, to be a step back for our account of 
applications.12 
I do not believe that these worries about the ur-map proposal need be fatal; our 
solution to the ontological problem should provide us with the resources to 
resuscitate ur-maps also. But for now, I want to suggest one other possible solution: 
this is, in short, Bueno and Colyvan’s suggestion of assumed empirical structure. In 
particular, we can take over their idea that our assumed empirical structure can itself 
be mathematically characterized in order to solve the worry about mappings. If the 
assumed structure is itself already mathematized, then there is no problem about its 
entering as input into an ordinary, run of the mill, mathematical map. Our worry was 
only about non-mathematical, empirical structures: mathematically described 
structures are fair game for mappings.  
But, of course, this solution is no solution at all. As we saw above, this brings with it 
the fatal fault, the worry that our mappings don’t seem to be doing the 
representational work at all. If, then, it came down to a fair fight between ur-maps 
and Bueno and Colyvan’s assumed structures, it seems that ur-maps would win the 
day. But as I hope to show, our solution to the ontological problem will level the 
                                                          
12 One possible way of making sense of this might be to identify ur-maps with certain sets of 
ur-elements in a set theory with ur-elements (Leng, 2010, pp.176-179). In that case this 
problem simply collapses back into that of the mapping account’s Platonistic ontology.  
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playing field between these two proposed amendments to the mapping account and, 
in the end, there will be little to choose between them.  
3.5.3 How to Kill Three Birds With One Stone       
 We have these three worries: One the one hand, the mapping account seems to bring 
with it a host of ontological commitments we do not share. On the other, Bueno and 
Colyvan’s amended mapping account seems to suffer from a fatal fault that suggests 
that the mappings are not doing the representing after all. On the third hand (so great 
are our difficulties, we require three hands to hold them), we seem to be talking 
about entities that behave in ways similar to ones with which we are antecedently 
familiar and which are yet not entities with which we are antecedently familiar. How 
are we to resolve our difficulties? 
Well, at least two of our difficulties suggest their own solution. Our first worry was 
that we were speaking about things we do not believe to exist. But, as we have 
already seen, one way in which we often speak about things we do not believe to 
exist is to engage in a pretense. We pretend that the suspect entities exist, even 
though we know that really they do not. For instance, when reading the Hobbit, we 
engage in the pretense that there is a dragon called Smaug, though, of course, we are 
well aware that there is no such dragon (nor any dragons at all). So perhaps we might 
evade our ontic responsibilities by claiming that, after all, we were only pretending.  
What about our second worry? There we noted that, if we follow Bueno and 
Colyvan, we seem to land ourselves with the result that the mappings are not doing 
the representational work we thought they were. But as it happens, we can deploy a 
fictionalist account of the kind countenanced in the last paragraph to resolve this 
difficulty as well. That is, we can say that instead of providing the representation 
relation that makes applications possible, mappings and assumed empirical structures 
are themselves part of the content of a pretense, and it is that pretense that provides 
us with our representation.  
What about our third worry? Will a fictionalized mapping account assist here? Well, 
the details will, of course, depend on the particular solution we prefer (ur-maps or 
assumed structures), but I believe that worries about both approaches can be 
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assuaged by a healthy dose of pretense. I will return to this particular issue later 
when a general fictionalist strategy has been introduced.  
With all that in mind, let’s try to develop a fictionalist version of the mapping 
account developed in the previous chapter, drawing on material already presented in 
this chapter. Here is how that goes: when we apply a piece of mathematics, let us say 
that we engage in a pretense or make-believe. There is, of course nothing new about 
this suggestion; fictionalist accounts of applications have been defended before, and 
we are drawing here on work already discussed early in this chapter. What is novel 
here is the content of the pretense. In short, let us say that when we apply a piece of 
mathematics within natural science, we engage in the pretense or make-believe that 
there is a mathematical structure and a suitable mapping between that structure and 
the empirical domain. This certainly seems to help with our first worry. We were 
concerned that by endorsing a mapping account we would land ourselves with anti-
nominalist commitments to all sorts of undesirable entities. But now we note that all 
the existential commitments that had been giving us grief have ended up within the 
scope of a pretense. And surely we need not be committed to the existence of 
anything we merely pretend to quantify over! 
Let us try to be a bit more precise about this. Following Leng (2010, pp.177-179), we 
can say that when we apply mathematics to the empirical world we engage in a 
pretense according to which the non-mathematical objects in the world can be 
collected together to form sets. That is, we conduct our applied mathematics against 
the background make-believe game characterised by the axioms of set-theory with 
ur-elements. These axioms will serve as our principles of generation.  
According to the principles of generation of this game (the axioms of set-theory with 
ur-elements), there is a set of all the non-mathematical things, and (according the 
subset axiom), for any predicate, there will be a subset of the set of all ur-elements 
such that all its members satisfy that predicate (Leng, 2010, p.177). In particular, we 
note that for any property exemplified by non-mathematical things (provided we can 
find a predicate for it), there will be a subset of the set of all ur-elements with just 
those things as members. As we will see, this gives us our assumed structure at the 
base of mathematical-scientific representation.  
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Once we have our sets of worldly props, we can go on to form further sets of these, 
and sets of sets of these. But once we start doing this it becomes interesting to ask 
which sets it is appropriate to make-believe in given the nature of the worldly props. 
That is, as Leng notes (2010, pp.177-178), the nature of the worldly props, the non-
mathematical ur-elements, will constrain our further set formation, and make it 
appropriate to make-believe that there are some sets of ur-elements, and 
inappropriate to make-believe that there are others. In particular, I want to suggest 
that the nature of the worldly props will make it the case that in cases of 
mathematical application, we will be required to establish the existence of a structure 
preserving map, a morphism, between some mathematical structure (or to be precise, 
some set-theoretic surrogate for this structure) and the original set of ur-elements 
with which we started.    
Let us see how this works in a simple case. We start by noticing that, according to 
the background make-believe of set-theory with ur-elements, my fingers are part of 
the set of all ur-elements. So, via the subset axiom, I can form the set L of all those 
fingers that satisfy the property predicate “...is on my left hand.” In other words, we 
can make-believe there is a set of fingers on my left hand. Now suppose I wanted to 
count my fingers, how would I go about doing so? According to the theory of 
application presented here, you would begin by selecting an appropriate structure – 
in this case the set N of natural numbers would probably do. You then establish the 
existence of a structure preserving map between the set of fingers on my left hand, 
and the set of natural numbers, that is, you prove the existence of a certain kind of 
function with domain consisting of the objects in the set L, and range consisting of 
some subset of N (most usually the ordered set beginning with one and ending with 
five). In more complicated cases, and especially if we are convinced of the need to 
allow a role for derivation in our account of mathematical applications, we will also 
need to establish the existence of a similar (but not necessarily identical) function 
taking us back from N to L.  
Notice that this is all taking place within the pretense according to which there are 
sets of ur-elements, so this is all taking place within a make-believe game, the game 
of applied mathematics. And because it is all taking place within a make-believe 
game, there is no need for us to be ontologically committed to the things we quantify 
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over while engaging in the pretense. That is, we are not committed to the existence of 
mathematical structures, we are not committed to the existence of structure 
preserving maps, and we are not even committed to the real world existence of sets 
of ur-elements. It is perfectly plausible to claim that the only things we need be 
committed to are the ur-elements themselves, that is, the worldly props that constrain 
our mathematical-scientific theorizing.         
We have seen how to solve our ontological concerns, but what about our second and 
third worries? These, remember, were related issues and our solution to the second 
worry will be identical to our solution of the third if we endorse the “assumed 
structures” approach. Let us see how that works. Suppose that we want to claim that 
we need not worry about the existence of empirical structure or its discovery 
independent of our scientific theories, because we can simply assume the existence 
of some antecedently identified empirical structure. Suppose, even, that we go 
further and claim that this antecedently identified empirical structure is described 
mathematically. One way we might make sense of this is by claiming that what we 
are in fact doing is engaging in the pretense that the world is so structured. That is, 
when we apply some piece of mathematics, we engage in the pretense that there is a 
set of ur-elements made up of just those worldly things satisfying some structural 
predicate, in other words, we suppose there is a set of worldly, non-mathematical 
objects, and a relation on these, that can serve as the base of our mathematical-
scientific application.  
How does this help us? Well, our problem was that the mathematically characterized 
empirical structure seemed to employ some representation relation between 
mathematics and the empirical domain that remained unaccounted for. But that was 
exactly the kind of thing our theory was supposed to be accounting for! But once our 
fictionalized account is in place, we can note that our assumed structure is only part 
of the content of a pretense and it is the pretense that does the representing. And we 
already have antecedently worked out theories of how pretend representations work. 
In short, then: We solve the worry that the world might not be suitably structured by 
simply pretending that it is; we solve the worry that our account was circular by 
acknowledging that it is not the mappings that do the representational leg-work after 
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all. Instead they form the content of a pretense that really accounts for the 
representational role of mathematics.   
And this same kind of solution will work if we adopted the assumed structures 
approach because we needed mathematically characterized empirical structures as 
inputs to our mathematical maps. We will still be able to say that we are engaged in 
the pretense that such mathematically characterized structures are available and 
everything that was said in the previous paragraph will carry over nicely.  
Now if we adopted the ur-map solution of our third worry, then it seems that we will 
not require any fictionalizing. And in so far as we are only interested in the problem 
of how the empirical world can be an input to a mathematical map, this certainly 
seems to be the case. Remember that we earlier identified one concern for that 
approach, namely that it seemed to introduce a new kind of sui generis entity into our 
ontology. Now one way around this, without employing fictions, is to identify ur-
maps with some already well-known entity: perhaps ur-maps are themselves just sets 
in a set theory with ur-elements, for instance. That is why I remarked when I 
introduced the ur-map approach that the worry about their sui generis status was 
unlikely to be fatal. But, as nominalists, we are presumably worried not only by the 
problem of empirical inputs to mathematical maps, but by the very existence of 
mathematical maps in the first place. And we may well remain worried by Bueno and 
Colyvan’s concerns about the existence of empirical structure at all or its 
identification prior to our applications of mathematics. And as we saw above, one 
way of dealing with these challenges is to go fictionalist. But once we have prior 
reasons for adopting a fictionalized version of the mapping account, we can see our 
way to a quite different resolution of the worry about the ontological status of ur-
mappings. In short, they do not have one. When we apply mathematics, we merely 
engage in the pretense that there are suitable ur-mappings between some empirical 
domain and a mathematical structure, or to be more precise, we simply identify these 
ur-maps with some suitable function in a set-theory with ur-elements. We are not 
committed to a sui generis kind of entity at all, nor are we committed to sets in a set 
theory with ur-elements; we merely pretend to be so committed, and pretend 
commitment is ontologically innocuous.     
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Let us bring all this together. Let us say that when we apply some mathematics, we 
engage in a pretense such that there is a mathematical structure, and there is a 
suitable map (or ur-map), and the empirical domain is suitably structured so as to 
make it appropriate to map (or ur-map) the empirical domain onto the mathematical 
structure. That is, let us say that we make-believe that set-theory with ur-elements is 
true, that some of these ur-elements will be the non-mathematical objects of our 
scientific theories, and that the nature of the non-mathematical objects constrains our 
pretense in line with the mapping account developed in the previous chapter. As far 
as I can see, this solves our three worries. We are not committed to any unwelcome 
entities, because all quantification occurs within the pretense. We need not assume 
any prior mathematically-characterized empirical structure exists, we merely pretend 
that it does. And we can either pretend in the existence of ur-maps or else pretend in 
the prior mathematical characterization of the empirical domain, and so solve our 
worry that mathematical maps do not take empirical inputs.  
 
3.5.4 The Point of the Pretence 
If the above arguments are correct, then we have a neat solution to our three main 
concerns about the mapping account. Perhaps most importantly, we have shown how 
to incorporate one plausible, but seemingly platonistic account of mathematical 
applications within a nominalist framework. But before we can rest on our laurels, 
we must say something about why we engage in all this pretense. In order for our 
account to be successful, it cannot be the case that viewing applied mathematics as 
pretense makes it a mystery how our mathematical-scientific theories could have 
been successful.  
Now I do not want to say a great deal about this; others have discussed the role of 
fiction in the natural sciences and there are a number of defenses in the literature of 
the idea that literally false or fictional theories can nonetheless be useful in 
applications (Balaguer, 1996b; Field, 1980; Leng, 2010; van Fraassen, 1980). But 
here is one thing we might say: the pretense we engage in when we apply 
mathematics (the pretense that there are suitable mappings and so forth) will be 
useful so long as the world holds up its end of the representational bargain, that is, so 
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long as the world is such (however that may be) as to make it pretense worthy that it 
is so structured as to be an appropriate input to a mapping onto some mathematical 
structure. In other words, we note that the world itself will constrain our pretense 
making.  
One way in which this constraining of our pretense is manifested is in experiment. 
Perhaps the need to provide explanations also places limits on what we can pretend. 
It could be that our pretenses will only be appropriate if they (indirectly) allow us to 
express the nominalistic facts. However that may be, we note only that our pretense 
will be a species of what, following Walton (1993), we have called “prop-oriented 
make-believe” with the world as a prop. And the world as prop will make certain 
pretenses admissible and rule others out. Experiment and further investigation will 
(so long as the world cooperates) enable us to sort the wheat from the chaff; so we 
see that even if we regard applied mathematics as mostly pretense, there is ample 
room for the exercise of the scientific method and ample opportunity for scientific 
success.   
 
3.6 Concluding Remarks 
In these final remarks I want to recapitulate what has been achieved over the course 
of this somewhat lengthy chapter. To begin with, we have adopted, following Leng 
(2010) and Yablo (2001; 2005), the idea that we can use Walton’s (1993) account of 
prop-oriented make-believe to support a fictionalist theory of mathematics generally, 
and applied mathematics in particular. We then moved on to a lengthy discussion of 
revolutionary and hermeneutic fictionalism, concluding that it was safest (though by 
no means obligatory) for the fictionalist to adopt the former. In this final section we 
developed the idea that treating the mapping account of chapter 2 as a prop-oriented 
make-believe, taking the world as a prop enabled us, among other things, to evade its 
apparent, and unwelcome ontological commitment to abstract mathematical objects.   
In the final two chapters of this thesis, prior to the conclusion, our focus broadens 
somewhat, as we move away from a narrow focus on issues of mathematical 
representation and explanation, into the realm of metaphilosophy. In the next chapter 
we will discuss how the fictionalist can defend her position against a certain kind of 
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Pragmatist objection that sees all metaphysical dispute as traceable to confusions 
about how language works. In the chapter after that, we discuss some recent ideas 
from metaontology that seem especially threatening to the fictionalist about 
abstracta. In the conclusion I draw these various strands together in order to argue 
that fictionalism about mathematics offers both a coherent and naturalistically 
satisfying account of applications of mathematics within the natural sciences and a 
viable response to the placement problem with which we began.    
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Chapter 4. Fictionalism and Meta-philosophy, Part 1: Anti-Representationalism 
 
4.1 Introduction 
So far we have been considering the consequences one theory of applications of 
mathematics in scientific representation has for the ontology of mathematics. What 
we have discovered is that a revolutionary, prop-oriented pretence theory, a kind of 
mathematical fictionalism, offers one way to defuse the apparently inflationary 
ontology of the mapping account of mathematical applications. But at this point we 
may begin to feel disquiet at the ease with which Platonist ontology has been 
dismissed. Perhaps, after all, there is less to this ontology business than we first 
supposed.  
There are, I suspect, two ways in which this initial disquiet might be developed into a 
full blown assault on the foundations of ontology. On the one hand, we may suspect 
that the ease with which the local (mathematical) fictionalist deflates inflationary 
metaphysics holds out the promise of using a global fictionalism to deflate 
metaphysics entirely. In that case, our successes at the local level will prove entirely 
Pyrrhic: we will have defused the Platonist menace, only at the cost undermining 
nominalism in turn.  
The strategy just considered invokes a global fictionalism in the defense of a 
deflationary metaontology. In the next chapter I will consider some attempts to 
substantiate a kind of metaontological anti-realism (distinct from the first order 
ontological anti-realism, of which genus local fictionalism is a species). But in this 
chapter I want to consider a different way in which our disquietude might be 
employed in the services of metaontological anti-realism: perhaps we drew negative 
conclusions from our investigation of scientific representation simply because 
representation doesn’t work the way we thought it did. Perhaps, after all, there are no 
conclusions to be drawn about ontology from the theory of representation. 
In the following chapter, I will set out one recent attempt to develop this pragmatist 
line of thought about representation, that of Huw Price’s Naturalism Without Mirrors 
(Price, 2011). As we will see, this kind of deflationary account of semantic relations 
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poses a challenge to the naturalist ontologist, because it suggests that she has been 
working all along with an unnatural account of representation. I will offer some 
criticisms of Price’s project (principally based around the claim that it is not as 
naturalistic as Price suggests), before moving on to more positive attempts to defend 
the ontologist’s activities. I will initially suggest that there is scope for a kind of 
pragmatism that would nonetheless be resistant to Price’s metaphysical pluralism 
(indeed, I suspect that something like this is the kind of thing Quine meant by 
naturalism (cf. Quine, 1951)). I will then go on to argue that however the debate over 
the correct pragmatist account of ontology turns out, Price himself may need some 
kind of word-world relations, of the kind the representationalist employs, in order to 
explain some of the features of his own account of linguistic practice. I will conclude 
by suggesting that whether or not my positive suggestions work out, Price has given 
us very little reason to favour his account of representation (and so, his metaphysical 
pluralism) over that of the naturalist ontologist.  
 
4.2 Naturalism and the Placement Problems 
Suppose we have committed ourselves to some broad philosophical program, 
empiricism say, or physicalism. Then there will be things about which we wish to 
talk, but which we may have trouble squeezing in to the procrustean bed of 
permissible ontology. For instance, an empiricist, whose ontology might be so 
austere as to allow only momentary sense data and constructions out of these, will 
have to find a place for ordinary middle-sized dry goods, theoretical entities, morals, 
mathematicalia and so forth. Obviously, this is not an easy task.  A physicalist may 
have an easier time of it with middle-sized dry goods and theoretical entities, but 
may still struggle to find a place for morals and mathematics and minds and the 
modal. These difficult cases are what Price calls ‘placement problems’ (Price, 2011, 
pp.184-189): our philosophical program allows only entities of certain kinds, yet our 
everyday talk is full of apparent references to things of other kinds. We must either 
find a home for these other kinds, placing them among the kinds of things already 
allowed, or else do without them.    
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Naturalism, of course, is just such a broad philosophical program, and like 
empiricism and physicalism it brings with it a prohibition on the kinds of things we 
are allowed to talk about: in short, there are no non-natural things (Price, 2011, p.4). 
Another way of putting this is to say that for the naturalist, there will be no things not 
countenanced by the natural sciences, no things that violate our picture of ourselves 
and our talk as part of the natural world and revealed by our best scientific theories. 
But this commitment brings with it a similar set of placement problems faced by the 
physicalist (Price, 2011, pp.3-6). We allow only natural properties and natural 
relations between those properties and ourselves. In particular, there can be no non-
natural relations between ourselves and the properties we know about and talk about; 
the only relations we can countenance are those that would be countenanced by our 
best science of ourselves as talkers and knowers. So how came we by our ability to 
talk about moral properties, if these should prove to be irreducible, non-natural 
properties? How did we learn about modal facts, if these involve knowledge of 
possibilia causally isolated from us? Just how do minds fit into our picture of the 
biological and physical world revealed by those sciences? Indeed, we have already 
encountered one of these placement problems. It has been the main focus of the 
thesis so far: just where do mathematical objects fit into the naturalist’s picture of the 
world?  
 
4.2.1 Placement Strategies 
Price sees four responses to the placement problems in the extant literature (Price, 
2011, pp.6-8). In the first place, we might conclude from the difficulty of fitting 
these important areas of discourse into our naturalistic picture of the world that 
naturalism is flawed. If naturalism is too austere to allow morals and modals, maths 
and minds, then naturalism should be abandoned. First philosophy is back, 
resurrected by our troubles with placement. But of course, such a pigheaded 
resistance to the tide of scientific success has proven justifiably unpopular. Canute 
hoped that his futile display before the waves would refute his fawning courtiers and 
prove his fallibility and piety. The non-naturalist has nothing comparable to gain by 
setting her face against the Tsunami of scientific accomplishment (Price, 2011, 
p.132).  
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Suppose, then, we have refused the retreat to first philosophy, what options are left 
for the naturalist trying to cope with the placement problems? One option is hard 
headed eliminativism (Price, 2011, p.7). The concepts we employ in mind talk or 
moral talk have no home in the conceptual landscape revealed by natural science, 
therefore they must go. There are, for instance, no minds and the concepts of folk 
psychology are irreparably faulty. In their place we should employ the concepts of 
neuroscience and experimental psychology. The problem with this response is that it 
seems to underestimate the importance of the concepts that would have to be 
jettisoned (Price, 2011, p.132). We can perhaps see this best when we consider that 
the eliminativist response has been less appealing to naturalists when dealing with 
modal talk and mathematical talk. The problem, of course, is that modal talk and 
mathematical talk themselves play a vital role in our scientific theorizing. To 
eliminate all mathematical talk from our discourse would cripple the natural 
sciences, indeed, would do most damage to the science traditionally of most interest 
to naturalists themselves, physics. We might, as enlightened naturalists do without 
morals, but we couldn’t spare our functions, sets and numbers.  
An alternative strategy is to find a home for the troublesome entities within the 
framework of naturalism (Price, 2011, p.6). We might, that is, attempt to reduce the 
suspect concepts to those with which naturalism has no difficulty: mental states just 
are brain states, for instance, or mathematics is megethology. The problem with this 
strategy is carrying it out. It is difficult to think of a single uncontroversial example 
of a naturalistic reduction of one concept to another. Indeed, in the moral case, the 
very intelligibility of the strategy has been repeatedly called in question. Given the 
difficulties of the reductionist strategy, we might, as naturalists hope for a better way. 
Price identifies one last strategy that he believes the naturalist can make use of to 
deal with the placement problems: we might adopt a non-cognitive semantics for the 
region of discourse (Price, 2011, pp.7-8). That is, we could claim that the discourse is 
unthreatened by our scientific world-view, because it doesn’t have the function of 
making truth-apt claims or representing how things are with world. The obvious case 
study here is in metaethics. There is no problem, claims the non-cognitivist, finding a 
home for moral properties in the world, because the function of moral property 
words is not to refer to moral properties after all (cf. Ayer, 2001). Moral sentences do 
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not purport to tell us how things are with the world and so their claims do not conflict 
with scientific sentences.  
Now the problem Price sees with this strategy is one of containment (Price, 2011, 
pp.239-242). For instance, it has been argued that the non-cognitivist faces 
difficulties if she marries her non-cognitivism to a deflationary theory of truth (Price, 
2011, p.240). After all, if all it takes for ‘P’ to be true is p, then how can the non-
cognitivist rule out the truth aptness of moral discourse? All it takes for ‘Stealing is 
wrong’ to be true, is that stealing is wrong. But presumably the non-cognitivist 
would be happy to say that stealing is wrong (if not, we would have to doubt her 
character as well as her theory). So the non-cognitivist seems to have difficulty 
drawing the needed distinction between truth-apt discourse and non-truth-apt 
discourse. But then, she seems to have no basis on which to found a distinction 
between cognitive and non-cognitive uses of language.  
As Price sees it, this is to get things the wrong way round (Price, 2011, pp.240-241). 
To view the deflationary challenge as a threat to non-cognitivism is to ignore the 
possibility that what blurring the lines between cognitive and non-cognitive, truth-apt 
and non-truth-apt discourse undermines is the former and not the latter category. The 
challenge assumes that it is cognitive, fact stating discourse that is in good standing, 
with non-cognitive, non-fact stating discourse needing to be distinguished from it. 
But perhaps, Price suggests (Price, 2011, p.241), the lesson we should learn is that no 
discourse is ever fact stating in the way the cognitivist supposes, that all uses of 
language perform some function other than that of representing things in the world. 
After all, the essence of minimalism about semantic concepts like truth is that there 
are no substantial semantic properties and no interesting theories to be had about 
them. In particular, there will be no theory of the kind: the purpose of truth-apt 
discourse is to state how things are with world. The lesson of the deflationary 
challenge to non-cognitivism, then, seems to be that we should allow that all 
language serves some function besides that of representing the world and the things 
within it (Price, 2011, p.241). 
Price goes on to suggest that this is an overlooked position in the literature on 
placements problems: instead of eliminativism, reductionism, non-naturalism and 
local non-cognitivism, we might adopt a global non-cognitivism (Price, 2011, pp.8-
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11). We might then claim that the placement problems cause no problem for 
naturalists, because, after all, it is not the function of any discourse, even scientific 
discourse to represent how things are with the world and its inhabitants. It is this fifth 
strategy for the naturalist faced with placement problems, global non-cognitivism, on 
which Price founds his metaphysical pluralism. In the next section I will give further 
details of Price’s theory and attempt some initial criticisms of its plausibility, but for 
now I want to say a few words about the challenge Price’s position presents my 
project in this thesis.  
So far I have been assuming that there is something to be learned about the ontology 
of mathematics from scientific representation. In particular, if it had turned out that 
reference to mathematical entities played an indispensable role in scientific 
representation, I suggested that we should have been forced to accede to Platonism. 
But throughout I have been working with the assumption that the purpose of a 
representation is to tell us how things are with the world. Should this turn out not to 
be the case, should scientific representation play some other role in our cognitive 
lives, some expressive or prescriptive role, then it is difficult to see what could be 
learned about ontology from its study. Science, we were supposing was our 
authoritative guide to how the world is and in particular to what the furniture of the 
world contains. If Price is correct, then even science is not a guide to how the world 
is; it may be that nothing in our linguistic practice fulfils that representational 
function. And if that is so, it could well be that ontology rests on a mistake.                                   
 
4.3 Representing Doesn’t Work Like That 
We have already seen one strand of Price’s pragmatist deflation of metaphysics at 
work: global non-cognitivism. It is not the purpose of any of our linguistic practices 
to represent how things are with world. Another way of putting this is to say that 
Price adopts a very radical form of semantic minimalism: there are no robust, big R 
representations, no word-world relations of the kind the representationalist 
presupposes (Price, 2011, p.25). But, of course, this is only part of the story. At 
present this doesn’t seem to deliver metaphysical pluralism. After all, it may be that 
some parts of our linguistic practice conflict with others, even if this is not a matter 
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of saying different things about the world and its contents. Consider, for instance, 
two regions of discourse, one moral and one scientific, both of which serve a 
prescriptive function in our cognitive lives, but both of which prescribe conflicting 
activities. In this case, it seems that simply denying big R representationalism might 
not automatically deliver ontological pluralism (a point that I hope will become 
clearer when we discuss a possible pragmatist response to Price). 
Second, Price wants to present his position as a kind of naturalism (Price, 2011, 
pp.184-185). Non-naturalism, remember, seemed hopelessly antiquarian, a desperate 
attempt to deny the inevitable encroachment of science and its results into the 
territory of philosophy. So Price needs to substantiate his claim that his global anti-
representationalism is naturalistically respectable. In what follows I hope to show 
that it is not. 
To establish metaphysical pluralism, Price makes use of a claim about human 
language use, namely that it is functionally diverse (Price, 2011, pp.136-140). As 
Price sees things, this functional pluralism is linked to his rejection of 
representationalism (Price, 1997, p.253): instead of thinking of language as an 
homogeneous tool for representing how things are with the world, we need instead to 
concentrate on the variety of roles language plays in our cognitive and practical lives. 
Once robust word-world relations of the kind the representationalist envisages are 
out of the picture, this anthropological investigation of linguistic practices is really 
all that is left to the linguistically oriented philosopher (Price, 2011, p.199). 
I believe – and will argue in the next section – that Price has overstated this link 
between global non-cognitivism and functional pluralism. But for now I just want to 
concentrate on the details of Price’s pluralism and to draw out its consequences for 
metaphysics of the kind being practiced in this thesis. Firstly, then, it is a striking 
feature of what we have been calling Price’s global non-cognitivism that he does not 
in fact deny that there may be a central linguistic activity of ‘description’. It may 
well be that there is a core practice, which Price variously labels ‘assertion’ and 
‘description’, which all linguistic practices have in common or which all uses of 
language derive from (Price, 2011, pp.138-139). For instance, when discussing 
Brandom, Price suggests that “It is open to us to say that the key similarity is 
precisely that various of the different language games all avail themselves of the 
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same inferential machinery” (Price, 2011, p.310), where this inferential machinery is 
part of Brandom’s inferentialist account of the linguistic ‘downtown’ of assertion. 
Again, in Naturalism and the Fate of the M-Worlds (Price, 1997, p.254), Price 
suggests that there may well be a central linguistic category, ‘description’, whose 
core properties are common to all uses of language.  
Nonetheless, Price is quick to point out that this is a fairly superficial level of 
linguistic homogeneity (Price, 2011, p.138), akin to the common clothing that 
Wittgenstein believed masked the diversity of language games and forms of life 
underlying our linguistic practices (Price, 2011, p.42). So, for instance, taking as our 
example the category of description, Price argues that what we need is an 
investigation of the core properties of this linguistic category that enable it to play 
the roles that it does in our cognitive and practical lives. But we need not assume that 
there is just one property or relation, namely representation, that is of the essence of 
description. Nor need we assume that the core properties of the descriptive category 
of language use cannot be employed differently in different situations. “Descriptive 
utterances about aardvarks serve different purposes from descriptive utterances about 
zygotes,” (Price, 2011, p.138) and they are able to do this because the core properties 
of description can serve different functions.  
It is now easy to see where the representationalist goes wrong. She assumes that 
there is one core property of description or assertion, and one purpose for which we 
employ descriptions with this property: namely, all descriptions are representations 
(employing word-world relations) and all are used to tell us how things are with the 
world. A global non-cognitivism, seen as the rejection of the idea that the function of 
language is to represent the world, undermines the idea that this can be the one true 
purpose for which language is employed – but note that it is functional pluralism, the 
idea that even core linguistic practices may serve a variety of functionally diverse 
roles in our lives, that does all the work of undermining the idea that there is any one 
true purpose for which language is employed.  
 
4.4 From Functional Pluralism to Metaphysical Pluralism 
148 
 
We have seen where the representationalist goes wrong, but what about the 
metaphysician, where did she lose her way? In adopting the misguided doctrine of 
representationalism, replies Price (Price, 2011, pp.12-14). Clearly, as our focus in 
this thesis is on the metaphysics of mathematics, it will be important to understand 
and evaluate this claim.   
To begin with, let’s return to the placement problems. We were faced, as naturalistic 
metaphysicians with the problem of fitting important areas of human discourse into 
our picture of ourselves as entirely natural beings. Where, for instance, do 
mathematicalia fit, given that such things are causally inert and our best scientific 
picture of humans makes it difficult to imagine how human beings can talk about or 
know about causally inert entities (Benacerraf, 1983b)? But why should the 
placement problems be a disease endemic to representationalism? Well, because the 
representationalist is working with the picture that it is the function of all areas of 
human discourse (to be more precise, of all descriptive or assertive discourses) to tell 
us how things are with the world and its furniture. And if that is the sole function of 
language, then discourses that give us conflicting accounts of the world and its 
furniture will be incompatible.   
 We are now in a position to see more fully how Price’s global non-cognitivism 
empowers us to deal with this sort of placement problem. Firstly, we deny that it is 
the function of any area of human discourse to tell us how things are with the world. 
From this we move to the claim that human language is functionally diverse. The 
first move makes it difficult to see how the claims of the two discourses, the 
naturalist and mathematical for instance, could conflict (Price, 2011, pp.7-8). More 
precisely, because neither discourse is in the business of telling us how things are 
with the world and its inhabitants, it cannot be that one discourse tells us something 
about the world and its inhabitants that is contradicted by the other (Price, 2011, p.8).  
But it is the second move, functional pluralism, that enables us to rescue the 
previously imperiled regions of discourse. To see this, recall the global prescriptivist 
considered above, that is, someone who believes that no area of linguistic practice 
serves the function of representing, instead contending that all discourse in some way 
aims to prescribe values to others. This is a kind of global non-cognitivism, but it is 
still functionally monist. And because of this it is still possible for two regions of 
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discourse to conflict – when, for instance, one of the discourses prescribes something 
that is proscribed by the other. It is still conceivable, then, that even Price’s global 
rejection of representationalism may still suffer with placement problems, if there is 
some one linguistic function served by both scientific and moral, modal, 
mathematical, and mental discourses.  
 It is the business of functional pluralism to rule out this sort of thing. There may 
well be some core practice common to all these language games, but it will be a core 
practice capable of serving in many different functional roles (Price, 2011, pp.138-
139). And if all these areas of discourse have different roles and fulfill different 
purposes in our cognitive lives, then it will not be possible for them to conflict. In 
other words, there is no reason to do away with mathematical talk just because we 
struggle to make it square with our best scientific picture of ourselves as knowers 
and speakers. To do so would be to assume that both mathematical and scientific talk 
were in the same functional category, that both had the same role in our cognitive 
and practical lives. But this latter claim remains to be substantiated, and given 
functional pluralism it is at least not immediately obvious that it will be.  
So attempts to settle placement problems are philosophically misguided. They rest on 
a functional monism about language that is at best questionable. The effect of all this, 
Price suggests, is a kind of Carnapian quietism about metaphysics (Price, 2007, 
pp.377-378). Recall that for Carnap, existence questions of the kind of interest to the 
ontologist can be separated into two kinds (Carnap, 1950). On the one hand, we have 
the internal questions, questions the answer to which will be settled by the linguistic 
rules definitive of a particular linguistic framework. On the other hand, we have the 
external existence questions, questions the answer to which would be independent of 
any linguistic rules (Carnap, 1950, pp.21-23).  
Now internal existence questions will come in two kinds. Consider, for instance, the 
framework of the rational numbers augmented with a name for the ratio of the 
circumference of a circle to its diameter. We can now ask two kinds of internal 
question within this framework, a substantive kind and a trivial kind. As an example 
of a substantive internal question, consider whether there are numbers p and q for 
which p/q = pi. The rules of the framework tell us how to find the answer to this 
question, but the answer is not trivial, we will have to do some work to arrive at it. 
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Now consider the trivial internal question, are there numbers? Given that we are 
working entirely within the number framework, the rules of the framework will 
deliver the immediate answer: yes.  
External questions, again, come in two varieties. In so far as they are substantive, 
then they are pragmatic questions about whether it serves our purposes to adopt a 
given set of rules, to work within a particular linguistic framework. But in so far as 
external existence questions are attempts to get, as it were, behind the linguistic rules 
that tell us how to go about answering them, then they are not even trivial, they are 
meaningless. So, for instance, “are there numbers?”, if it is not a trivial internal 
question or a pragmatic question about whether or not talking about numbers serves 
our purposes, is a piece of meaningless metaphysics, an attempt to bypass the 
linguistic rules that give any questions their meaning by telling us how to answer 
them (Carnap, 1950, pp.22-23).  
Now Price sees similarities between this Carnapian stance on metaphysics and his 
global non-cognitivism plus functional pluralism (Price, 2007, pp.377-378). To see 
this, note that there will be substantive internal existence questions within any region 
of discourse. Suppose that we settle on what there is by seeing whether we quantify 
over things of that nature in our talk. And suppose that we are at present wondering 
whether there are electrons. Settling this may not be an easy matter. It may require us 
to carry out sophisticated and sensitive experiments on oil drops, for instance, or 
involve us in calculating minimal electric charges. None of this need be easy to 
accomplish. Nonetheless, the correct procedures for deciding whether or not we 
quantify over electrons, and so whether there are any, will be a matter internal to the 
region of discourse (physics) for which their existence is an issue (again, there will 
be trivial internal questions for Price as well. Consider, “are there physical objects?” 
asked within physics. The answer, “Of course there are!” is as trivial as could be). 
But what about metaphysical existence questions? How are they to be settled? Let’s 
suppose we have asked the question, are there really electrons? That is, we 
acknowledge that electrons are quantified over in the region of discourse within 
which the existence of electrons is at issue, but we remain unsatisfied. We want to 
know really, Really really, whether there are electrons. Well, this might be a kind of 
pragmatic external question. An anthropological question about what purpose, if any, 
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electron talk serves in our lives. Note that this need not be trivial for Price; nothing in 
the anthropological investigation of human linguistic practice rules out the discovery 
of a linguistic practice that is useless or even harmful. And nothing rules out the 
discovery of a linguistic practice whose purposes might perhaps be better served by 
talking differently. But however that may be, this external question is not, and for 
Price cannot be a question about the furniture of the world, about what is Really 
really there.  
How about the other kind of external question, the kind that wants to get behind the 
linguistic framework to the world it represents? Well, like Carnap, this is where Price 
locates metaphysical questions (Price, 2011, pp.189-190). Metaphysics turns out, for 
Price, to be an attempt to move from the linguistic representation to the world 
represented, an attempt to ask, not just whether we quantify over something in our 
ordinary linguistic practice, but whether the things quantified over are Really really 
there. But for Price, as for Carnap, this kind of question is illegitimate, and it is 
illegitimate for Price precisely because it presupposes representationalism (Price, 
2011, p.190). The mistake the metaphysician makes is to assume there is some 
question beyond the question of whether we speak within a discourse about some 
kinds of objects. It is the mistake of assuming that that discourse serves the one true 
purpose of representation, that there are robust relations between our words and the 
world. But this is false: there are many purposes served by language, many reasons 
we might say that something exists. And there is no route from semantics to the 
world, no path from what we say (for myriad reasons) exists and what exists.  
Given this mixture of semantic minimalism and linguistic functional pluralism, 
metaphysical pluralism results. All that remains is for us to investigate why humans 
feel compelled to speak about the existence of certain kinds of things, what purpose 
such talk fulfills in their varied and complex cognitive and practical lives (Price, 
2011, p.199). And semantic minimalism of the extreme variety espoused by Price, 
the denial of any kind of strong semantic relations, rules out our finding a way down 
from the ways we talk to the world we talk about. Metaphysics, in so far as it 
requires a descent from semantics to world, is out; in its place a suitably pluralist 
anthropology will teach us that being, and so existence, is said in as many ways as 
there are forms of life (Price, 2011, pp.189-199).  
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Clearly this is an unwelcome result for this thesis, which is, after all, intended as a 
contribution to one small part of metaphysics. The question of mathematical 
ontology of concern to us, whether numbers, sets, functions, etc. exist is an instance 
of a placement problem. If the combination of anti-representationalism, linguistic 
functional pluralism, and their corollary metaphysical pluralism render placement 
questions moot, then they render this thesis moot, an academic exercise of the worst 
kind: the naturalist equivalent of wondering how many angels might dance upon the 
head of a pin. It will be helpful, then, to develop some kind of response to Price’s 
anti-metaphysical challenge.        
 
4.5 Naturalism and Pluralism: an Uncomfortable Marriage 
With functional pluralism comes metaphysical pluralism, and with metaphysical 
pluralism we lose the picture of philosophy as an investigation of the world and its 
furniture. At the end of the last section we were left with the unsettling conclusion 
that all there is to existence is what is quantified over within a particular region of 
discourse, and that will be a matter for participants in that discourse. So what is left 
to the philosopher? And what is left for the naturalist, who saw herself as working 
within the confines of the scientific project? 
Well, we were left at the end of the last section with the idea that there remains a 
kind of external question about linguistic practices and linguistic frameworks, 
namely, the anthropological investigation of the reasons and purposes human beings 
have for talking in the many different ways that they do. And Price is keen to 
reassure the naturalist here (Price, 2011, p.199): there is nothing for the naturalist to 
balk at in the idea that her new role is as a kind of sociologist or anthropologist of 
language. After all, this is a perfectly naturalistically acceptable undertaking: it is the 
investigation of human linguistic practice as a natural phenomenon (Price, 2011, 
p.199).  
But in this section I want to argue that the combination of metaphysical pluralism 
and naturalism is more difficult than Price makes it appear. And if that is so, then in 
so far as metaphysical pluralism results from functional pluralism and global non-
153 
 
cognitivism, it makes the combination of these views with naturalism less attractive 
than we might initially have supposed.  
So why might metaphysical pluralism and naturalism make uncomfortable 
bedfellows? Well, in short, the problem is with the status of science. After all, 
naturalism is, if somewhat nebulously, nothing but the idea that science is in some 
sense authoritative for philosophy. As Price himself puts it “I take [naturalism] to be 
the view that the project of metaphysics can properly be conducted from the 
standpoint of natural science.” (Price, 1997, p.247n.1) Indeed, I think that Price has 
understated the naturalist’s demands significantly here. Naturalism is the view that 
philosophy and not just metaphysics, should be conducted from the standpoint of 
natural science.  
And Price himself seems initially happy with this. After all, his project is to tell us 
how we can stop worrying and love the placement problems consistently with our 
naturalistic scruples. And he repeatedly adverts to the idea that what science tells us 
about human beings and the linguistic practices of human beings may well have 
deflationary consequences for metaphysics (Price, 2011, p.5; pp.184-199). The 
problem with all this is with what happens to science if metaphysical pluralism is 
true. After all, if the arguments of the preceding section are anywhere near the mark 
we are left with the result that no discourse, not even scientific discourse is in the 
business of telling us how things are with the world. And all discourses are in the 
same boat here. Science may well play a different function in our cognitive lives to, 
say, moral discourse, but not a better one, and not a more interesting one, and 
certainly not a metaphysically fundamental one (Price, 2011, p.199). The upshot of 
all this is that the existential claims of natural science turn out to be different to, but 
no better than, any other region of discourse. Put another way, in the world of the 
metaphysical pluralist, science is just another perspective, with no real claim to 
authority (Price, 2011, pp.30-32).  
But this seems to fit rather poorly with the naturalist claim that science is 
authoritative. One reason for embracing functional pluralism is that it provides a 
naturalistically respectable way of diffusing the placement problems. But why should 
we be constrained to accept only scientifically acceptable solutions to the placement 
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problems, if science is just another perspective, speaking with no metaphysically 
authoritative voice as to how things are? 
Perhaps worse is the havoc that metaphysical pluralism plays with Price’s claims 
about human language use. Given what we know of ourselves as revealed by natural 
science, and given the likely role that language will play in the lives of creatures like 
that, linguistic functional pluralism comes to look like an attractive story about 
semantics. At the very least, semantic monism of the kind embraced by the 
representationalist has a worryingly a priori flavour, if it is just the blanket rejection 
of pluralism prior to any scientific investigation. But now suppose that Price is 
correct about the link between global non-cognitivism and metaphysical pluralism. 
Suppose that science is no more authoritative about how things are with human 
language users than is any other discourse, because no discourse plays that 
representational role. Then why should we treat the deliverances of natural science as 
authoritative for philosophical semantics? And if metaphysical pluralism is true, and 
no discourse’s existence claims are better (in the sense of more representative of how 
things Really really are) than any other’s, why should philosophical semantics be 
constrained by the existential claims of natural science?  
To put all this another way, we are supposing that human language users are natural 
creatures with only natural properties and natural relations to natural things, only 
because this was the picture revealed by our best science! (Price, 2011, p.186) We 
have since discovered that the picture of the world revealed by our best science is no 
more representative of how things Really really are with human beings than is the 
picture revealed by any other functionally distinct discourse. And yet we seem to be 
clinging to the idea that human beings Really really are natural creatures with only 
natural properties and natural relations to natural things, rather than, say, Cartesian 
egos with non-physical properties and extra-sensory relations to a realm of pure 
ideas. If we could find some role that talk of the latter kind plays in at least some 
areas of human life (and I suspect that we could), why should its existential claims 
and its descriptions of human language users not count as equally authoritative with 
those of science, at least given the pluralism Price wishes to defend? 
We seem to be faced with an unpleasant choice, given metaphysical pluralism and 
the position to which it relegates scientific discourse. Either way we seem to have to 
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abandon the claim that science is authoritative for philosophical semantics, but there 
are two ways in which we might take this. On the one hand, we could see this as 
undermining many of the foundations on which Price’s pluralism rests. That is, we 
no longer have reason to believe that human language users are natural creatures and 
so we should abandon this claim and the idea that it somehow supports functional 
pluralism or underwrites the naturalistic acceptability of Price’s project. But this is 
just to retreat to first philosophy, to treat functional pluralism and anti-
representationalism as a priori commitments unresponsive to scientific theory.   
 On the other hand, we could retain the idea that human beings are natural creatures, 
and that this constrains proper philosophical theorizing about semantics. But now we 
are faced with two further problems. The first is that the claim about human language 
users – that they are natural creatures, in a natural world, entering into only natural 
relations – was originally derived from scientific theories we now regard as just one 
more perspective among many equally good perspectives. If that is so, then it looks 
worryingly like our claim that human language users are natural creatures, in a 
natural world, entering only natural relations, is an a priori commitment. Once again 
we have beaten a retreat to first philosophy. But this response looks even less 
promising when we consider in what sense we are to take the claim that humans are 
natural creatures, in a natural world, entering only natural relations. After all, if this 
is not a descriptive claim, a claim about how things Really really are with the world, 
then what kind of claim is it? What other role could it be playing and how would that 
role ensure that this claim actually did constrain philosophical speculation about 
semantics?   
I suspect that these kinds of worries pose a major challenge to the kind of pluralism 
Price envisages. That is, I see no way to be a naturalist, that is, someone for whom 
science is authoritative, without embracing monism of some kind. In the next section 
I want to spend some time discussing ways in which a naturalist might embrace 
pragmatism without ensnaring themselves in pluralism. My aim is not to defend this 
position, but to show how much of Price’s project depends upon the unargued 
assumption of functional pluralism (and a kind of evaluative equality as well). But 
whether or not the suggestions I make succeed in undermining the idea that a 
pragmatist must or should be a pluralist, I suspect the objections raised in this section 
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force us to an important choice point: we can be pluralist or we can be naturalist, but 
we cannot be both.  
 
4.6 A Non-Pluralist Pragmatism 
In this section I want to suggest two ways in which a pragmatist might resist Price’s 
metaphysical pluralism. In short, this requires rejection of either of two unargued 
assumptions Price makes (one explicit and one implicit in Price’s presentation). On 
the one hand, we can accept that the function of language is not to mirror the world, 
without accepting that language is functionally diverse. Alternatively, we might 
accept both of these claims, but deny a premise that I believe is implicit in Price’s 
presentation of his project, namely, evaluative equality; in other words: of all the 
different linguistic functions, none is better than any other.  
It is not my intention to defend the resulting position. Indeed, I suspect that such a 
position will face a challenge from those who believe that it is a kind of metaphysical 
trivialism. My aim is only to exhibit a kind of philosopher for whom the denial that 
language is a mirror of the world would not involve the view that almost any way of 
talking is potentially as good as any other. In doing so, I hope to exhibit the central 
role that the unargued premises of functional diversity and evaluative equality play in 
establishing metaphysical pluralism. Hopefully this should further strengthen my 
claim that metaphysical pluralism is not mandated for a naturalist, and further bolster 
the defence of the variety of naturalist metaphysics undertaken in this thesis.     
 
4.6.1 More Problems with Pluralism 
Why might a philosopher who has rejected representationalism be interested in 
denying Price’s pluralist thesis? Well, recall that for Price existence is a thin notion. 
There is no more to ask about the existence of some entities than whether they are 
quantified over (or referred to or whatever) in a particular region of human discourse. 
The only remaining questions are not metaphysical ones (sure, so and sos ‘exist’, but 
do they Really really exist?), but instead the anthropological question of why 
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creatures like us find it useful or important to speak a language in which such 
existence claims are warranted.  
The resulting position, as we saw, was a kind of Carnapian metaphysical pluralism, a 
pluralism in which many different kinds of ontological commitments – those of 
mathematical discourse, for instance, as well as natural scientific discourse – can be 
tolerated. But this tolerance was bought at the cost of deflating the very idea of 
ontological commitment, by making ontological commitment no more than a matter 
of whether entities of a particular kind are quantified over in some region of 
discourse (or something to that effect. It is, in fact, none too clear what notion of 
ontological commitment Price is working with). The obvious worry here is that this 
makes Price’s position far too tolerant. There will be many kinds of existential 
commitments, in many regions of human discourse, that we do not want to inherit. 
There are the gods of various kinds of religious discourse, the planetary influences of 
astrological discourse, the ‘memory’ that homeopaths attribute to water, and so on 
and so forth. Even if we allow our naturalistic scruples to turn a blind eye to moral 
talk and modal talk, there is no way that we can tolerate the existence claims of 
theology and crystal healing.  
The issue here is that Price seems to lack the resources to rule out these less 
respectable areas of human language use. Certainly, some people sometimes for 
some reasons find it profitable to speak about supramundane causal influences or 
transubstantiation. And given that it is not the function of any discourse to represent 
how things are with the world, there is no further question about whether there really 
are supramundane causal influences or whether transubstantiation ever actually 
occurs. Instead, all we as philosophers are left with is the rather dry task of 
understanding why creatures of the kind we believe human beings to be would go in 
for talk of this kind.  
But this seems deeply troubling. The only way the kind of inquiry Price envisages 
could rule out these kinds of talk is by discovering some anthropological reason to 
reject them. Perhaps, after all, they do not serve any function. Or perhaps the role 
they play in our cognitive and practical lives would have been better served by some 
other kind of linguistic practice. But this doesn’t seem nearly enough. There are two 
worries here: the first is that anthropological enquiry is not guaranteed to throw up 
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some fault in the relevant kind of discourse. But, as naturalists, we do seem justified 
in saying that the existence claims of homeopathy and astrology are guaranteed to be 
wrong.  
The second worry is that this just seems to locate the problem with these kinds of 
linguistic practices in the wrong place. Intuitively, the worry with homeopathy is not 
that creatures like us, situated as we are, should refrain from homeopathic discourse 
or that our practical needs or whatever would be better served by, say, scientific 
medical discourse. Or to put this another way, these are problems with homeopathic 
discourse, but they have a deeper foundation. What is wrong with homeopathic 
discourse and the reason we should go in for some other kind of discourse is that 
homeopathy just gets things wrong about the world. 
Now anybody who has committed themselves to the rejection of representationalism 
cannot really salvage the second point. Indeed, anyone committed to the idea that 
there are no robust word-world relations presumably would not feel the force of this 
objection. Nonetheless, the scrupulous naturalist may well feel that we still need to 
do something to guarantee that our repudiation of the existential claims of quack 
discourses will not depend on the whims of an anthropological enquiry that could go 
either way. That is, even if we reject representationalism, we may still want to 
preserve the authority of natural science. If the natural sciences say something 
doesn’t exist, or make the existence of something unlikely, then whether that 
something is morals, numbers, or the holy trinity, we should not allow functional 
pluralism to overrule their authority.  
 
4.6.2 Pragmatism Sans Pluralism 
 Let’s suppose that we are willing to concede to Price his anti-representationalist 
stance (for the sake of argument), but as naturalists we are concerned about even thin 
ontological commitment to the kind of nonsense foisted onto us by the quacks – how 
might we nonetheless resist ontological pluralism? Well I see two ways of achieving 
this. Remember that Price’s pluralist position has two working parts: the rejection of 
representationalism and the endorsement of functional pluralism. So suppose we 
were to reject functional pluralism. That is, we reject the idea that different regions 
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of language serve different functions. We are now in the position of the global 
prescriptivist we considered earlier, that is, we have conceded that all language is 
non-cognitive, but we have denied the crucial premise that different regions of 
discourse may serve different functions (or that there may be a central activity of 
asserting or describing, but that this central activity is itself applicable in a variety of 
different cognitive and practical projects). And we saw above that the claims of 
different regions of discourse can conflict for someone who has adopted this mixture 
of anti-representationalism and functional monism.  
Now the kind of naturalistic pragmatism I have in mind here doesn’t want to claim 
that all language serves a prescriptive function. Instead consider an anti-
representationalist who says something like this: “no region of language serves the 
function of representing how things are in an external world. Instead, all language 
serves a much more practical function: it enables us to cope with incoming 
experience, it enables us to predict future experience on the basis of past experience.” 
Now, clearly, if all language has this practical function, different regions of 
discourse, employing different ontological posits can conflict. They can conflict at 
the level of how well they enable us to predict and control our experience.  
Suppose, then, that we have two regions of discourse, a region of discourse that 
predicts the flow of future experience using a theory of elementary particles and laws 
governing their interaction, and a region of discourse that attempts to meet the same 
requirement using a theory of the Homeric gods. The elementary particle theory 
(well, really other theories in what we might broadly think of as ‘scientific 
discourse’) make the existence of Homeric gods unlikely (in the thin sense, that 
existential quantification over them would play havoc with the theory), and the 
elementary particle theory does a much better job of predicting and controlling our 
future experience. Surely this gives us very good reason to reject the thin posits of 
the Homeric theory in favour of those of the elementary particle theory. 
Again, consider a community of speakers who make use of a theory of viruses and 
another community of speakers who make use of a theory in which all illness is the 
result of demonic possession. Ex hyposthesi, both communities speak the languages 
they do in order to predict and control their future experience (in this case their 
experiences of bodily health). But clearly the speakers who make use of the 
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existential commitments of the virus theory will, all things being equal, do a much 
better job of this than the community who make use of the demon theory. Again, we 
have a reason to adopt the thin ontological commitments of the virus theory that is, at 
the same time, a reason to reject the thin ontological commitments of the demon 
theory.  
Now a position like this will sometimes be available to Price. So long as our 
anthropological enquiry discovers that two apparently distinct regions of discourse 
actually serve the same function in our cognitive or practical lives, then they can 
come into conflict in this way. And perhaps in the case of the demon theory and the 
virus theory this will be the case. Both, even for the functional pluralist, will be 
employed in the pursuit of health and the treatment of illness. But is every quack 
discourse employed in this way, in pursuit of some goal that is also the goal of a 
more successful scientific enquiry? Consider, for instance astrology. Astrology is 
surely bunk, from the perspective of natural science. Its ontological commitments are 
just straightforwardly naturalistically unacceptable, functional pluralism 
notwithstanding. But just which scientific toes does astrology tread on? what 
functional role is served by both scientific talk and astrological talk? Astrology, after 
all, is not weather forecasting. Nor is it experiment or engineering or any of the other 
scientifically respectable activities where some knowledge of future contingencies is 
useful.  
The worry here is that Price’s anthropology of language use just will not be able to 
find some function that both scientific and astrological discourse both serve, and so 
some way in which they conflict with one another. And given Price’s thin notion of 
ontological commitment, it looks as though the posits of an astrological theory will 
turn out to be naturalistically respectable after all.  
 But this is just monstrous: any naturalism that cannot banish astrology is in dire 
straits indeed. By denying the functional pluralism that underwrites Price’s 
metaphysical pluralism, we have seen one way in which the anti-representationalist 
and the pragmatist can banish the quack discourses. If we insist that all language has 
the non-representational, pragmatic function of predicting and controlling future 
experience, then this enables us to recognize that some discourses do this better than 
others. And once we have recognized this we can limit our ontological commitment, 
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even our thin ontological commitment, to just those discourses that are the best at 
fulfilling this functional role.  
There is another way, I think, of achieving a similar result, and consideration of this 
second road to a non-representationalist monism will enable us to bring to view a 
premise that I believe is implicit in Price’s presentation of his project. Suppose, then, 
we have conceded global non-cognitivism. And suppose further that we have granted 
Price’s functional pluralism. Is metaphysical pluralism the inevitable result? I think 
not. To see this, consider what would happen if we were to allow that different 
language games have different roles in our cognitive lives, but that, notwithstanding 
this, some one of these ‘forms of life’ was the preeminent one. That is, we humans 
go in for many different kinds of activities, subserved by many different linguistic 
practices, but only one of these activities (and so only one of these language games) 
is really useful or valuable. Suppose, for instance, we were to suggest that the only 
really valuable human activity was to discover what would happen to us in the future 
and to control future occurrences. That is, the really valuable activity is prediction 
and control of incoming experience. We could then limit our thin ontological 
commitments to just the posits employed in that region of discourse that best serves 
the one really valuable human activity.        
To put all this another way, we can see that Price’s metaphysical pluralism rests on 
the assumption that all the different forms of life are equally valuable. In other 
words, he has tied his functional pluralism to a kind of equality of evaluation: all the 
different regions of discourse, all the different language games, are all equally good. 
But it seems perfectly possible to deny this claim, and if we do so, and tie ontological 
commitment to what we regard as the most valuable linguistic practice, then it 
doesn’t seem that metaphysical pluralism results. Many posits, of many regions of 
discourse will be discarded, simply because they are not among the posits of a truly 
valuable discourse.  
Now either of these ontologically monist positions seems to deal better with the 
quack discourses than does Price’s. In the second case, we free ourselves to discard 
the existential commitments of astrology, homeopathy and the rest, by tying a thin 
notion of ontological commitment to the idea that some activities and so some 
linguistic practices are better (not better at representing, but perhaps just better at 
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realising important human values) than others. In the first case, we saw that by 
insisting on the functional unity of human language use, we could deny 
representationalism, but still banish the quack discourses and their commitments 
from a naturalistically respectable ontology. Given that these two positions solve 
Price’s problems with tolerance, I suggest they are better bets for a naturalistically 
inclined pragmatist.  
But it has not been my intention in this section to defend either variety of anti-
representationalism. I can see a number of issues with both the strategies outlined 
above. Firstly, it is open to Price to insist that this is not much of a rescue of 
metaphysics. After all, ontological commitment is still a thin notion, nothing more 
than being quantified over in the discourse or discourses that best serve the one 
function of all language (or appear in the discourse that best serves the linguistic role 
required by the most valuable human activity). This is not a matter of how things are 
in the world; it is still illegitimate to ask, given that there are electrons, whether there 
Really really are electrons? Indeed, metaphysics seems to have become nothing more 
than the trivial business of reading off the existential commitments that appear in our 
best scientific theories.  
I can see other issues with the two proposals outlined in this section.13 But as I have 
said, it has not been my intention to defend either way for an anti-representationalist 
to resist metaphysical pluralism. Instead, I hope to have shown the essential role that 
functional pluralism plays in establishing metaphysical pluralism, that it is, in effect, 
the sine qua non of Price’s deflationary metaphysics. Without the claim that language 
plays many different roles in our practical and cognitive lives (and without the 
equally essential claim that all of these activities and discourses are equally good), 
Price cannot claim to have established metaphysical pluralism. And as far as I can 
see, neither claim has been sufficiently argued for. Neither functional pluralism nor 
evaluative equality is straightforwardly a result of denying representationalism. 
Merely because language does not have the one function semantic monists have 
tended to think it does, that doesn’t establish that it has no one function after all. And 
while the claim that language is a multi-purpose tool might at least be established by 
                                                          
13 For instance, with respect to the second strategy, the claim that the only, or even the most, 
valuable human activity is prediction and control of experience seems hard to swallow. 
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the kind of anthropology Price recommends, it is difficult to see how any similar 
kind of enquiry could establish the claim of evaluative equality. Even if we were to 
discover that, as a matter of contingent fact, descriptive or assertive language use had 
many functions, that wouldn’t establish that all of these functions were equally good.   
There is, then, at the heart of Price’s project an essential premise for which it is 
difficult to uncover any argument. And given that, as we saw at the end of the last 
section, together with anti-representationalism this premise threatens to undermine 
the very naturalism that motivates Price’s response to the placement problems, it 
seems that we have strong prima facie reason to resist, if not functional pluralism, 
then at least its combination with anti-representationalism to produce the kind of 
view Price recommends. Furthermore, if the arguments of this section are correct, 
then we have at least two kinds of naturalistic pragmatism for which the ontological 
question addressed in this thesis would be a perfectly substantial one. I conclude that 
anti-representationalism by itself is no threat to the mathematical fictionalist.   
 
4.7 A Defence of Representationalism and a Vindication of the Placement Problems      
In the previous section we considered a possible kind of anti-representationalism 
which was resistant to the kind of ontological pluralism Price defends. If we accept 
that it is not the function of any discourse to ‘represent’ how things are with the 
world, but insist that, nonetheless, language is functionally monist, then we may well 
discover that there can be the kinds of ontological conflicts we have been considering 
under the name of placement problems. But I do not want to suggest that this is the 
best that an opponent of Price can do. Instead, in this section, I want to consider a 
number of issues faced by Price’s program that seem to have natural responses if we 
endorse representationalism, but look more difficult to account for from the anti-
representationalist perspective.  
To begin with, we need to consider just exactly what the anti-representationalist 
thinks language is for. Given that language does not serve the function of 
representing how things are with the external world and its inhabitants, just what is 
its function? The first thing to note is that clearly we cannot expect an entirely 
uniform answer to our question; the raison d’etre of Price’s Naturalism Without 
164 
 
Mirrors is the denial of the idea that language has just one function. To a certain 
extent, then, our question will be answered by the piecemeal anthropological enquiry 
that tells us why human creatures have developed the kinds of linguistic practices 
they have, and what role these practices play in their everyday practical and 
cognitive lives. 
But this will not be all that can be said. Remember that, for Price, there is a certain 
amount of uniformity to human linguistic practices, a kind of common clothing that 
they all wear: namely, assertion. Assertion and assertoric language form a kind of 
core linguistic practice, language’s ‘downtown’, upon which all our other linguistic 
activities depend. So we can rephrase our original question about the function of 
language so that it becomes instead a question about the function of assertoric 
language: for what purpose do we have practices of uttering and evaluating assertoric 
sentences? 
Here is what Price says about this: 
The suggestion is that the core function of assertoric language is to give voice 
to speaker’s mental states and behavioural dispositions, in a way which invites 
criticism by speakers who hold conflicting mental states. (Price, 2011, p.139) 
In other words, Price believes that the reason so much of our language comes in 
assertoric form is that it invites criticism from our interlocutors. When we utter 
sentences (or write them) asserting something, we are in effect making ourselves 
answerable for what we have asserted, opening ourselves to the challenge to give 
reasons for our utterance. Or in other words:  
The key thing about assertoric discourse is thus that it embodies a normative 
idea of answerability to an external standard, the effect of which is to place an 
onus on speakers to be prepared to defend their views in the case of 
disagreements. (Price, 2011, p.139)    
But this external standard is not the external standard imposed by the requirement to 
say only things that accurately represent the world, but is instead a standard imposed 
by our linguistic community, a case of the norms of evaluation for the relevant area 
of discourse (which may differ from discourse to discourse, and which, for the anti-
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representationalist, will presumably never be a matter of getting it right about the 
external world and its inhabitants) (Price, 2011, p.139-140).  
Now Price is fairly tentative about putting forward this theory of the role of 
assertoric language, insisting that it is only one plausible hypothesis and that it 
doesn’t ultimately matter (for his purposes, anyway) if it is, in fact, the correct one 
(Price, 2011, p.139). But it is interesting to note that it does parallel some of things 
that Price says about truth. Note, to begin with, that assertoric discourse is, as 
ordinarily construed, discourse that is truth apt. Price does not want to deny this, but 
he clearly cannot make use of any kind of theory of truth that would make truth a 
matter of a relation between a truth bearer (in this case, assertoric sentences) and the 
world. Such a relation would seem to be the kind of word-world relation the anti-
representationalist is at pains to deny the existence of, and so, clearly, he will need to 
make use of some other kind of theory of truth. Price’s suggestion (Price, 2011, p.47) 
is that the role of truth is to serve as a norm governing discourse, a norm that, in 
effect, facilitates agreement between speakers. When speakers agree that something 
is true, this will put an end to their disagreement and to any further discussion. 
Without some such norm it is difficult to see how discursive and argumentative 
activities could ever reach a satisfactory termination.  
This is obviously just a sketch of the kind of idea Price has about truth, but even 
from the sketch it is clear that this kind of proposal meshes quite well with Price’s 
tentative hypothesis about assertoric language. Assertoric, truth-apt language, invites 
challenge and invites discussion of reasons, but contains at the same time a 
discursive norm that will tend to settle discussion and promote agreement among 
interlocutors. But this neat picture of assertoric language is threatened when we start 
to wonder how disagreement and conflict could arise for speakers of the kinds of 
language Price envisages. That is, we need to ask how speakers can have conflicting 
mental states given Price’s anti-representationalist picture of language. 
We are now faced with the challenge of saying how mental states can conflict with, 
or contradict one another. Price says very little about this, but here is one kind of 
account of how this can happen. Beliefs, and mental states in general, have truth 
conditions. And these truth conditions can conflict. We might, for instance, be 
persuaded by Field of the need to attribute truth-conditions to mental states for 
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explanatory purposes, and that, moreover, if these explanatory purposes are to be 
served, then these truth-conditions will have to be correspondence truth conditions 
(Field, 1978). This gives us an easy answer to how mental states can conflict, but it 
gives us this answer at the price of representationalism, in this case 
representationalism about mental states. Given this representationalist theory of truth 
conditions for mental states, we can say that two people’s mental states conflict when 
they deliver conflicting representations of the world. But this would be, to say the 
least, a very odd position for Price to adopt. It would amount to the claim that the 
function of language is not to represent the world, but that the function of our mental 
states is. And given that, if assertoric language is meant to invite criticism about our 
mental states it will somehow have to give voice to those mental states, it is very 
difficult to see how these positions might be coherently combined.  
Of course, it is open to Price and other anti-representationalists to deny 
representationalism about mental states, as well as representationalism about 
language. But at this point a second worry arises. The whole point of denying 
representationalism was to evade the kind of disagreements between apparent 
representations that we have been calling placement problems. The mathematical 
placement problem, for instance, is dissolved once we recognise that, because it is 
not the function of either mathematical or natural scientific discourse to represent 
how things are with the world, neither discourse in fact says conflicting things about 
that world. But this might cause us to fear that anti-representationalism about mental 
states might be a similarly powerful solvent of apparent disagreements. If no mental 
states serve to represent how things are with the world, then they will not be 
representing the world in conflicting ways. But this would be a disaster if the ‘core 
function of assertoric language is to give voice to speaker’s mental states…in a way 
which invites criticism by speakers who hold conflicting mental states’ (Price, 2011, 
p.139), because it will turn out that there aren’t any conflicting mental states. 
I am not suggesting that anything I have said so far is a knock-down argument 
against Price’s anti-representationalism. But at the very least, the onus is on Price to 
tell us, given his anti-representationalism about language, what kind of theory he has 
in mind for mental contents, and how disagreement and conflict work in that theory. 
The representationalist has an easy answer here, and it is not clear just what Price’s 
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answer is supposed to be. Given the role conflict between mental states is playing in 
Price’s account of assertion, this is a troubling omission.  
We might also worry about the level of tolerance that Price’s theory of truth, 
sketched above, seems to enjoin. Remember from the last section that metaphysical 
pluralism seemed to have a problem ruling out kinds of discourse that we do not in 
fact regard as respectable. The price of reconciling naturalism and moral talk, for 
instance, seemed to be that we also had to tolerate homeopathic and astrological talk. 
A similar worry arises for Price’s anti-representationalist theory of truth. We 
presumably want to give voice to our concerns about the quack discourses by saying 
that the problem with these discourses is that almost everything they say is false. But 
for Price, truth is just a matter of regulating agreement and disagreement within 
discourses, it is not a matter of getting things right or wrong about the external world. 
But then we might worry that, so long as there are evaluative standards within a 
discourse, marking some sentences as acceptable and some unacceptable, then that 
will be enough to have truth for that discourse. In other words, so long as there are 
recognised standards for settling disputes within a discursive practice, there will be 
truth for that practice. But that certainly seems to be the case for, say, homeopathy. 
Homeopaths will disagree with one another, and there will be recognised channels 
for settling such disagreements. But then there will be homeopathic truth, and so long 
as the standards for settling disagreement do not overlap with those of, say, medical 
science, then homeopathic truth will just be a different (not a worse) kind of truth to 
medical scientific truth. It seems that naturalists, at least if they adopt Price’s theory 
of truth will have problems ruling out kinds of linguistic practice that even the most 
lenient are usually intolerant of.  
Once again, it seems that the representationalist has an easy answer to this challenge. 
Let us take as an example of a representational theory of truth a correspondence 
theory. Then we can say that the problem with homeopathic sentences is that they 
fail to correspond to facts, or states of affairs (or we can tell a more complicated 
story if we have adopted something like Field’s correspondence theory). In other 
words, the problem with homeopathic sentences is that they are very largely false. 
Once again, the representationalist has an easy answer to an issue that seems 
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problematic for the anti-representationalist –  which must surely serve to enhance the 
attractiveness of representationalist theories over anti-representationalist ones.  
Another worry for Price’s anti-representational stance comes out when we consider 
the topic of reduction. Clearly the pluralist wishes to avoid the kinds of reductions of 
mental or moral properties, for example, to natural or physical ones that certain kinds 
of naturalists or physicalists will believe necessary. But the metaphysical pluralist 
goes much further: reducing the entities of one discourse to another functionally 
distinct discourse is not only not necessary, it is something like a category mistake. 
In effect, reductions of, say, moral properties to natural ones look like attempts to 
settle the ‘Julius Caesar’ question of whether the number 2 is identical to the famous 
Roman emperor. The problem with both the reduction and the ‘Julius Caesar’ 
question is that they are attempts to settle the identity of objects across discourses or 
linguistic frameworks. As Price puts it, ‘To ask whether an entity referred to in one 
framework is identical to an entity referred to in another framework seems to 
presuppose a framework-independent stance, from which the question can be raised.’ 
(Price, 2011, p.146) 
Now the worry with this is that it seems to prove too much. It looks as though all 
attempts at reduction must, for Price, be internal to a discourse. But this just doesn’t 
look as though it will always be the case. Consider, for instance, the reduction of 
water to H2O. Many people will want to claim that water is identical to the substance 
with that chemical composition, but this seems to be a case where we are attributing 
identity across discourses or frameworks. On the one hand, we have our linguistic 
practices concerning ordinary, common-sense objects and substances, and on the 
other we have the linguistic practices constitutive of mature chemical science. And it 
just doesn’t seem like these are the same framework. If this is correct, then it looks as 
though the identification of water with H2O is as problematic as the identification of 
mental states and brain states, goodness with utility, or Julius Caesar and the number 
2. There is no framework independent stance, no position above and beyond our 
discursive practices from which these attributions of identity can be made. 
The problem here is noted by Price (Price, 2011, p.147), but never adequately 
resolved. It is, in effect, the problem of individuating linguistic frameworks, and 
describing their relations to one another. For instance, we could solve the problem 
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with water and H2O, if we were able to say that the common-sense ontology 
discourse is somehow embeddable within the chemical scientific discourse. Or, 
perhaps, the objects and properties of chemistry are shared with the objects and 
properties of common-sense ontology. The problem with this is that Price says 
nothing at all to settle these issues. He raises, for instance, the questions of 
individuating linguistic frameworks, and of combining linguistic frameworks and 
nesting them, and how linguistic frameworks might relate to one another (Price, 
2011, p.147); but he never actually answers these questions. He doesn’t tell us if 
frameworks can be nested or if they relate to one another at all. He doesn’t even 
provide a rudimentary sketch of identity conditions for frameworks. But this just 
leaves open the possibility that each region of human language use is an island, entire 
unto itself, and that all reductions, even apparently scientifically respectable ones are 
in fact illegitimate.  
Once again, representationalism appears to have the upper hand here. If all 
discourses are in the business of representing how things are with the world, then the 
subject matters of two discourses will overlap just if they are describing the same bit 
of the world. In other words, the objects of two regions of discourse can be 
identified, because the objects of two regions of discourse can be shared. And they 
can be shared because both discourses are in the business of representing how things 
are with the world and its objects.  
Obviously this doesn’t make reduction an easy matter; there is still the tricky task of 
trying to discover when two apparently distinct regions of discourse are in fact 
describing the same bit of the world. But it does at least make reduction possible. We 
have left open the possibility that, for instance, our common-sense ontology 
discourse (at least when it talks about water) and our mature chemistry discourse (at 
least when it talks about H2O) are in fact talking about the same stuff! We have, of 
course, also left open the possibility that mental states are identical with brain states 
(or that the number 2 may be identical to Julius Caesar). But this is surely how it 
should be: reduction may be difficult because it involves chemical investigation 
(water is H2O), but it may also be difficult because it involves some other kind of 
investigation, metaphysical perhaps or conceptual (mental states are brain states). 
Reduction may even be impossible because it involves identifications that are, for 
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local reasons, malformed (like, perhaps, the attempt to identify Julius Caesar with the 
number 2). But reductions should not be globally impossible because of the lack of 
an overarching framework or discourse in which to carry them out.  
Once again, it is important to note that this is not intended as a coup de grace to the 
anti-representationalist theory; it is a request for further elaboration. Until the anti-
representationalist enlightens us as to how linguistic frameworks or regions of 
discourse are to be individuated and how they relate to one another, she will leave 
open the unpalatable possibility that even scientifically respectable identifications of 
the objects of one discourse with those of another are in fact naturalistically 
illegitimate. Perhaps there are ways of filling this lacuna, but until this is 
accomplished (and in such a way as to rule out reductionist responses to placement 
problems), then the representationalist seems to have the upper hand.  
So far the representationalist has had the upper hand in accounting for scientifically 
respectable reductions and in accounting for disagreement and conflict between 
mental states. I also believe the representationalist has the upper hand when it comes 
to an issue that is at the very heart of Price’s project. Remember that for Price the 
core role of assertoric language is ‘to give voice to speaker’s mental states…in a way 
which invites criticism by speakers who hold conflicting mental states’. (Price, 2011, 
p.139) Now this explains (if we discount previous objections), why we have a 
linguistic practice of assertoric utterance. But it does little to explain why we have 
practices of disagreement and agreement in the first place. What role does agreeing 
with one another serve in our practical lives? Why do we bother to demand reasons 
of one another, when those reasons have nothing to do with how the world is?  
Once again, I think the representationalist has an (admittedly speculative) answer to 
this question. Creatures like ourselves, existing in the kind of world we inhabit will 
have a very strong interest in getting things right about how the world is. Creatures, 
otherwise like ourselves, who are routinely mistaken about how things are with the 
external world would not tend to last very long in that world. But one important way 
in which we learn about the world is through discussion with others of our kind. We 
learn more from others than we do by ourselves. But discussions that continue 
interminably (or end in unresolved disagreement), will serve this function very badly. 
We learn nothing from one another if we can never agree.  
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We have, then, an account of how norms tending towards agreement (truth, for Price) 
can grow up for a representational species. What about the very practice of 
discussion, of agreeing and disagreeing, of demanding reasons? Well, here I think 
our answer will have to depend on the idea that after a process of giving reasons that 
are themselves beholden to the norm of getting things right about the world, any 
conclusions on which we all agree will be better representations of how things are 
with the world. Interlocutors who agree after they have reviewed all the reasons, will 
be agreeing about representations that are more likely to be correct about how things 
are with things in the world. And having representations like that must surely be a 
good thing for creatures like us. 
Now I do not expect anything I have said to convert the confirmed sceptic. If you are 
convinced that, after a process of sustained examination of reasons beholden to the 
supposed norm of getting things right about the world, we could end up agreeing, 
and still be radically mistaken, then the above story will probably not be terribly 
convincing. But the representationalist has at least provided a story about how these 
practices grew up among creatures like ourselves situated as we are. Just what kind 
of story can the anti-representationalist give? Why do we bother agreeing and 
disagreeing with one another, when that has nothing to do with describing our shared 
(external) environment? I am not sure that Price says anything about this, and the 
concern is that, for the anti-representationalist, practices of agreement and 
disagreement are the bedrock on which all other linguistic practices are founded. 
That is, there is a worry that for the anti-representationalist, engaging in discussion 
becomes an end in itself, not explainable by any kind of more fundamental activity. 
But this is a deeply unattractive picture. 
Once again, it is important to recognize that the anti-representationalist may well 
have responses available. Perhaps reaching agreement in conversation in some way 
facilitates social cohesion, for instance. But however that may be, the provision of 
some such story is essential. We cannot rest with practices of agreeing and 
disagreeing, as though they floated free of any requirement for further explanation. 
In so far as the representationalist offers such an explanation, she seems to have the 
advantage over Price’s anti-representationalist.     
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In this section we have seen three points at which the anti-representationalist owes us 
an explanation that seems to be within easy reach of the representationalist. We need 
to be told how mental states can conflict, without that committing us to a 
representationalist view of mental content. We need to be told how discourses are to 
be individuated and identified (and how they relate to one another) in such a way as 
to rule out reductionism about placement problems, but to rule in reductionism about 
water and H2O. And finally we need to be told what the point of all this linguistic 
behaviour is, all this discursive to-ing and fro-ing, if it is not to get things right about 
the world. To all three challenges the representationalist gives a similar answer: 
mental states represent the world, and conflict when they provide conflicting 
representations; discourses represent the world, and reductions are possible when 
they represent the same bit of the world; discourses represent the world, and reaching 
reasoned agreement in discussion with others tends to produce better representations. 
Until Price provides his anti-representationalist responses to these challenges the ball 
is in his court, and it is advantage representationalism. 
 
4.8 Final Remarks – Back to Mathematical Fictionalism 
The bulk of this chapter has concerned issues that may in some ways seem far 
removed from the topic of mathematical fictionalism. It will be well, then, to remind 
ourselves how all this bears upon the defence of the fictionalist account of 
mathematical applications developed in the previous chapter. 
In chapter 3 we saw how a revolutionary, prop-oriented pretence-theory could be 
leveraged to downgrade the ontological commitments of the mapping account of 
mathematical applicability. But this involved us in claims about scientific 
representations involving mathematical posits. In effect, our claim was that 
mathematical-scientific representations are a kind of pretence or make-believe, 
something like an ongoing communal fiction whose content is given by the mapping 
account, and the focus of which is not on the content of the fiction so much as on the 
props it is used to describe. The idea was that because these are fictional 
representations, we need not accept ontological commitment to their posits in the 
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way we would if those posits appeared in a realist discourse whose focus was on 
directly representing the way the world is. 
 From this perspective, Price’s anti-representationalism presents an extremely 
worrying challenge. It threatens to undermine the very utility of this kind of project 
by calling into question the naturalistic respectability of the whole idea of a realist 
discourse, that is, a discourse which has the function of representing how things are 
with the world. If no discourse represents how things are with the world, so that we 
cannot distinguish between mathematical-scientific representations and supposedly 
literal representations in this way, then we might wonder what is the point of 
distinguishing them. Of course, it might be that we have good naturalist, 
anthropological reasons for distinguishing these kinds of uses of mathematical-
scientific discourse from what we ordinarily call “literal” language. But we certainly 
shouldn’t do so just because we are feeling ontological scruples.  
In this chapter I have identified three different kinds of response we might make to 
Price’s anti-metaphysical project. We noted, to begin with, that Price’s anti-
representationalism seems to struggle to vindicate the naturalist presupposition that 
science is in some sense authoritative for philosophical inquiry. By relegating 
science to just one more discourse among many equally good discourses, it 
threatened to undermine that authority, and we were left wondering just how 
coherent the combination of naturalism and anti-representationalism ended up being. 
We then considered two kinds of non-pluralist anti-representationalist: the anti-
representationalist who is a monist about linguistic function, and the anti-
representationalist who is a chauvinist about linguistic function. Both seem able to 
recover some version of the placement problem. In the penultimate section, we 
examined some reasons for thinking that representationalism offered better 
explanations of a number of features of Price’s own account of linguistic practice, 
then Price’s own anti-representationalism.  
If any of these responses are successful, then we have done something to vindicate 
the kind of placement problems of which genus our own case of mathematical 
ontology is a species. But clearly some of these lines of argument are of more use for 
my purposes than others. In particular, it is difficult to see that the project of this 
thesis, defending a revolutionary, prop-oriented pretence theory of the mapping 
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account of mathematical application, is greatly assisted by adopting a non-pluralist 
anti-representationalism. Both the varieties of this kind of view we considered seem 
to lead to a minimalist kind of metaphysics, in which we simply read off our 
ontological commitments from our favoured discourse. Such ontological minimalism 
sits uncomfortably with the approach taken in the rest of the thesis.             
But the other arguments, that anti-representationalism is insufficiently naturalistic, 
and that representationalism offers better explanations of linguistic practice anyway, 
seem compatible with the fictionalist project outlined in the previous chapter. It 
would, of course, be nice to say a bit more about the kind of representationalism that 
might be adopted by a fictionalist about mathematics. In section 4.7 we drew on 
Hartry Field’s (1972; 1978) early correspondence theory of truth, but it is not clear 
that a correspondence theory is the only one available to the fictionalist about 
mathematics. For instance, Leng (2010) combines fictionalism about mathematics 
with deflationism about truth, and it would be interesting to examine whether that 
combination of views was also resistant to Price’s own extremist version of semantic 
minimalism. Unfortunately, that will have to await further work in the future.  
For now, I want to suggest that Price has done too little to undermine the kinds of 
placement problem we have focused on in this thesis. At best, he has provided a 
pluralist alternative to representationalism, which awaits further empirical 
confirmation. If any of the objections raised in this chapter stick, he has not done 
even this much. I conclude that it is perfectly appropriate to defend anti-realism in 
the philosophy of mathematics (and perhaps elsewhere), without this leading to a 
global quietism about metaphysics.        
In the next chapter we turn to metaontology, to see whether some recent 
metametaphysical arguments will establish a deflationary approach to metaphysics – 
and so threaten our fictionalist project – where Price’s anti-representationalism could 
not.    
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Chapter 5. Fictionalism and Metaphilosophy, Part 2: Metaontology 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we turn from the philosophy of representation to the methodology of 
metaphysics: what are the consequences for fictionalism of recent discussions in 
metaontology and metametaphysics? This will complete our defence of fictionalism 
against metaphilosophical objections. The first part of the chapter concerns itself 
with Stephen Yablo’s (1998) attempts to motivate a deflationist metaontology using 
insights that will be familiar to the fictionalist. After dismissing Yablo’s 
metaontological deflationism, I will turn to a sceptical suggestion of Karen Bennett 
(2009) and argue that, while fictionalism is a difference minimizing brand of 
metaphysics, it is unlikely to fall prey to similar objections to those that afflict the 
most odious brands of Platonism (in particular, there is a kind of epistemic challenge 
to Platonism that does not seem to carry over to fictionalism). I conclude that 
fictionalism seems well placed to defend itself against those forms of 
metaontological scepticism that seem, prima facie, the most threatening.  
 Before proceeding, it will be helpful to discuss why it is I have chosen to focus on 
these two kinds of metaontological scepticism. After all, there are many kinds of 
deflationary position in the metaontological literature, and it seems that a full defence 
of fictionalism from this direction would need to refute all of these or at least the 
most characteristic varieties of deflationism. To some extent this is a fair point, and a 
more systematic refutation of ontological deflationism would be welcome. 
Nonetheless, I believe there are two things we can say. 
 The first is to note that it is not clear that all forms of metaontological scepticism are 
meant to apply to the debate at issue in this thesis. For instance, as we will see below, 
Eli Hirsch, whose semantic variety of deflationism has been extremely influential, 
does not believe his position threatens the debate over mathematical ontology 
(Hirsch, 2011). On the other hand, it seems clear that the two positions discussed 
here would undermine the fictionalist’s position, by undermining the very viability of 
the debate she is trying to contribute to.  
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 And this leads into our second point, that these two varieties of metaontological 
scepticism seem especially threatening to the fictionalist. In the case of Yablo’s 
deflationism it should be obvious why this is: because Yablo is drawing on the very 
same insights as the first-order fictionalist, it is initially difficult to see a way of 
resisting his argument that doesn’t undermine the very fictionalism one is seeking to 
defend. In the case of Bennett’s epistemicism, the way in which she identifies high-
ontology and low-ontology sides in the debates that fall victim to her scepticism 
seems, prima facie, the perfect characterisation of the debate over mathematical 
ontology, with Platonists ranged with the high-ontologists, and fictionalists with the 
low.  
Both these varieties of metaontological scepticism seem, then, to offer a very specific 
kind of challenge to the fictionalist position we have sought to defend in this thesis. 
If we can resist these kinds of scepticism, then this should strengthen fictionalism’s 
claim as a theory of mathematical ontology and applications. In particular, it should 
make us confident that the fictionalist can resist those more general varieties of 
deflationism that seem to affect fictionalism no worse than any other branch of 
metaphysics.      
 
5.2 Does Ontology Rest on a Mistake? 
In his (1998) Stephen Yablo attempts to motivate a brand of metaontological 
deflationism that draws upon some of the central insights of fictionalism. In brief, the 
strategy outlined in Does Ontology Rest on a Mistake? is to call in question our 
ability to distinguish literal from non-literal uses of language in a way that makes it 
difficult to see how we could set about determining which of the existential 
commitments of our discourse we inherit as ontological commitments. The border 
between the literal and non-literal, he suggests, is simply too ill-defined, too porous, 
for us to determine in certain cases which of our utterances are intended literally and 
seriously, and which are only put forward in a make-believe spirit (Yablo, 1998, 
pp.257-258). This is, of course, consistent with there being large and settled regions 
of discourse, outside the vague border lands, where the question of literality and non-
literality is perfectly determinate. It is just that the questions of interest to ontologists, 
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the kinds of utterances about abstract objects and temporal parts and mereological 
sums and so on that he takes to be of central concern to metaphysics, are likely to fall 
outside these more stable regions, in the unsettled and contested marches between the 
literal and the figurative. And, supposing that we need not be committed to the posits 
of a merely make-believe utterance, this will make it indeterminate what our 
ontological commitments actually are.  
 
5.2.1 Carnapian Deflationism 
The starting point for Yablo’s deflationism, as with so many others, is Carnap 
(1950). Carnap, he suggests gave us a theoretical framework in which to make good 
the suspicion, apparently so widely shared, that metaphysics is bunk (Yablo, 1998, 
pp.230-232). Many, it seems, feel there is just something wrong with questions like: 
are there temporal parts? When, if ever, do two things compose a third? Can a statue 
be located where its constitutive lump of clay is located? Do numbers, sets, functions 
and the like actually exist? These questions have something like a whiff of triviality 
about them, or else they strike one as malformed, uninteresting, or otherwise 
downright silly (Yablo, 1998, p.230). But a suspicion is not a theory, and without a 
theoretical framework in which to locate and explain our feeling that something is 
very wrong with metaphysics, it is hard to tell whether there is really anything of 
substance to the naysayers’ naysaying. After all, impatience with philosophy and 
philosophers is a cross-cultural phenomenon and hardly limited to metaphysics and 
its practitioners. Perhaps what the anti-metaphysicians are feeling is just the near 
universal dissatisfaction felt when one is asked to think deeply and carefully about 
issues one would rather settle summarily and without cerebral travail. 
It is this theoretical framework for making good anti-metaphysical sentiment that 
Carnap is supposed to have provided (Yablo, 1998, p.232). We have encountered 
Carnap’s suggestions in previous chapters. The idea, as we saw in the previous 
chapter, is to distinguish between questions asked from within a linguistic framework 
and questions asked outside the framework. A linguistic framework is something like 
a set of rules that provide meaning for the sentences and constituents of sentences by 
specifying under what conditions a sentence is to be counted true, and under what 
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conditions false (Carnap, 1950, pp.21-22). An internal question, that is a question 
asked within the linguistic framework, will be perfectly meaningful, the linguistic 
framework rules ensuring that there will be some procedure for settling it one way or 
the other. But questions like this will be of little philosophical interest. The 
framework will tell us what empirical results would settle the matter, if the 
framework is an empirical one (Carnap,1950, p.22). If the framework is a logical or 
mathematical one, then the issue will not be settled by collecting empirical evidence 
but by the kinds of logical manipulation licensed by the framework in which one is 
working (Carnap,1950, p.22). In either case, the philosopher, it seems, must simply 
accede to the judgements of the first order practitioner, the experimenter or the 
logician.  
External questions will be another matter. Consider, for instance, the question “Are 
there material objects?” asked in the context of philosophical discussion over the so-
called ‘thing language’ (Carnap, 1950, pp.22-23). There are three ways of reading 
this question. One might see it as a straight-forward internal question of the kind 
discussed in the previous paragraph. In that case, the question is perfectly meaningful 
(the linguistic rules of the thing language will provide a determinate procedure for 
settling it), but it is likely to be trivially analytic. Given the rules of the thing 
language, it is likely to follow from the linguistic rules alone that there are material 
objects. Alternatively, we might read the question in a way that makes it external to 
the linguistic framework (Carnap, 1950, p.22). In that case, being detached from the 
linguistic rules that give meaning to the constituent words (“material”, “object”, etc.), 
the question is cognitively empty, that is, it lacks meaning. But there are two ways to 
ask a cognitively empty external question. One might raise the question in a merely 
pragmatic spirit, that is, the question is in fact a request for the point of the thing 
language, an attempt to ascertain how advisable (given our aims) it is to go on 
speaking as if there are material objects (Carnap, 1950, p.23). On the other hand, we 
might ask the question in a theoretical spirit, that is, we might be wondering whether, 
quite aside from the linguistic framework for talking about things, there really are 
any things. The first kind of external question is harmless. The second is strictly 
meaningless, it is the attempt to ask a meaningful theoretical question without the 
theoretical framework that could confer meaning upon it (Carnap, 1950, pp.22-23).  
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Carnap’s suggestion (Carnap, 1950, pp.31-32) is that the majority of metaphysical 
questions, the debate over the existence of universal properties, for instance, or 
numbers and sets, are theoretical external questions, that is, the wholly pernicious 
kind. They are attempts to raise the issue of the existence of some objects in a way 
external to the linguistic framework in which that question might have meaning. 
Were the questions asked in a pragmatic spirit, that is, were philosophers simply 
querying the advisability for scientific purposes of continuing to employ the 
linguistic framework in question, then they would be quite in order, though perhaps 
not terribly philosophically interesting. But this is not how philosophers have 
traditionally seen their metaphysical enquiries (Carnap, 1950, p.31). The traditional 
picture of metaphysics sees its questions as theoretical existence questions, but not as 
questions whose issue depends wholly on the relatively trivial matter of what the 
rules of our language are. As such, the traditional picture of metaphysics makes its 
questions cognitively empty external questions. Metaphysics is, for good logico-
linguistic reasons, bunk.  
But, of course, and as Yablo is well aware, Carnap’s project could not work 
(Yablo,1998, pp.235-240). The idea of a linguistic framework, so the traditional 
history of analytic philosophy has it, is intimately bound up with the idea of the 
analytic-synthetic distinction. And the analytic-synthetic distinction, or at least any 
analytic-synthetic distinction sufficiently robust to underwrite Carnap’s anti-
metaphysical project, was decisively overturned by Quine’s Two Dogmas (1951a). 
Yablo sees no reason to demur from the traditional verdict on the outcome of 
Carnap’s tussle with Quine over the analytic-synthetic issue (Yablo, 1998, p.232). 
But, he suggests, the palm was too quickly awarded to Quine in the ontological 
contest, because the notion of a framework can be made useful without relying on the 
analytic-synthetic distinction (Yablo, 1998, p.240).  
 
5.2.2 Linguistic Frameworks as Games of Make-Believe 
The core of Yablo’s deflationist proposal is that we can recover the concept of a 
linguistic framework, and so the distinction between internal and external questions, 
by seeing linguistic frameworks not as systems of rules giving meaning to the 
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sentences of the language, but instead as sets of generation principles for Waltonian 
games of make-believe (this is the fictionalist element of Yablo’s metaontology. 
Waltonian games of make-believe will of course be familiar from chapter 3’s first 
order fictionalism, in which they functioned as a way of deflating existential 
consequence at the local level of mathematics or empirical science. Yablo is, in 
effect, deploying fictionalism as a way of deflating existential consequence across 
the board) (Yablo, 1998, pp.242-244 and pp.245-248). The rules of generation tell us 
what we are licensed to pretend is true when we engage in the game of make-believe 
generated by those rules. An internal question will now be a question asked within 
the game, that is, a question asked in a make-believe spirit. An external question 
becomes a question asked from outside the game generated by the rules of the 
linguistic framework, a question about whether the make-believe or fictional truths 
of the game are really true.    
Now it is important to note that the new concept of a linguistic framework does not 
make external questions cognitively empty, nor does it relegate external questions to 
a merely pragmatic significance. External questions can be perfectly meaningful 
questions about the existence or otherwise of the posits introduced in a merely make-
believe spirit within the linguistic framework. The problem for the project of settling 
our ontological commitments is that games of make-believe are to a certain extent 
autonomous of the external questions. Consider, for instance, the game of make-
believe generated by the linguistic framework of Melville’s Moby Dick. And 
consider an utterance of “Call me Ishmael”. Now we are faced with a question: Is 
there anyone whom we are to call Ishmael? As an internal question this is settled 
positively (and immediately and trivially) by the rules of generation. So within the 
linguistic framework, it is perfectly proper to say “Yes. There is someone whom we 
are to call Ishmael.” But we can also ask the question in an external spirit, and in that 
case the appropriate answer (ignoring for now disputes in the metaphysics of 
fictions) seems to be: “No. There is no-one whom we are to call Ishmael.” But now 
note that our answer to the external question does not in any way affect the 
legitimacy of our continuing to talk, within the Moby Dick framework, as though 
there was someone called Ishmael. Our internal practices are unresponsive to our 
external deliberations. We do not abandon a make-believe framework just because its 
posits do not exist. 
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But nor, obviously enough, do we inherit its posits. The whole point of the make-
believe approach to fictionalism is that we can continue to talk as if there are Xs 
(within the game of make-believe), even if there are no Xs. Not even Quine thinks 
that we are ontologically committed to things we only figuratively or fictionally say 
there are (cf. Quine, 1948). So it seems there will be cases in which we continue to 
talk as if there are some things (internal to a framework in Yablo’s sense) even 
though we do not think there are any such things (external to the framework in 
Yablo’s sense). 
None of this immediately makes trouble for the ontologist. So long as we can 
continue to distinguish between posits introduced within a make-believe framework 
and posits introduced external to any make-believe, then we can continue to pursue 
the Quinean ontological project. But this is precisely what Yablo goes on to suggest 
we cannot do (Yablo, 1998, pp.248-255). For how are we to identify when it is we 
are talking in full ontological seriousness? When, says Quine, we are doing science. 
We are ontologically committed to the posits of science because it is there, and there 
alone that we talk in full literalness about what there is (indeed, I think Quine would 
concede to Yablo the porousness of the literal and non-literal distinction in our 
ordinary discourse. This is precisely why the man on the street has no fenced in 
ontology). But this claim would seem to be in danger of straight-forward empirical 
refutation. For, as we have noticed previously in this thesis, metaphor (a familiar 
example of figurative or non-literal language) seems to play an indispensable role in 
scientific discourse. Scientific discourse is not literal through and through; it is shot 
through with make-believe. 
What is Quine to do about this? He needs to isolate some literal uses of language, if 
we are to have any ontological commitments at all (given that we do not inherit the 
commitments of our non-literal language games). But his chosen candidate, 
regimented best science, seems at present to be up to its ears in figurative language; 
in frictionless planes, in point masses, in thermodynamic limits, and so on. Here is 
one suggestion: best science at present is a work in progress. As the work progresses, 
the non-literal elements will drop out; we will clear the tropical jungle of its tropes, 
and in the long run, perhaps the very long run, science will be a completely literal 
enterprise. But Quine is in trouble here if the non-literal elements never do drop out, 
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if metaphor turns out to be indispensable or ineliminable. And Yablo suggests this 
may well be the case (we have already seen reasons to agree, but it will be helpful to 
rehearse his arguments) (Yablo, 1998, pp.248-258).  
 
5.2.3 Three Grades of Metaphorical Involvement 
Yablo goes on to identify three grades of metaphorical involvement, each of which 
makes it progressively more likely that the metaphors at that grade will be 
ineliminable (Yablo, 1998, pp.250-255). At the first grade of metaphorical 
involvement are the representationally essential metaphors. These are metaphors 
whose content cannot be expressed by any strictly literal paraphrase, such that the 
only way to say what one wants to say is to employ the metaphor in question. For 
instance, “There are butterflies in my stomach.” We all know what content is being 
expressed by utterances of that sentence, but it is doubtful whether there is any 
reductive paraphrase, employing only literally descriptive language that captures 
exactly what it is that the metaphor conveys (Yablo, 1998, pp.250-251).  
At the second level of metaphorical involvement are the presentationally essential 
metaphors (Yablo, 1998, pp.251-253). These are metaphors whose content could 
perhaps be expressed by some entirely literal paraphrase, but where the metaphorical 
presentation is doing more work for us than just expressing some content. It is the 
way that the metaphor presents its content that is important in this case, the way in 
which the metaphor encourages us to see something as something else. The example 
given by Yablo is that of calling someone “A wagging lapdog of privilege.” (Yablo, 
1998, p.252) I do not just want to convey, by employing that unflattering epithet, that 
someone has a number of doglike properties, a fawning obsequiousness, perhaps, or 
a foolishly naïve and misplaced loyalty. It is not just by failing to go over into a 
paraphrase in which only the relevant properties are invoked that the metaphor can 
be essential. What I want is for you to see the victim of my insult as a fawning 
lapdog; I want to call to your attention the ways in which one might see someone as a 
dog; I want to reframe your view of the individual in such a way as to bring out his 
essential dogginess. I could not do any of that without employing the metaphor I did 
employ (or else another very like it).  
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 The third level of metaphorical involvement makes the most difficulty for separating 
out the literal and non-literal aspects of our discourse. At this level we find the 
procedurally essential metaphors (Yablo, 1998, pp.253-255). These are metaphors 
that may not have any determinate metaphorical content at the time of utterance; or 
that may have several contents competing to be seen as the correct reading of the 
metaphor; or that, still worse, may have several different contents associated with 
them, but not in competition, all equally good readings of the metaphor. These are 
the metaphors put forward in a make-the-most-of-it spirit (Yablo, 1998, p.254), 
metaphors that are introduced with the aim that the reader or hearer of the metaphor 
will themselves read into the metaphor whatever available content there is. It is these 
metaphors that make the most havoc with our ordinary judgements of literality and 
non-literality, because one of the readings that may be up for grabs when the 
metaphor is introduced is the literal content! (Yablo, 1998, p.257) The idea here is 
that the metaphor is put forward with the intention that it is to be associated with the 
most suitable metaphorical content, if any and with its literal content if no figurative 
content is forthcoming.  
Quine is in trouble, so Yablo contends (Yablo, 1998, p.255), if any of these grades of 
metaphorical involvement turns up in our best science. If there are essential 
metaphors at any of these grades of involvement in our best scientific theories, then 
even in the longest of long runs there is no hope of arriving at a science completely 
purged of ontologically innocent make-believe. But it is the final grade of 
metaphorical involvement, the procedurally essential metaphors, that cause the most 
difficulty for Quine, because it is these metaphors, put forward in a make-the-most-
of-it spirit that blur the boundary between the literal and the non-literal (Yablo, 1998, 
p.257). Because one of the readings that is up for grabs in the case of a procedurally 
essential metaphor is its literal content, and because the business of settling on a 
correct reading for a metaphor is a matter of art and, to some extent, individual taste, 
we may not be able, at any point in the development of best science, be able to say 
whether some disputed sentence is non-literal or literal, a metaphor or the God 
honest truth. It is the procedurally essential metaphors, then, that threaten the entire 
project of distinguishing the literal and the non-literal, which is precisely what Quine 
needs if his project of determining our ontological commitments is ever to be 
accomplished (Yablo, 1998, p.258).  
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5.2.4 In Defence of Quinean Metaontology  
Now clearly this is a disaster for the fictionalist: it turns out that the very ideas on 
which fictionalism is built, make-believe and pretence and talking as-if there are 
things when there are not, undermine the very ontological project to which it is 
supposed to be a contribution. After all, given the intractability of ontological 
disputes, isn’t it likely that they will turn out to have been taking place within the 
vague and amorphous region of discourse introduced by the procedurally essential 
metaphors? Isn’t it just possible that the problem with the existence or otherwise of 
numbers, sets, functions, and the like is just that we cannot be sure we were talking 
literally when we uttered them?  
Fortunately, I think we can say a number of things in response to this challenge. The 
first is to note that Yablo is here discussing a kind of hermeneutic fictionalism 
(which I will henceforth, following Yablo, call figuralism (Yablo, 2001)). He is 
suggesting that some of our ontological utterances may well have been put forward 
in a kind of make-believe game, a make-believe game generated by the utterance of 
certain kinds of figurative language. And this brand of hermeneutic figuralism 
inherits the same challenges in the mathematical case as standard hermeneutic 
fictionalism did (cf. ch4.) Of course, given the arguments from chapter 3, we cannot 
claim that hermeneutic figuralism is implausible on the grounds that it attributes 
attitudes or linguistic intentions to speakers that they know they do not have (we 
cannot object: wouldn’t people just know if they were putting forward existence 
claims in a make-the-most-of-it spirit?) Nonetheless, the worries we had about 
hermeneutic mathematical fictionalism’s empirical openness, its susceptibility to 
challenges from future scientific discoveries, will carry over to the case of Yablo’s 
figuralism as well. Should it turn out, for instance, that future psychological research 
suggests that some autistic people cannot competently handle certain kinds of 
metaphor, but that they show no mathematical impairment, that would tend to 
suggest that Yablo’s figuralism just cannot be a correct account of our use of 
mathematics. Clearly this is not a knock-down argument against figuralism, but it 
should make us suspicious that it might not be the correct interpretative theory for 
mathematics. 
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 In this connection, it will be noted that I give no examples of procedural metaphors 
in either science or ordinary language. This is because I cannot think of any. I am in 
fact deeply suspicious of this entire category of metaphor, and wonder whether we 
ever put forward an utterance without first deciding whether we mean it 
metaphorically or are actually asserting the literal content of our utterance. If there 
are no metaphors of this category, then that would further undermine the 
interpretative adequacy of Yablo’s figuralism.  
My second pair of responses begins by noting that Quinean ontology is not the 
ontology of ordinary discourse (Quine, 1948). As I have already remarked, the 
ordinary man on the street may well have no fenced in ontology and may not be able 
to distinguish between his literal and non-literal utterances. Quinean ontology is the 
ontology of best science, it is the ontology we find ourselves with when we have 
completed the project of regimenting our best scientific theories in the canonical 
notation of first order logic with identity. Now it seems to me that science just is 
more literal than ordinary language. Yes, Yablo is quite correct to point out that there 
are, nonetheless, substantial portions of non-literal discourse embedded within 
scientific discourse, but these regions will surely be smaller in extent than the non-
literal regions of everyday discourse. It hardly seems likely that there will be huge 
areas of science where the metaphors roam wild, sufficient to underwrite a general 
scepticism about our existence claims. If there are areas of essential metaphor in 
scientific discourse, they are likely to be small regions, easily contained within the 
larger body of completely literal, completely serious science.  
And this brings me to my second objection. Quine does not need to eliminate 
metaphor from science, he merely needs to isolate it. What the Quinean ontological 
project needs is some way to identify and ignore the metaphorical portions of 
discourse, so that we do not think that we are committed to some things that, in fact, 
we only pretend that there are. And the reason for switching to scientific discourse 
was not, surely, that it is completely literal, but because it is considerably more literal 
than everyday chatter. We turn to science to settle our ontological commitments, 
because, while there are still essential (that is, representationally essential and 
presentationally essential) metaphors within scientific discourse, there are fewer of 
them and we have a pretty good idea of which ones they are. We can be confident 
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that we are not committed to anything we quantify over in these regions of our 
scientific discourse (and here we might use some kind of theory of prop-oriented 
make-believe to explain what it is we are actually doing in science with our non-
literal utterances). I cannot see, then, that Yablo’s first two grades of metaphorical 
involvement need greatly trouble the Quinean ontologist, so long as we have some 
way of isolating and discounting them from our ontological reckoning.  
It is, then, as Yablo notes (Yablo, 1998, p.257), the final grade of metaphorical 
involvement that causes all the problems. As I have just argued, Quine will have no 
difficulties with essential metaphor, so long as he can distinguish the essential 
metaphors from the literal parts of scientific discourse. And there is no reason, in the 
case of presentationally and representationally essential metaphor, to think that this 
cannot be done. But procedurally essential metaphor threatens to evade this response 
altogether. What we need, in order to do Quinean ontology, is to separate out and 
ignore our merely make-believe commitments when trying to establish what there is. 
But if some of our existential commitments are embedded in games of make-believe 
constitutive of make-the-most-of-it metaphor, this cannot be done. And it cannot be 
done, because one of the readings of the metaphor that is potentially up for grabs is 
its literal reading; one way to legitimately engage in this kind of game of make-
believe is not to make-believe at all, but just to believe. The problem, then, is that 
this kind of metaphor, with all its commitments, threatens to go literal and to become 
a piece of serious, ontologically loaded discourse – and there is no way of knowing, 
at any given time, if that might not be the correct way to receive the metaphorical 
utterance.  
This would indeed be a problem for the Quinean ontologist. It would blur the 
boundaries of the literal and non-literal in such a way that the project of settling our 
ontological commitments would lapse. It would be a disaster for a great deal of late 
twentieth and early twenty-first century metaphysics. I say “would”. It would be a 
disaster, but then it would only be a disaster if this kind of metaphor played any role 
in scientific theorizing. And I see absolutely no reason to think that it does. Indeed, I 
can think of very good reasons to say that it doesn’t. Science is, among other things, 
an enterprise of prediction and explanation. But surely generating predictions and 
giving explanations requires our utterances and inscriptions, the utterances and 
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inscriptions that are to play some role in those explanations and predictions, having 
some kind of determinate content. But that is what procedural metaphors lack, at the 
time of utterance/inscription, and possibly at all times until and including the 
completion of science! A metaphor that expresses some determinate content, but 
does so in such a way that only the metaphor can express that content – I can imagine 
metaphors like that playing a role in generating predictions and giving explanations. 
A metaphor that hovers indifferently between many contents, that even encompasses 
the possibility that it expresses no content whatsoever – such metaphors may be 
living in ordinary discourse, but they are surely dead to science.  
An example. According to the DN model of scientific explanation (and it goes 
without saying that this is not an endorsement of the covering law model, but a 
sketch of a potential family of problems for procedural metaphor) a scientific 
explanation is a deduction at least one of whose premises states a natural law 
(Hempel and Oppenheim, 1948). But it follows from this that procedural metaphor 
cannot play a role in explanation, because contentless utterances or inscriptions 
(which are not candidates for truth or falsity) cannot play any role in deduction. It 
seems to me that a sentence can only be part of a deduction if it expresses some 
determinate content. Otherwise, not being a candidate for determinate truth or falsity, 
how can it play any role in a truth-preserving argument? Well, so much the worse for 
the DN model, right? But the example is intended to be perfectly generalizable. It is 
difficult to imagine any theory of explanation in which sentences expressing no 
determinate proposition could play a role.  
I submit, then, that procedurally essential metaphor plays no role in scientific 
theorising. And as Quinean ontology is the ontology of our best scientific theory, I 
propose that procedurally essential metaphor is no threat to the project of settling our 
ontological commitments. Nor, for reasons already outlined, are the other kinds of 
essential metaphor obviously a threat to the ontological project. It is important to 
stress that this is not a defence of everything that passes for metaphysics in 
contemporary philosophy (indeed, throughout this chapter my concern will be to 
establish the substantiality of the dispute over mathematical Platonism and 
fictionalism. I will not be concerned at any point with defending metaphysics more 
broadly). I think that, the use of presentationally essential and representationally 
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essential metaphor notwithstanding, it is perfectly intelligible to ask whether best 
science requires an ontology of abstract objects and theoretical entities or whether we 
can do without one or either. Where it leaves the debates over temporal parts or 
statues and lumps of clay I do not presume to judge.  
 
5.2.5 Concluding Remarks 
We have seen reason in this section to doubt that Yablo’s project can succeed: at 
least in the way he has chosen to do it, there is no clear route from first-order 
ontological fictionalism, to a second order metaontological fictionalism with 
deflationary consequences. As we have seen, Quinean metaontology is not the 
ontology of ordinary language, it is the ontology of our best scientific theories, in 
which we are usually confident which parts of our theory are accurately representing 
the world, and which parts are meant non-literally. As far as concerns 
representationally and presentationally essential metaphor, therefore, we can be 
confident that we can isolate and discount the non-literal portions of our theories 
when doing Quinean ontology (of course, we will need to give some kind of account 
of what it is we are really doing with our non-literal utterances, and what we are 
really committed to). And we saw good reason to think that procedurally essential 
metaphor, if it even exists, can play no role in our scientific theorizing. As it was this 
kind of metaphor that blurred the boundaries between literal and non-literal, I submit 
that the Quinean metaontologist is perfectly entitled to a robust demarcation of the 
literal and non-literal. I therefore conclude that the kind of fictionalism defended in 
this thesis is not under threat from the brand of global fictionalist deflationism Yablo 
envisages. We are entitled to be both Quineans in metaontology, and fictionalists 
about mathematical ontology.  
 
5.3 Difference Minimization and Epistemicism 
In this section we consider an alternative way in which the deflationist intuition 
might be fleshed out, Karen Bennett’s epistemicism (Bennett, 2009). According to 
the epistemicist, the problem with ontology is not that its questions have no correct 
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answers, as some have suggested, but that we lack justification for believing one of 
the answers rather than another to be the correct one. This lack of justification, 
Bennett argues, can be traced to a strategy pursued by most low-ontologists (those 
with a preference for parsimony and desert landscapes) of ‘up-playing’ their 
expressive resources in order to minimize the difference between their own view and 
more inflationary ontological positions. But by placing themselves in a position to 
ape everything the high-ontologist says, the low-ontologist runs the risk of inheriting 
the very problems with less parsimonious metaphysical theories that motivated her to 
take the eliminativist route in the first place. The consequence of this difference 
minimization strategy is that the distance between the competing philosophical 
positions becomes so small that we have no way of choosing between them, and so 
no justification for believing one rather than the other (Bennett, 2009). Obviously 
this is of particular concern for the mathematical fictionalist, because her position is 
low ontology (it does without the abstract objects a Platonist is happy to 
countenance) and difference minimizing (both the revolutionary and the hermeneutic 
fictionalist want to preserve as much of mathematical practice as they can, in 
particular, they do not want to be outdone in this respect by Platonism).  
 
5.3.1 Varieties of Metaontological Dismissivism 
Bennett begins the presentation of her deflationary position by outlining three 
possible ways in which the deflationary intuition (what she calls ‘dismissivism’) 
might be made more concrete (Bennett, 2009, pp.39-42). According to the first, anti-
realist dismissivist, the problem with ontological claims is that they lack a truth-
value. So for instance, a claim of the form “There are Fs” is neither true nor false 
(Bennett, 2009, pp.39-40). Bennett doesn’t really discuss this position in any detail, 
and nor will I. Indeed, it is not clear at this stage that there really is a position on the 
table. This is not to say that the suggestion that ontological claims lack truth value is 
obviously false or that its assertion is incoherent. But as things stand, anti-realism 
seems underspecified. Why do ontological statements lack a truth-value? The mere 
brute assertion that they do does not really amount to a philosophical theory. Until 
the anti-realist position can be sharpened, it does not seem any more philosophically 
substantial than the anti-metaphysical prejudice it seeks to flesh out.  
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A second kind of dismissivism is semanticism, the view that metaphysical disputes 
are trivial because they are merely verbal or because the disputants are simply talking 
past one another (Bennett, 2009, p.40). There are many ways in which this idea 
might be made more concrete, but perhaps the most familiar is Eli Hirsch’s 
quantifier variance theory (Hirsch, 2011), according to which the disputants are 
talking past one another because they mean different things (or might be charitably 
interpreted as meaning different things) by their respective utterances of 
quantificational phrases like “there is”, “there are”, “there exists”, etc. According to a 
dismissivist like Hirsch, there is no fact of the matter about who is right in an 
ontological dispute over the existence of Fs, because both parties to the dispute can 
be seen as talking their own language with its own meanings for the quantifier 
phrases, and because principles of interpretative charity demand that we interpret 
both parties to the dispute, both the F deniers and the F partisans, as speaking truly 
within their own language (Hirsch, 2002, pp.67-71). According to Hirsch, the only 
substantive issue in the area is that of whose language or whose use of the quantifier 
phrases best accords with ordinary English. But this is a matter to be settled, not by 
metaphysicians, but by philosophers of language (Hirsch, 2002, pp.64-71).    
Now again, I will not say much about semanticism here. Partly, this is because I 
struggle to make sense of the idea of two languages sufficient to describe all the 
facts, but differing over the meaning of the quantifier terms. In particular, I find it 
obscure why some pieces of language should be called quantifiers if they differ in 
meaning. How can they both be existential quantifiers, if they do not both mean the 
same thing? Hirsch’s suggestion is that we see the two phrases as sufficiently 
syntactically similar to license calling them quantifiers (Hirsch, 2011, p.xiv), but the 
collapse argument seems to threaten that if two words share the same syntactic 
profile (license the same inferences), then they will mean the same thing. There is a 
worry here that Hirsch’s position is just the familiar point that we can imagine two 
orthographically identical words, and so two orthographically identical sentences 
containing those words, that nonetheless have completely different meanings. But 
no-one would find it ontologically significant that I can truly say “John is at the 
bank”, and you can truly say “John is not at the bank”, and neither of us need be 
disagreeing with the other because I meant that John is standing by the river and you 
meant that John is at the place where the money is routinely mishandled. The fact 
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that two people may assign wildly different meanings to the word ‘exists’ is only 
ontologically significant, if it has already been conceded that there is no correct or 
best meaning for that word (cf. (Sider, 2011)). But that is surely what was at issue.    
However that may be, Bennett says much more about semanticism than I have here, 
and so if you do not find my worries about the significance of the quantifier variance 
view satisfying, I direct you to her 2009. The gist of Bennett’s objection to 
semanticism is that its interpretative strategy requires an analytic equivalence 
between the sentence up for dispute and its meaning in the two respective languages 
of the disputants (Bennett, 2009, pp.50-57). But, Bennett argues (Bennett, 2009, 
pp.54-57), there is no reason to think that these analytic equivalences will hold in the 
respective metaphysicians’ languages. I think we can say more. If Hirsch’s view, and 
those like it, really do require analytic equivalences of this kind, then it is hard to see 
how they move us beyond the Carnapian deflationism from which they take their 
cue. If we are happy to concede that Quine won the debate with Carnap over the 
analytic synthetic distinction, then it is difficult to see how any view which takes on 
a commitment to this distinction can be advance over Carnap’s linguistic 
frameworks.14   
The final version of dismissivism is the one that will concern us for the rest of this 
chapter. This is epistemicism. According to the epistemicist it may well be that an 
ontological claim such as “There are Fs” is true or false, and that the dispute over its 
truth or falsity is not merely a verbal dispute, but that, nonetheless, the dispute is still 
trivial (Bennett, 2009, p.42). And the dispute might still be trivial because we lack 
justification for believing one way or the other, that is, we lack justification for 
thinking that “There are Fs” is true rather than false, or false rather than true 
(Bennett, 2009, p.42). And if metaphysical disputes are like that, then clearly it is not 
worthwhile to engage in them, any more than it would be to engage in the dispute 
about how many grains of sand there are on Blackpool beach or how many quarks 
there are in the universe. Presumably questions like these are intelligible, and have 
                                                          
14 It is also worth noting that at one point Hirsch seems to deny that his notion of a dispute’s 
being verbal will apply to the debate between the nominalist and the Platonist (Hirsch, 2011, 
p.192). That is, he sees no way in which the nominalist community (speaking a nominalist 
language) could charitably interpret Platonistic utterances in a way that makes them come 
out true. 
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answers with determinate truth values. But because we lack justification for 
believing one way rather than the other, dispute over these questions would be 
pointless. Metaphysical disputes, Bennett suggests (Bennett, 2009, p.42), are a little 
like that, intelligible questions with determinate answers, which we will never get the 
right answer to (at least if we stay at the level of first-order metaphysics).  
 
5.3.2 Epistemicism and the Special Composition Question 
Why might metaphysical disputes be trivial in the way the epistemicist envisages? It 
will help if we have a concrete example before us, and so, following Bennett (2009, 
pp.44-45), let us consider the dispute over the so called special composition question: 
When, if ever, do two things compose a third? Mereological believers (which group 
includes the mereological universalists) say sometimes, and possibly always, 
depending on which principles of composition they adopt. Mereological nihilists, by 
constrast, say never: two things never compose a third; there are only simples.  
 Here we have what Bennett calls a low ontology side, and a high ontology side 
(Bennett, 2009, p.46) (it is unclear to me whether this is a general feature of disputes 
threatened by epistemicism or just a feature of the kinds of examples Bennett 
considers. I see no necessary connection between difference minimizing metaphysics 
and ontology, and it is difference minimization that threatens to render metaphysical 
disputes trivial. Nonetheless, fictionalism fits the pattern Bennett identifies, and so 
we need not worry overmuch about what conditions a dispute needs to meet in order 
to be a candidate for epistemic deflation). The high ontology side are the believers, 
those who think there are tables, chairs, people, pigs, possibly simples, and possibly 
arbitrary mereological fusions as well. The low ontology side in this dispute are the 
nihilists, who countenance only simples.  
As Bennett sees it, this division into high and low ontology sides is common to many 
different metaphysical disputes (Bennett, 2009, p.46). And clearly the distinction 
applies in the case of the dispute over mathematical ontology, with the nominalists of 
various stripes occupying the low ontological side, and the Platonists with their 
infinities of abstracta defiantly occupying the ontological high ground. 
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But both the high ontologists and low will, Bennett argues (Bennett, 2009, p.46), 
seek to minimize the distance between their respective theories. This is because 
neither side wishes to look crazy. Consider, for instance the mereological 
universalist. According to the mereological universalist, every arbitrary fusion of 
simples and non-simples is itself an object. So not only are atoms objects, so are 
chairs and ducks. And not only are chairs and ducks objects, but so are chairducks, 
where chairducks are objects composed of ducks and chairs. But there is a risk here, 
a risk that by endorsing such an expansive ontology one opens oneself up to the 
charge of ontological profligacy. So the high ontologist in this dispute will try to 
downplay her ontological commitments. She will say things like: “But really, there is 
nothing more to there being chairs and ducks than there being simples arranged 
tablewise and duckwise. And there is nothing more to there being chairducks than 
there being simples arranged chairduckwise. All it takes for an object to exist is for 
some simples to be arranged objectwise. Your mistake, my nihilist friend, is to 
suppose that the conditions on objecthood are more stringent than this.”  
Now, clearly, if this kind of downplaying strategy can be made to work, it lessens the 
distance between the low and the high ontologist, but it is the other direction of 
difference minimization that Bennett sees as causing trouble for metaphysics 
(Bennet, 2009, pp.62-65). The low ontologist also wants to minimize the distance 
between herself and the high ontologist, because the low ontologist wants to be able 
to capture as much of our everyday discourse as possible within her ontologically 
austere framework. Consider the mereological nihilist this time. The nihilist denies 
the existence of all non-simple objects, but she does not want to condemn all of our 
ordinary speech about composites as useless falsehoods. Here the nihilist has two 
options to up-play her expressive resources and recover as much of everyday 
discourse as she can, both of which will be familiar from our earlier discussion of 
fictionalism: she can endorse a hermeneutic nihilism or a revolutionary nihilism. 
First the hermeneuticist: “Strictly speaking, there are no composite objects. But 
when, in the course of everyday chatter, we say things like ‘here is a table’, we are 
not speaking strictly! ‘Here is a table’, uttered in any common or garden 
conversational context is just a figurative or colourful way of saying ‘here are some 
simples arranged tablewise.’” The revolutionary nihilist, on the other hand, will say 
something like this: “Speaking strictly, there are no tables. So ordinary utterances of 
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‘here is a table’ are false. Nonetheless, ‘here is a table’ is suitably related to its 
literally true paraphrase ‘here are some simples arranged tablewise’, so that we – we 
philosophers, that is – know that we can always switch to the paraphrase whenever 
strict and literal speech is required, say, in the ontology room. And meanwhile, we 
can let the folk get on with their business unmolested, given that their strictly false 
utterances, by being suitably related to true ones, are perfectly innocuous.”   
Now the danger here is that by up-playing her expressive resources in this way, the 
nihislist has moved her position so close to that of the high ontologist that there will 
be little to choose between them. By aiming to recover all those portions of our 
everyday discourse that the high ontologist is able to account for, the low ontologist 
risks collapsing the distinction between the two positions (Bennett, 2009, p.64) (it 
seems to me that the high ontologist’s strategy will have similar consequences. By 
downplaying the ontological weightiness of her commitments, the high ontologist 
looks to have available a line of response that will go something like this: “If your 
objections to my ontological profligacy stick, then they will be as much of a problem 
for you as for me. After all, there is no more to my ontology than…” So while 
Bennett focusses on the expressive up-playing route to epistemicism, it seems to me 
the ontological downplaying will take us in the same direction).     
In order to make good on this suggestion, Bennett runs through a number of familiar 
objections to the high ontology side of the special composition issue (Bennett, 2009, 
pp.65-71). In each case she finds an analogous objection that can be raised against 
the low ontologist who has engaged in the kind of difference minimization (via 
expressive up-playing) we are considering here. Now we need not rehearse all these 
objections, but let us briefly consider one, in order to better appreciate how Bennett’s 
strategy proceeds. Let us take as our example the problem of the many (Bennett, 
2009, pp.66-67). The mereological believer says “here is a table”. We point out that 
here is also an object containing all of the atoms of the table, minus one. But an 
object lacking only one atom possessed by a table would seem to meet every 
condition the mereological believer can offer for composing a table. So it too is a 
table. And so on for all of the table’s outlying atoms. We can imagine subtracting 
one at a time from the original table, giving us each time a new object that also 
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seems to be a table. But then, where we thought there was only one table, there will 
be billions of tables.    
The mereological nihilist might think that it is one advantage of her theory that she is 
able to avoid this unwelcome counterintuitive consequence. That is, because there 
are no tables located where we thought there was just one table, there are certainly 
not many tables where we thought there was just one. But things are not quite so 
clear cut as this suggests. Note that the difference minimizing nihilist thinks that 
when we say “here is a table”, while there is in fact no table, there are simples 
arranged tablewise. But now we can simply run the problem of the many against 
these pluralities of simples. Subtract one atom from some simples arranged 
tablewise, and it would seem that you are still left with some simples arranged 
tablewise. So there are at least two groups of simples arranged tablewise. In fact, 
there are as many as there were tables in the original objection, because we can 
simply subtract one simple at a time from the original group of simples arranged 
tablewise to get another group of simples arranged tablewise. There are, then, 
billions of simples arranged tablewise where we were initially inclined to say “here is 
a (one) table”. Because the difference minimizing nihilist wants to up-play her 
expressive resources to the point that “here is a table” is a legitimate thing to say, she 
seems to inherit the problem of the many in just the form that it afflicted the believer 
(Bennett, 2009, pp.66-67).15 
Now, because the difference minimizing nihilist tries to recover all that the 
mereological believer says with respect to our ordinary quotidian speech about 
composites, she inherits all the objections that are traditionally urged against the 
believer (or so Bennett argues. For more details see her (2009)). But then we are left 
with no way to choose between the mereological nihilist’s and the mereological 
believer’s positions. If the objections to mereological belief stick, then they stick 
equally to expressively up-played mereological nihilism. If they don’t stick, then 
they don’t stick to either. Either way, we seem to have equal justification for both 
views, and so no justification for choosing between them. In that case, the dispute 
                                                          
15 I do not want to suggest that one should find Bennett’s reasoning convincing. This is 
meant only as an indication of her general strategy.  
 
196 
 
seems completely nugatory, no better, that is, than the idle dispute about how many 
grains of sand are on the beach: there is an answer, but we have no reason to think 
we know or will ever know what it is.  
 Now this is a fairly pessimistic conclusion to reach, but it is important to note that 
Bennett is not defending a kind of quietism about the debates in question. We cannot 
settle the dispute between the difference minimizing high and low ontologists, she 
suggests, by the usual first-order squabbling characteristic of analytic metaphysics. 
But it might be that the case before us is something like a case of underdetermination 
of theory by evidence, familiar from philosophy of science. Here the evidence that 
underdetermines the theories is the usual philosophical argumentation of first-order 
metaphysics. But perhaps, following the analogy with science, we can find some way 
to settle the issue by turning to the consideration of theoretical virtues (Bennett, 
2009, pp.73-74). Maybe if we had a better idea of the relevant weightings of 
simplicity criteria, for instance, or fecundity, or elegance for metaphysical theories, 
then that would enable us to settle the issue in favour of the simpler, the more 
fecund, or the more elegant theory. Maybe the low ontologist out scores the high 
ontologist on ontological parsimony, for instance. And maybe idealogical parsimony 
is of less importance than ontological parsimony, or the high ontologist’s promised 
ideological savings fail to materialize. In that case, we might have a route to deciding 
between the competing positions. In short, what Bennett suggests is that faced with 
an epistemicist impasse, we should switch to methodological considerations 
(Bennett, 2009, pp.73-74). We need to stop doing metaphysics, and start doing 
metaphilosophy. 
 
5.3.3 Epistemicism and Fictionalism 
Now I am fairly sympathetic to the above line of thinking, but before we throw in the 
towel, I think we should ask ourselves whether Bennett’s epistemicism applies in the 
case of fictionalism about mathematics. On the face of it, both revolutionary and 
hermeneutic fictionalism would seem to be perfect candidates for Bennett’s 
deflationism. The fictionalist is clearly on the low ontology side of the dispute and on 
the whole she is a difference minimizer: the mathematical fictionalist is usually 
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unwilling to throw out the mathematical baby with the ontological bath water, she is 
happy to leave mathematical practice as it comes. How this is done will depend on 
the brand of fictionalism endorsed, whether hermeneutic (mathematical practice is 
already in good order. Strictly speaking, “2+2=4” is false, but, then, we were never 
speaking strictly) or revolutionary (“2+2=4” is strictly speaking false, but it is related 
to the true “In the mathematical fiction, 2+2=4” in such a way that mathematical 
practice need not be tampered with). But both the revolutionary and the hermeneutic 
fictionalist are keen to recover just as much of our everyday mathematical practice as 
the Platonist, and this leaves them open to the charge that they have moved their 
position so close to the Platonist’s, there will be little reason to choose between them.  
In order to make good this epistemicist objection, though, we would have to establish 
that every objection to mathematical Platonism will carry over to the expressively 
up-played nominalism we call fictionalism. By contrast, if we find even one 
objection to Platonism that does not carry over to the case of fictionalism, then it 
seems that Bennett’s epistemicism cannot apply in the case of the debate over 
mathematical ontology. (In Bennett’s defence at this point, we should note that she 
does not explicitly address the issue of the scope of her epistemicist deflationism, 
and so does not explicitly claim that issues of mathematical ontology are 
epistemically undecidable. Nor, it should be further noted, would the fact that 
epistemicism does not apply to the debate over mathematical ontology show that it 
doesn’t apply anywhere else)  
By far the most common objections to Platonism are epistemic ones. Let us then 
take, as our example of an objection to Platonism, Field’s challenge (Field, 1989, 25-
30), that is, the challenge to say how the existence of abstract, acausal entities located 
outside of spacetime is compatible with any plausibly naturalistic theory of 
knowledge. Should we discover that this afflicts both Platonism and expressively up-
played fictionalism, then Bennett’s epistemicism will have been partially vindicated 
(we would then have to complete the task for every other objection to Platonism). 
Should it turn out to afflict one and not the other, then epistemicism, in this case, will 
have been refuted.  
 To begin with, is Field’s challenge a good one? Well, recall from the introduction 
that should the indispensability argument succeed, the Platonist would have a kind of 
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response to this line of argument. She could say that we know about abstract, acausal 
entities located outside of spacetime in the same way that we know about theoretical 
entities: by their presence in our best well-confirmed theories of natural phenomena. 
In other words, if there is no plausibly naturalistic theory of knowledge for 
mathematical entities, then there will be no plausibly naturalistic theory of 
knowledge for whole swathes of our scientific knowledge of reality. But the 
indispensability argument, as we have repeatedly seen, is not successful. If we are 
correct about the status of the indispensability argument, then Field’s challenge is 
still live. The Platonist still owes us an explanation of how we can come to know 
anything about the kinds of entities she takes the truth of mathematics to require. 
Will anything like Field’s epistemic challenge re-arise for the expressively up-
playing fictionalist? Well, on the face of it, it is difficult to see how. Of course, there 
are all sorts of interesting philosophical issues surrounding the epistemology of 
fiction. “How do we (or can we) learn from fictions?” is one of particular concern for 
those of us who think that applied mathematics might be a sophisticated form of 
make-believe. But on the surface of it, there is little reason to think that answers to 
these questions will require the existence of a transfinite realm of acausal entities or a 
Platonic heaven. And if that is the case, there seems to be little reason to think that 
anything like Field’s challenge will trouble the fictionalist. Of course, we may not 
have a fully worked out theory of knowledge for fictions, but the point is that there is 
no reason to suspect that our having one will require us to go beyond naturalism. In 
the case of Platonism, at least as traditionally conceived, it is difficult to see how we 
could have a theory of knowledge that did not go beyond naturalism. 
There appears, then, to be a disanalogy between fictionalism and Platonism as 
traditionally conceived that seems to leave the epistemic balance in favour of 
fictionalism. Platonism is subject to an epistemic objection that simply does not seem 
to arise for fictionalism, even though the fictionalist can recover every part of our 
quotidian mathematical practice that the Platonist can. Putting this another way: 
fictionalism is difference minimizing, but only up to a point. The fictionalist wants to 
minimize the difference between herself and the Platonist with respect to 
mathematical practice, but with respect to mathematical ontology and epistemology 
she wishes to leave as much room between the views as is consistent with her 
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difference minimizing aim. The difference here between the mathematical fictionalist 
and the mereological nihilist is that there is no way for the mereological nihilist to 
capture everything that we ordinarily say that does not close the gap with the 
mereological believer. Or in other words, there is no way to leave room between 
nihilism and mereological belief consistent with the difference minimizing aim. And 
here we might note the way in which the mereological believer downplays her 
ontology: when both parties to a dispute are moving towards one another, the 
distance is closed twice as fast.       
 In the case of mathematical ontology, the high ontologist, that is, the Platonist is 
willing to endorse the existence of a whole panoply of abstracta, and usually feels no 
obligation to suggest that in doing so she is really doing no more than ordinary folk 
do when talking of ordinary objects.16 This means that the typical Platonist is just not 
very interested in downplaying her ontological commitments in a way that would 
move her position closer to the fictionalist. Meanwhile, of course, the fictionalist is 
concerned with reducing her ontological commitments, and so is concerned to 
position her theory, in this respect, as far from the Platonist as possible. It is this dual 
dialectic movement in the case of mathematical ontology, with the Platonist moving 
away from the fictionalist in the direction of greater ontological profligacy, and the 
fictionalist moving away from the Platonist in the direction of greater ontological 
parsimony, that leaves open the space between the two theories within which 
something like Field’s challenge can decide against one in favour of the other. And it 
is this feature of the mathematical ontology debate, so different from Bennett’s 
characterization of the debate between the mereological believer and mereological 
nihilist, that makes the former debate resistant to her epistemicism, whereas the latter 
                                                          
16 Not all forms of Platonism do this. For Balaguer’s Full Blooded Platonism (Balaguer, 
1998b), according to which any consistent set of axioms defines an existent set of 
mathematical objects, this objection may not work. Similarly for Hale and Wright’s 
abstractionist Platonism (Hale and Wright, 2009), according to which, mathematical 
existence is secured through abstraction principles definitive of our mathematical concepts. 
Nonetheless, our concern has primarily been with those forms of Platonism established on 
the basis of the indispensability argument, and these tend to be of the ontologically 
inflationary variety. Further, there are objections to both these kinds of Platonism, which I 
lack space to discuss, which make them independently unattractive as ontologies for 
mathematics.  
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was not. In other words, in the case of mathematical epistemology, we have found an 
objection that tells against mathematical Platonism, and that does not afflict 
mathematical fictionalism. I propose that in the case of mathematical ontology, 
epistemicism has been refuted.  
 
5.4 Conclusion     
In this chapter we have sought to respond to two kinds of metaontological challenges 
that seem especially threatening for the mathematical fictionalist. We began by 
considering Yablo’s attempt to draft insights familiar to the fictionalist into the 
services of ontological deflationism. In particular, we saw that for Yablo the 
presence of certain kinds of metaphorical idioms in our linguistic practice threatens 
the divide between the literal and non-literal in a way that in turn threatens to 
undermine the whole ontological project. I argued, contra Yablo, that the presence of 
representationally and presentationally essential metaphors in science is no threat to 
the Quinean ontologist and that the trouble-making metaphor, the procedurally 
essential kind, is unlikely to play any role in science. The prospects, then, for a 
general fictionalist deflationism seem poor. 
 In the second half of the chapter we considered Bennett’s epistemicism, according to 
which the way in which parties to metaphysical debates seek to minimize the 
difference between their respective positions, threatens our ability to discover the 
answers to metaphysical questions. I went on to argue that while fictionalism is a 
difference minimizing approach to ontology, in that it seeks to up-play its expressive 
resources and capture just as much of mathematical practice as the Platonist can, 
there is one kind of objection to Platonism, Field’s epistemic challenge, that the 
fictionalist does not inherit. Because the Platonist is not interested in downplaying 
her ontological commitments, she is obliged to provide a naturalistic epistemology 
for those commitments, something that it seems difficult to imagine her succeeding 
with. No such challenge seems to face the fictionalist.  
 I conclude, then, that with respect to the most serious metaontological challenges, 
fictionalism is surprisingly well situated. There is no reason to think that the debate 
between the fictionalist and the Platonist cannot be decided, and no reason to think 
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that fictionalist considerations favour dismissing ontological questions as ill-formed. 
This conclusion should serve to strengthen fictionalism’s claims as a theory of 
mathematical ontology and applications.     
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Conclusion 
In this thesis I have sought to outline and defend an anti-realist approach to the 
philosophy of mathematics based on Kendall Walton’s theory of fictions as games of 
make-believe (Walton, 1990). The idea has been to combine this fictionalist 
approach to mathematical ontology with an attractive recent theory of mathematical 
applications, the mapping account (Pincock, 2004), to give us a detailed account of 
how mathematics works in application, without finding ourselves committed to any 
abstract objects. The remainder of the thesis addressed a number of objections to this 
kind of approach to metaphysics, and defended the legitimacy of pursuing an anti-
realist project in ontology, within a realist approach to metaontology.  
 In the introduction we addressed the motivations for the fictionalist approach. We 
saw there that once we have adopted a synoptic program for philosophy, like 
naturalism, it becomes difficult to see how to accommodate certain entities within 
our conceptual scheme. In particular, drawing on a challenge to the mathematical 
platonist due to Hartry Field (Field, 1989) and Paul Benacerraf (1983b), we saw that 
there is a particular challenge in accounting for our knowledge of mathematical 
objects given what science tells us about the kinds of creatures we are, and the kinds 
of cognitive abilities we are likely to possess. Following Huw Price (Price, 2011) we 
have labelled this the placement problem, the problem of finding a place for those 
mathematical entities we routinely talk about, but which cause difficultly for a 
naturalist program in philosophy. 
 We saw further that the placement problem is exacerbated by the existence of the 
indispensability argument, which suggests that as good naturalists, who take our 
science seriously, we should be committed to the existence of mathematical objects 
because of the role they play in science (Putnam, 1971). This means that we cannot 
easily adopt an eliminativist response to the placement problem, because doing so 
seems to be incompatible with our naturalistic approach to philosophy.  
 In the first chapter we turned to the indispensability argument, in order to assess its 
cogency. I there argued that traditional indispensability arguments fail. The 
indispensability argument of Quine and Putnam, as formalized by Colyvan (2001a), 
includes as a premise a view about scientific confirmation, confirmational holism, 
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that is questionable in the light of the recent close attention paid to scientific 
methodology. That is, philosophers such as Maddy (1992) and Sober (1993) have 
found reason to doubt that empirical evidence confirms every part of a successful 
theory equally, but that some parts of our theories are insulated from empirical 
confirmation or discomfirmation. This alone would be enough to show the 
unsoundness of the indispensability argument, but we saw further how Leng argues 
that mathematical portions of our theories may be more like the posits of idealized 
representations in science, which it is reasonable to treat as kinds of fiction (Leng, 
2010, pp.155-181).  
 In the light of this failure we saw how some mathematical platonists have switched 
to a new and enhanced version of the indispensability argument, the explanatory 
indispensability argument (Baker 2005; Baker and Colyvan, 2011). This new 
argument does not depend on the truth of confirmational holism about science, but 
instead rests on the prima facie plausible assumption that whatever posits appear in 
our best explanations of some phenomena must exist (alternatively, theories that 
explain are true). The platonist pursuing this line of argument then presents evidence 
that seems to suggest that in some cases mathematical entities can explain physical 
phenomena. For the explanation to be true, the mathematical entities must exist. The 
naturalist believes the explanation is true, so she must be committed to the existence 
of the mathematical entities appearing in it. Once again, the naturalist seems to have 
to find a place for mathematical objects in her ontology.  
 I argued that this line of argument fails, because it fails to take account of a vicious 
circularity in the kinds of examples mathematical platonists have adduced. In every 
case the mathematical platonist can name, mathematical entities already appear in 
our characterization of the phenomenon under investigation. For instance, in Baker’s 
cicadas example (Baker, 2005, pp.229-233) we must already have in place a 
numerical theory for the characterization of the cicada life-cycles, before we can 
appeal to number theoretic results to explain those life cycles. But then the 
explanatory pattern looks like this:   
 
Number Theory + Biological Facts         Explained By        Number theory 
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But then what we have is a case of some number theoretic facts explaining 
something that is already in part number theoretic, and I argued that this introduces a 
circularity that vitiates the platonist’s argument.  
 The upshot of this chapter was that explanatory indispensability arguments are 
unlikely to be successful, and so if there is a successful indispensability argument it 
will be found by examining scientific representation. That is, the failure of the 
explanatory indispensability argument suggests that the best bet for finding an 
argument for platonism is by turning to the role mathematics plays in facilitating 
representations of scientific phenomena. If it turns out that our best theory of 
mathematics’ role in scientific representation requires a platonist ontology, then it 
seems we will have a new argument for a naturalistic platonism.    
 In the second chapter we turned to a contemporary theory of the role mathematics 
plays in facilitating scientific representations. According to Pincock’s mapping 
account (Pincock, 2004), some piece of mathematics is playing a representational 
role in science when there exists a structure preserving map between the empirical 
domain under investigation and a suitable mathematical structure. This theory is 
attractive because it provides a detailed account of how mathematics functions in 
representations. Indeed, to me this seems a major advance over previous discussions 
of mathematical representation in science, which usually shy away from giving 
technical details about how representation might proceed.  
 We then saw a number of objections put forward by Bueno and Colyvan (2011, 
pp.348-352) that suggest that Pincock’s mapping account might not be able to handle 
every instance of mathematical representation. In place of the mapping account they 
propose a three stage inferential conception of mathematical representation (Bueno 
and Colyvan, 2011, pp.352-356), with immersion mapping from the empirical 
domain to a mathematical structure, derivation allowing for inferential manipulation 
of the structure, and finally interpretation taking us back the other way, from 
mathematical structure to empirical phenomena.  
We saw reason to doubt Bueno and Colyvan’s claim that their inferential conception 
is a significant advance over the mapping account. I argued that the fundamental role 
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of mathematics in its application to science is as a descriptive or representational 
device, not its role in facilitating inferences that we would otherwise struggle to 
make (though I mentioned in passing that a similar view is endorsed by Field (1980), 
and so is perfectly compatible with fictionalism). I also argued that there is no reason 
to expect a theory of mathematical representation to also be a theory of mathematical 
explanation or inference, and so there is little reason to think that a theory of 
mathematical representation will have to give central place to inferential uses of 
mathematics. Because the inferential conception is in other respects so similar to the 
mapping account, I then suggested that we could build an enhanced mapping account 
to avoid Bueno and Colyvan’s objections, making use of their immersion and 
interpretation stages, but remaining agnostic about the derivation stage until a better 
argument could be produced for the central role of inference in applied mathematics 
(though I reserved the right to reincorporate this stage of application, if a convincing 
case could be made that this was necessary to accommodate uses of mathematics in 
science that are plausibly construed as inferential in nature. I do not believe that 
doing so need undermine the claim that the central role of mathematics in science is 
as a representational device).  
 But this theory, the enhanced mapping account, seems prima facie thoroughly 
platonistic. In chapter 3 I introduced a new version of the indispensability argument, 
drawing on the role mathematics plays in our best theory of scientific representation. 
There I argued that as naturalists, for whom philosophy is continuous with our best 
current science, we ought to be committed to any posits that play an indispensable 
role in our best philosophical theory of mathematical representation. If we are 
satisfied that the mapping account is a true account of mathematical representation, 
then we ought to be committed to the mathematical entities that are quantified over 
by that account. This leaves us ontologically committed to the existence of structure 
preserving maps and mathematical structures.  
 The bulk of chapter 3 was then spent outlining a particular kind of nominalistic 
approach to mathematics that would enable us to evade this commitment – a 
revolutionary pretence theory of mathematics based on Kendall Walton’s view of 
fictions as games of make-believe (Walton 1990; Walton, 1993). The idea is to 
embed the mapping account’s detailed story about mathematical applications within 
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the kind of fictionalist approach to mathematics outlined by the likes of Leng (2010) 
and Yablo (2001; 2005). We start with principles of generation drawn from 
axiomatic set theory with (real world) ur-elements (that is, we say something like, 
“Let’s pretend that ordinary things can form sets”), and then use the mapping 
account to constrain the kinds of sets that will be appropriate within mathematical 
applications. Because the relevant sets, mappings and mathematical structures are 
only encountered within a pretence, we do not inherit any ontological commitment to 
these kinds of abstract entities. 
 I further argued that it is appropriate to view this account as a variety of 
revolutionary fictionalism, that is, as a philosophical theory adopted by ontologists, 
and not as an interpretative account of what mathematicians and scientists 
themselves mean by their utterances (a hermeneutic fictionalism). The idea is that, 
while hermeneutic fictionalism cannot be dismissed as obviously false, and while 
objections like the autism objection do not at present seem sufficient to overturn it 
(Liggins, 2010), this very susceptibility to possible empirical discomfirmation makes 
hermeneutic fictionalism less attractive as an account of mathematical ontology. 
Once we have granted that a revolutionary fictionalism is acceptable from a 
naturalistic point of view (something I hope to have established in the material on 
Balaguer and Armour-Garb), adopting a revolutionary fictionalist perspective on 
applied mathematics looks like an attractive alternative to the hermeneutic option.          
 This theory of mathematics as a kind of make-believe game has a number of 
attractive features. Firstly, it has enabled us to evade the indispensability argument, 
even at the level of mathematical representation. If there is no hope for an 
indispensability argument from mathematical explanation, and no hope for an 
indispensability argument from our best theory of mathematical representation, and 
no hope for the Quine-Putnam holist version of the indispensability argument, then 
this leaves the naturalistically minded platonist, concerned to establish platonism on 
the basis of our best science, with very few options to pursue. If we are concerned 
about the placement problem of locating mathematics within our naturalistic program 
(say because of Field’s epistemological challenge), then this is a considerable 
advantage.  
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 Secondly, the fictionalized mapping account I have outlined here gives us a 
helpfully detailed story of how mathematical applications can be expected to 
proceed. We begin by pretending that we can gather the empirical stuff into sets as 
defined by the axioms of set theory with ur-elements. We then establish the existence 
of structure preserving mappings between these empirically grounded sets and a 
suitable mathematical structure, in line with the account of the immersion and 
interpretation stages outlined earlier. These mappings and the mathematical 
structures mapped onto will also just be further sets, and the whole procedure is 
taking place within the fiction generated by our choice of the axioms of set theory 
with ur-elements as principles of generation.  
 I believe that this theory can be leveraged to give us usefully detailed accounts of 
mathematical methodology. In this thesis, for reasons of space, I have shied away 
from giving detailed case studies, but one piece of future research might involve 
applying the above story to some particular scientific application of mathematics, 
showing how, in particular, the nature of the empirical stuff collected into our 
imaginary sets constrains our choice within the pretence of mappings and 
mathematical structures. Doing this should help illuminate the way in which 
practising scientists are constrained in their choice of mathematical structure to 
apply, and give us new insight into the way in which these choices proceed. I believe 
that there is, then, scope for applying this account in future research into the 
methodology of applied mathematics, and that this brand of fictionalism should be 
seen as a fruitful theory of mathematical applications in its own right, and not merely 
as device adopted to evade platonistic commitments.                 
 In the remainder of the thesis we have sought to defend this brand of fictionalism 
about mathematical application from a number of challenges that call into question 
the very viability of this kind of approach to metaphysics. It will be remembered that 
the burden of chapters 1 through 3 was that it is to mathematics' role in scientific 
representation that we must look to establish what our ontological commitments are. 
But Price’s (2011) pragmatism threatens this entire project, in effect calling into to 
question whether the notion of representation works in the way the realist/anti-realist 
debate in mathematical ontology needs it to. Price’s contention is, that for good 
naturalistic reasons, we ought to adopt an anti-representational account of apparently 
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descriptive language, according to which it is not the function of language to tell us 
what the world is like (Price, 2011, pp.184-199). The result of this change of focus is 
that questions about what kind of entities the world contains are likely to lapse 
(Price, 2011, pp.8-11): there is no reason to think that any one way of speaking (say 
the scientific way of speaking) is better than any other for establishing what there is 
(because no way of speaking will establish, in some metaphysically robust sense, 
what there is), and the naturalistic philosopher must just content herself with a kind 
of sociological or anthropological investigation into the reasons we have for speaking 
the languages we do (Price, 2011, p.199).  
 I argued against this that there are a number of reasons for favouring the traditional 
representational account of language over Price’s alternative anti-
representationalism. In particular, his metaphysical pluralism seems to sit 
uncomfortably with his claims to be a naturalist, the core commitments of his 
position are mostly unargued, and there are a number of outstanding challenges to 
the position that seem to have plausible answers from a representationalist point of 
view, but are more challenging to account for from the anti-representational point of 
view.  
 This opens a number of avenues for future research into related philosophical issues. 
Firstly, we must consider what kind of account of language is acceptable to a 
fictionalist. What kinds of theory of word-world relations are compatible with the 
realism and anti-realism debate in philosophy, and how plausible are those positions 
in the light of modern philosophy of language? Secondly, and relatedly, it would be 
useful to have some account of the kind of theory of truth the fictionalist ought to 
prefer, and whether there are any theories of truth that might undermine the kind of 
metaphysical project to which the fictionalist has committed herself. I hope to 
discuss both of these issues in future work.  
 Finally, in passing we noted that Quine might not have been totally resistant to some 
kind of pragmatist theory of word-world relations, but that his disagreement with 
Price would have centred on the role accorded to scientific discourse in building our 
total theory of the world (see Quine, 1951). This raises the important historical issue 
of identifying how it is that a debate that begins with Quine’s pragmatist approach to 
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issues in ontology, has since evolved into a debate that seems to involve robust 
metaphysical commitments and strong word-world relations. 
 In the final chapter we turned to the assessment of two objections drawn from the 
burgeoning subdiscipline of metametaphysics. We began with Yablo’s (1998) 
attempts to motivate a deflationist metaontology on the basis of his figuralism. In 
particular, we saw how Yablo believes that the very same kind of theory of fictions 
as games of make-believe that we have employed to evade the indispensability 
argument could be employed to resuscitate the Carnapian idea of language 
frameworks (Yablo, 1998, pp.242-244). Once this is done, Yablo believes, the 
existence of differing grades of metaphorical involvement will tend to undermine the 
distinction between literal and non-literal uses of language that the Quinean 
ontologist requires (Yablo, 1998, pp.248-258). As the bulk of this thesis has been 
concerned with ontology in a largely Quinean mode (in which one inherits an 
ontological commitment to those entities one indispensability quantifies over in 
one’s best theory of the world) Yablo’s argument presents a very serious challenge to 
the work done previously. 
 Against Yablo I have argued that at least two of his forms of metaphorical 
involvement are harmless (representationally and presentationally essential 
metaphor). Metaphors of this grade may well be indispensable for our best science, 
but once we have recognised the falsity of confirmational holism (as we did back in 
chapter 1), the Quinean ontologist will have no problem regarding these as merely 
convenient fictions, with no ontological import. Further, the trouble making 
metaphors, the procedurally essential metaphors, seem to play no role in our best 
scientific theories (indeed, I raised the sceptical possibility that such a grade of 
metaphorical involvement might not exist even in everyday speech). Such 
metaphors, in which the metaphorical content is ambiguous or even undetermined, 
seem to thwart the aims of prediction and explanation for which we have scientific 
theories in the first place. I concluded that Yablo’s fictionalist deflationism is 
unlikely to be successful.  
 But this raises the interesting question of whether there is any hope of marshalling 
the intuitions upon which the first-order fictionalist draws for the purpose of 
developing a second-order metaontological scepticism or deflationism. In the modern 
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field of metametaphysics, and in particular within metaontology, deflationary 
intuitions abound, and scepticism about metaphysics seems to be the dominant strain 
among modern metametaphysicians (of the 16 articles, not inclusive of the 
introduction, published in Chalmers, Manley, and Wasserman’s 2009 volume 
Metametaphysics, over half develop a sceptical position with respect to 
metaphysics). Clearly, then, attempts to develop a deflationary metametaphysics on 
the basis of some kind of fictionalism would be both attractive against the backdrop 
of the current revival of anti-metaphysical sentiment, and a serious threat to the 
project pursued in this thesis. So far, Yablo’s is the only developed attempt to do this 
in the literature, but being aware of the possible ways in which fictionalism might be 
employed in the service of metaontological deflationism would certainly be helpful 
for a defender of mathematical fictionalism, and one avenue of further research that 
ought to be undertaken in future. 
 In the final section of the thesis we turned to Bennett’s epistemicism (Bennett, 
2009), a kind of scepticism about our ability to settle metaphysical questions one 
way or the other. As we saw there, Bennett believes that in a significant number of 
metaphysical disputes, the two sides to the dispute (what Bennett calls the high-
ontology and low-ontology sides) will seek respectively to downplay their 
ontological commitments or to up-play (that is increase) their expressive resources 
(Bennett, 2009, p.46). This is because, in most cases, the disputants wish to capture 
as much of our quotidian practice and speech as possible: they wish, in short, to 
avoid looking crazy. But this has disastrous consequences for the epistemology of 
metaphysics, because it means that in most, perhaps all of the disputes characterized 
by this difference-minimizing tendency, there will end up being nothing to choose 
between the two positions, no evidence that would settle the debate one way or the 
other (Bennett, 2009, pp.65-71).  
 This seemed to be a particular threat to the dispute over mathematical ontology, 
because in at least two ways this dispute seemed to fit the pattern identified by 
Bennett: there is a high and a low ontology side (the platonist and the nominalist 
respectively), and, at least in the case of revolutionary and hermeneutic fictionalism, 
serious attempts are made to up-play the expressive resources the nominalist can 
draw upon so that the resulting nominalism can capture every part of mathematical 
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practice that Platonism can. It looks then, at first blush, as though the kind of 
fictionalism defended in this thesis will end up being a contribution to an 
undecidable debate; no evidence will be available to settle the issue either way.  
 Against Bennett I argued that, because the Platonist is not typically committed to 
downplaying her ontological commitments, there will be at least one piece of 
evidence – the Benacerraf-Field epistemic challenge – that will have purchase in the 
one case, and not in the other. But this raises the question of whether there might not 
be kinds of platonism that evade the epistemic challenge, platonisms for which the 
downplaying of ontological commitment is an option. In this thesis I have largely 
been concerned with those platonisms that are established on the basis of the 
indispensability argument, and for these kinds of platonisms, mathematicalia are 
usually abstract objects, causally inefficacious and located outside of space and time. 
But in a footnote to the main text I noted the existence of at least two kinds of 
platonism that do not fit this mould: Balaguer’s Full Blooded Platonism, according to 
which every consistent mathematical structure exists (Balaguer, 1998b); and Hale 
and Wright’s abstractionist platonism, according to which mathematical existence is 
merely a consequence of abstraction principles definitive of mathematical concepts 
(Hale and Wright, 2009). In the footnote I mentioned the existence of reasons to be 
suspicious of these kinds of platonism (the bad company objection, for one), but it 
would be helpful in future research to conduct a systematic study of the various kinds 
of options for epistemically downplayed platonism, and to examine any common 
weaknesses that might be exploited by the fictionalist seeking to defend the 
epistemic robustness of her position.  
 As a final line of future research, it would be helpful to conduct a thorough review 
of the modern positions in metametaphysics and to examine which, if any, pose a 
threat to fictionalism about mathematical ontology (and to develop responses to 
these). As a related line of future research, it would be helpful to examine the various 
kinds of metaontological realism (according to which ontological questions are 
substantive and decidable), and especially to seek out kinds of metaontological 
realism that fit with the broadly naturalist and Quinean framework within which the 
research presented here takes place. 
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 Before closing, I will recap the results established in this thesis. The final position 
which I hope to have established is this: we should see mathematics in its 
applications to natural science as functioning something like a sophisticated game of 
make-believe. We begin with the axioms of set-theory with ur-elements, according to 
which we are instructed to pretend that we can gather together ordinary, 
nominalistically acceptable items of the world into sets (and sets of sets of these, and 
so on). These axioms will then serve as our principles of generation, in line with 
Walton’s account of games of make-believe. On the basis of this we are then able to 
form further new sets of these ur-elements that will serve as our tentative assumed 
structure for our application of mathematics. This assumed structure will constrain 
our choice of further set formation, in particular, if the picture presented by Pincock 
is correct, we will be forced to establish the existence of a structure preserving 
mapping between this assumed structure and some appropriate mathematical 
structure, which will serve as our final representation of the empirical domain in our 
mathematical-scientific theory. Working back from this mathematical structure, via 
(possibly new) structure preserving mappings, we can interpret this mathematical 
structure in terms of our original assumed structure, the set of ur-elements with 
which we started. In this way we can see directly how the empirical stuff we are 
actually interested in constrains the kind of story we are able to tell within the 
mathematical-scientific fiction.  
 I have argued that we should see this position as a kind of revolutionary 
fictionalism, not as a hermeneutic variety, on the grounds that hermeneutic 
fictionalism leaves far too much to empirical chance. The result, I believe, is an 
ontologically minimal account of mathematical practice, that enables us to evade the 
challenge of the indispensability argument, while maintaining a nominalist position 
in metaphysics. It gives us an attractively detailed story about how mathematical 
applications proceed, that shows exactly how it is that the empirical world constrains 
our fictional story-telling about the mathematical portions of our scientific theories, 
and I believe the variety of fictionalism I have defended here has shown itself robust 
in the face of a number of recent challenges. On these grounds I conclude that this 
revolutionary pretence-theory of the mapping account of applied mathematics is our 
best account of mathematical practice, and our best available response to the 
mathematical placement problem.     
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